SARASWATI v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
RANGANATH SARASWATI, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Defendant and Respondent.
No. D056676.
Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division One.
Filed December 21, 2011.
Certified for publication January 11, 2012.
IRION, J.
Ranganath Saraswati appeals from the trial court's judgment denying his petition for writ of administrative mandamus against the County of San Diego (the County) challenging the County's determination in an administrative hearing that the child abuse allegations made against Saraswati in 2006 were inconclusive rather than unfounded. As we will explain, we conclude that the trial court applied the wrong standard in reviewing the County's determination, and accordingly we remand this matter to the trial court to apply the correct standard.
IFACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUNDIn April 2006, Saraswati was involved in a contentious custody dispute over his then five-year-old daughter (the Child) after the dissolution of his marriage to the Child's mother (Mother).
On April 18, 2006, several days before a scheduled April 24, 2006 hearing to consider sanctions against Mother for violations of a custody order, Mother took the Child to the emergency room, stating that the day before, while being bathed, the Child told her that Saraswati had inserted his fingers and his toothbrush into her vagina and anus. According to the report of the County's investigating social worker, while the Child was playing with a teddy bear in the emergency room lobby, she said to the teddy bear, "'I'll give you a bath but not like daddy does'" and then shoved her fingers toward the bear's private parts. The Child was evaluated the next day in a sexual abuse screening. The Child told the interviewer that Saraswati inserts his electric toothbrush in her vagina and anus and then brushes his teeth with the toothbrush. In a meeting with the investigating social worker on May 4, 2006, the Child repeated the claim about the toothbrush and also added that Saraswati put dental floss into her vagina and then used it on his teeth.
In addition to the sexual abuse allegations, the Child stated that Saraswati touches, hits or pinches her when she is "in trouble" and has left bruises. Mother stated that the Child told her that Saraswati had plucked the Child's eyelashes when she did not tell him information about Mother and that Saraswati had twisted the Child's arm.
1. The CACI consists of an index of all reports of child abuse and severe neglect submitted to the DOJ pursuant to the CANRA under Penal Code section 11169. (Id., § 11170, subd. (a).) In maintaining the CACI, the DOJ acts as a repository of the reports (ibid.), and the CANRA contains specific provisions setting forth the limited categories of persons who have access to the CACI. (Id., § 11170, subds. (b)-(e).)
2. Saraswati states that he originally sent a letter to the County in 2006, seeking review of the social worker's "inconclusive" determination, and the County's DOJ Review Committee notified Saraswati in December 2006 that the determination would remain "inconclusive." Apparently — as the parties' briefing in the trial court explains — there was more than one referral number relating to the abuse allegations, and Saraswati's original letter cited a referral number that had not been reported to the CACI. Unaware of that fact, Saraswati filed a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court in January 2007, seeking judicial review of the County's December 2006 decision. When Saraswati learned that he had cited the wrong referral number, he sent a letter to the County citing the correct referral number and seeking review of the social worker's "inconclusive" determination. By the time that the County considered Saraswati's request for review, it had adopted a different review procedure, involving a grievance hearing presided over by a grievance officer.
3. Saraswati has not identified any statutory provision that would give college administrators access to the CACI when considering a candidate for employment, and our review of the CANRA reveals no such provision. (See Pen. Code, § 11170, subds. (b)-(e).)
4. The 2009 petition for writ of mandate was consolidated with the petition for writ of mandate that Saraswati filed in 2007. However, as a practical matter, the trial court adjudicated the second petition, as that petition sought relief regarding the report that was actually sent to the DOJ.
5. We have obtained and considered supplemental briefing from the parties on the County's mootness contention.
6. We express no view on whether this action would be saved from mootness solely on the ground that the County's files contain an "inconclusive" determination on the abuse allegations. We note also that if, after remand to the trial court, the County obtains information that that DOJ has in fact removed Saraswati's name from the CACI under the amended version of the CANRA, the County may renew its mootness argument with the trial court.
7. When a trial court has applied an independent judgment standard of review of an administrative decision, "an appellate court need only review the record to determine whether the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence." (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143, fn. 10 (Bixby).)
8. Saraswati states that alternatively, instead of remanding for application of the correct standard, we should reverse and order that judgment be entered in his favor. According to Saraswati, that disposition would be proper because the trial court commented during the hearing that "if this were an independent judgment test, I would be siding with Mr. Saraswati, I would be finding in his favor." Having reviewed the record, we do not consider the trial court's comments during the hearing to constitute a thorough and considered application of the independent judgment standard, and the trial court did not set forth the alternative finding in its written order. We accordingly decline to adopt the alternative disposition suggested by Saraswati.
9. Although we need not reach this issue, as we are reversing and remanding on other grounds, we exercise our discretion to address it in the interest of efficiency and for the guidance of the parties because Saraswati will likely assert the issue again on remand.