LOUGHRAN v. THE PHILLIES
888 A.2d 872 (2005)
Jeremy LOUGHRAN, Appellant
THE PHILLIES and Marlon Byrd, Appellees.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued September 14, 2005.
Filed November 23, 2005.
Steven E. Wolfe, Holland, for appellant.
Robert Foster, King of Prussia, for appellees.
Before: MUSMANNO, BENDER, and OLSZEWSKI, JJ.
¶ 1 This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment in favor of appellees.1 Appellant claims the trial court misapplied the "no duty" rule in finding that a spectator at a major league baseball game is not owed a duty by either the team or individual player to protect against a ball thrown into the stands; and that the trial court incorrectly found that his injury was an inherent risk of attending the game. We disagree with appellant, and affirm the order of the trial court. ¶ 2 On July 5, 2003, Jeremy Loughran (appellant) attended a baseball game between the Philadelphia Phillies (Phillies) and the Florida Marlins. Appellant's
Brief, at 5. At the end of the top half of the seventh inning, appellant was injured when Philadelphia centerfielder, Marlon Byrd, after catching a ball for the last out, threw the ball into the stands. Id. Appellant was treated twice at the Veterans Stadium Infirmary and later at St. Mary's Medical Center. Id. at 6. Appellant's immediate injuries included bleeding around his left eye, a concussion, facial contusions, and abrasions.2Id. Appellant has since been treated for severe headaches, vomiting, confusion, incoherence, hallucinations, loss of balance, head and neck pain, photophobia, eye spasms, sleep disruption, and depression. Id.
¶ 3 Appellant filed the current negligence action against Byrd and the Phillies on March 8, 2004 and on March 8, 2005, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees, holding that "the applicable law clearly states that recovery is not granted to those who voluntarily expose themselves to risks by participating in or viewing an activity." Trial Court Opinion, 5/3/2005, at 1. This timely appeal follows.
¶ 4 Our standard of review of an order granting or denying a motion for summary judgment is well established:
We view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment be entered. Our scope of review of a trial court's order granting or denying summary judgment is plenary, and our standard of review is clear: the trial court's order will be reversed only where it is established that the court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.
Sackett v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,880 A.2d 1243 (Pa.Super.2005).