STATE v. AYALA
991 P.2d 1100 (1999)
164 Or. App. 399
In the Matter of Veronica Ayala, Alleged to be a Mentally Ill Person.
STATE of Oregon, Respondent,
Veronica AYALA, Appellant.
(C980025MC; CA A101430)
Court of Appeals of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted September 14, 1999.
Decided December 15, 1999.
Susan D. Isaacs, Beaverton, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.
Thomas C. Patton, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Before De MUNIZ, Presiding Judge, and HASELTON and WOLLHEIM, Judges.
Appellant seeks reversal of a judgment adjudicating her to be a mentally ill person and committing her to the Mental Health Division. ORS 426.130(1)(b)(C). The trial court committed appellant because her disorder made her unable to provide for her basic needs, and she was not receiving the care necessary for health and safety. ORS 426.005(1)(d)(B).1 On de novo review, State v. O'Neill, 274 Or. 59, 61, 545 P.2d 97 (1976), we reverse.
Appellant is a 25-year-old female who suffers from schizoaffective disorder. She was previously committed and is required to take medications for her disorder. At the time of the commitment hearing in February 1998, appellant was approximately seven and one-half months pregnant.
At a prenatal appointment in early February, appellant was diagnosed with gestational diabetes. Her physician scheduled a follow-up appointment. Appellant needed to be tested to determine the severity of her diabetes
and whether she would require medication to control it. Appellant appeared for the appointment, but the tests could not be performed because she had not fasted for the previous twelve hours. Another appointment was scheduled for a few days later. Appellant did not keep this appointment because she expected transportation to be provided by her services coordination assistant. The assistant could not provide transportation because appellant had failed to notify the assistant of appellant's new address. After failing to keep the appointment, appellant was held pending the outcome of her civil commitment hearing. Although appellant was held at the same hospital where she received prenatal care, appellant was never tested to determine the severity of her gestational diabetes.
At the civil commitment hearing, the trial court heard testimony addressing appellant's mental disorder, changed conduct in response to her pregnancy, missed medical appointments, and housing problems. In their reports, two certified mental health examiners found that appellant suffered from a mental disorder, was a danger to others, and was unable to provide for her basic needs and was not receiving care necessary for health and safety. The examiners were split as to whether appellant was a danger to herself. Noticeably absent from the hearing was any evidence regarding the severity of appellant's gestational diabetes. The state also failed to present any expert testimony concerning the dangers generally posed by gestational diabetes or the specific risks for appellant and the fetus.
At the close of testimony, the trial court concluded that appellant was not a threat to herself or to others, but that her mental disorder was causing her to miss critical medical appointments and that this endangered the fetus. The trial court ordered appellant's commitment because she was "unable to provide for basic personal needs and not receiving such care as necessary for health and safety." Appellant assigns error to the trial court's conclusion and also assigns error to the trial court's holding that appellant endangered the fetus. Because we conclude that these arguments are dispositive, we do not address appellant's other arguments.
On de novo review, we examine the record to determine if the state has established by clear and convincing evidence that appellant was unable to provide for her basic needs. State v. Johnson,131 Or.App. 561, 564, 886 P.2d 42 (1994). Basic needs are those things necessary to sustain life. State v. Brungard,101 Or.App. 67, 71, 789 P.2d 683, modified102 Or.App. 509, 794 P.2d 1257 (1990), rev. den. 311 Or. 427, 812 P.2d 827 (1991). Medical care for a life threatening condition is considered a basic need. Id. The threat to life must be likely to occur "in the near future." State v. Jensen,141 Or.App. 391, 394-95, 917 P.2d 541 (1996). Furthermore, the threat must be actual; a speculative threat is not sufficient for commitment. State v. Bunting,112 Or.App. 143, 145, 826 P.2d 1060 (1992).