IN RE MARRIAGE OF HAMM-SMITH
633 N.E.2d 225 (1994)
261 Ill. App.3d 209
198 Ill.Dec. 763
In re the MARRIAGE OF Susan HAM-SMITH, Petitioner-Appellee, and Lewis Daniel Smith, Respondent-Appellant.
Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.
May 5, 1994.
E. Frederick C. Gain, Springfield, for appellant.
William T. Panichi, Springfield, for appellee.
Justice KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:
Lewis Daniel Smith appeals from the trial court's denial of his petition, brought pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 110, par. 2-1401), to vacate a judgment of dissolution of marriage. He alleges the trial court failed to consider whether the settlement I. FACTS
agreement was unconscionable within the meaning of section 502(b) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 40, par. 502(b)). He additionally alleges the trial court erred in declining to set aside the judgment on the basis of duress, fraud, unconscionability or other grounds. We disagree and affirm.
Lewis married Susan Hamm-Smith on September 1, 1984. Lewis and Susan have no children. During their nine-year marriage, both parties were employed as salespersons and earned substantial incomes. Susan also inherited $60,000 during the marriage. By virtue of their incomes and Susan's inheritance, the parties acquired various assets, the most significant of which are the marital residence, valued at $350,000 to $384,000 and subject to a mortgage of $275,-000, and Susan's pension plan valued at $70,-000.
Susan, through her attorney, Steven Nardulli, filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on January 5, 1993. Lewis filed his appearance and consent on the same day. A judgment for dissolution of marriage was entered by the court on January 22, 1993. The judgment incorporated a settlement agreement which had been approved by both Susan and Lewis.
On May 26, 1993, Susan filed a petition for a rule to show cause, alleging Lewis had failed to comply with the terms of the judgment. On June 14, 1993, Lewis filed a petition to vacate the judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code. In his petition, Lewis alleged the judgment ought to be set aside because the terms of the agreement are unconscionable within the meaning of section 502(b) of the Marriage Act.
In support of his petition, Lewis alleged the "judgment was obtained against him by default as Steve Narduli [sic ] was the attorney selected by the wife for both parties," and "[t]he wife hired an attorney only to represent herself and defendant was without benefit of attorney." Lewis contended Susan took advantage of his lack of education and sophistication, causing him to agree to a judgment allocating 100% of the marital property to Susan, and leaving him with only debt. According to Lewis, the settlement agreement "is so excessively one-sided as to amount to a fraud upon the court." Lewis contended Susan represented she would sell the marital home immediately, but actually has no intention of selling it. Finally, Lewis contended, "he has proceeded diligently since learning of the suit and default judgment." The hearing on the petition occurred on August 27, 1993.