BOARDMAN v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
United States District Court, E.D. California.
December 6, 2012.
"The Free Exercise Clause . . . does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal procedures." Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 693 (1986). Thus, "[t]he fact that some persons may object, on religious grounds, to some of the things that the government does is not a basis upon which they can claim a constitutional right not to pay a part of a tax." Autenrieth v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1969). "The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief." Lee, 455 U.S. at 260. Moreover, "[t]he Supreme Court has made it clear that a federal taxpayer has no standing to maintain a purely religious objection to federal expenditures." Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1532 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985). Because Plaintiff claims she is willing to voluntarily remit her outstanding tax liability only upon assurance that the funds will be used for purposes she deems acceptable, she essentially objects to Defendant's method of allocating tax dollars. Her position also prescribes both the grounds on which she will pay the tax and how the government can use the revenue. Furthermore, Plaintiff repeatedly cites her religious convictions as the basis for withholding tax payments. As a result, the Court agrees with Defendant that "the overwhelming weight of authority" clearly demonstrates that Plaintiff fails to state a claim.6 In an analogous case decided after Congress enacted the RFRA, a plaintiff sought a court order preventing the IRS from allocating his tax dollars to war-related programs. Kennedy v. Rubin, 1995 WL 552148, *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 07, 1995). Additionally, the plaintiff wanted his payments distributed to programs that he did not consider "religiously objectionable." Id. In granting the defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court found that "a plaintiff cannot state a claim based upon a religious objection to paying taxes." Id. at *3. The court also noted that the plaintiff simply "attempts to elevate form over substance" when he endeavors to distinguish his lawsuit from past cases on the ground that "he is not opposed to paying his federal taxes, but rather, seeks Only to divert his taxes away from military programs." Id. The court held that Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit decisions attach "equally whether the taxpayer refuses to pay taxes or simply attempts to control the use of any taxes tendered to the Government."
Likewise, Plaintiff in the present case seeks to prevent Defendant from using her tax dollars for war-related programs. Plaintiff claims that she will pay the full extent of her tax liability only if the money is allocated to peaceful purposes. Plaintiff predicates her lawsuit on Defendant allegedly suppressing religion. However, Kennedy v. Rubin plainly demonstrates that Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit cases estop Plaintiff from bringing her lawsuit, a religious objection to the country's tax system, even if she does not dispute her overall tax liability. Moreover, Plaintiff claims that Defendant's tax procedures violate her Constitutional and statutory religious rights, but "nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Congress from levying a tax upon all persons, regardless of religion, for support of the general government." Autenrieth, 418 F.2d at 588. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim, and Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is GRANTED.
CONCLUSIONAs a matter of law, and for the reasons set forth above, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Complaint is accordingly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and, alternatively, for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
Because the Court does not believe that the defects of Plaintiff's Complaint can be remedied though amendment, leave to amend is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the file.
1. All further references to "Rule" or "Rules" are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.
2. Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).
3. The factual assertions in this section are based on the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint unless otherwise specified. (ECF No. 1.)
4. Plaintiff put forth several additional arguments as to why the Act should not bar the Court's jurisdiction over this case. After examining Plaintiff's theories, the Court finds them unpersuasive.
5. There appears to be some confusion over Defendant's use of the word "frivolous." Plaintiff mistakenly believes that Defendant utilizes "frivolous" as a means of discouraging religion. The Court finds that Defendant uses "frivolous" in its legal context, referring to an argument lacking a legal or factual basis. (ECF No. 12 at 7.)
6. Although the Court has duly considered Plaintiff's various arguments opposing the Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), these arguments are insufficient to warrant further discussion.