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10th STREET PARTNERS, LLC v. COUNTY COMMISSION FOR SARASOTA COUNTY
United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.
September 20, 2012.
10th Street brings its failure to accommodate claim pursuant to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f), and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Under the ADA, "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, . . . be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Similarly, discrimination under the Fair Housing Act includes "a failure to make a reasonable accommodation in rules, policies and services when such accommodations may be necessary to afford a handicapped individual with equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(b). Finally, the Rehabilitation Act provides that "[n]o qualified individual with a disability in the United States, . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794. Although there are certain differences between the statutes, due to their similarities, courts generally apply the same analysis to reasonable accommodation claims brought under each of the statutes. United States v. Hialeah Hous. Auth., 418 F. App'x 872, 876 (11th Cir. 2011)("We have previously recognized that we look to case law under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act for guidance in evaluating reasonable accommodation claims under the FHA."); Caron Found. of Fla., Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, No. 12-80215-CIV, 2012 WL 2249263, *5 (S.D. Fla. May 4, 2012)("Due to the similarity of the ADA and the FHA's protections of individuals with disabilities in housing matters, courts often analyze the two statutes as one."). Additionally, the ADA, FHA, and the RHA all apply to municipal zoning decisions. Caron Found., 2012 WL 2249263 at *5; Oconomowoc Residential Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 782-83 (7th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, the Court's analysis applies to 10th Street's claims brought under each of the statutes. The Eleventh Circuit has discussed failure to accommodate claims on a number of occasions. In Hialeah Housing Authority, the court enumerated the elements for a failure to accommodate claim as follows: "A plaintiff must establish that (1) he is disabled or handicapped within the meaning of the FHA, (2) he requested a reasonable accommodation, (3) such accommodation was necessary to afford him an opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling, and (4) the defendants refused to make the requested accommodation." 418 F. App'x at 875. The court noted that "whether a requested accommodation is required by law is highly fact specific, requiring case-by-case determination." Id. The Court also explained that "for a demand to be specific enough to trigger the duty to provide a reasonable accommodation, the defendant must have enough information to know of both the disability and a desire for an accommodation, or circumstances must at least be sufficient to cause a reasonable [defendant] to make appropriate inquiries about the possible need for an accommodation." Id. at 876. Furthermore, in Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1218-1219 (11th Cir. 2008), the court noted, "[T]he duty to make a reasonable accommodation does not simply spring from the fact that the handicapped person wants such an accommodation made. Defendants must instead have been given an opportunity to make a final decision with respect to Plaintiffs' request, which necessarily includes the ability to conduct a meaningful review of the requested accommodation to determine if such an accommodation is required by law." The parties disagree on the appropriate scope of review the Court should employ in evaluating Defendant's denial of the zoning variance request and 10th Street's challenge to it. Finding no binding authority on point, Defendant urges the Court to follow several other Circuits by limiting its review "to the materials that were presented to [the] local land use board, except in circumstances where the board prevents applicants from presenting sufficient information." (Doc. # 11 at 9) (citing Lapid-Laurel, LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442 (3d Cir. 2001)). Defendant argues that based on the evidence — or the lack of evidence — provided by 10th Street to the Board in support of its reasonable accommodation request, 10th Street failed to demonstrate that its requested accommodation was necessary to afford disabled persons an opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling on the property, as required to establish a reasonable accommodation violation. Specifically, Defendant argues that 10th Street failed to present sufficient evidence establishing "the requested accommodation — an increase in density that would allow 96 beds instead of 68 beds — as being necessary to allow persons with a disability to live at this location." (Doc. # 11 at 17). Accordingly, Defendant contends that its denial of 10th Street's zoning variance request did not violate the ADA, FHA, or RHA as a matter of law. 10th Street, on the other hand, asserts that the Court's review is not limited to the administrative record from the zoning proceedings, but rather, the Court may consider any evidence supplied by the parties to evaluate the efficacy of 10th Street's claims, whether or not the evidence was presented to the Board when it made its decision. 10th Street contends that such further evidence will show that its requested accommodation was reasonable and necessary and, accordingly, that Defendant's denial of the requested accommodation violated the ADA, FHA, and RHA. Additionally, 10th Street argues that even if the Court were to utilize Defendant's proffered standard, the exception to the rule applies in this case because Defendant prevented 10th Street from presenting sufficient information to support its request. The Court need not determine at this juncture the appropriate scope of its evidentiary review. The Court agrees with 10th Street that even if it adopted Defendant's proffered scope of review, disputed issues of material fact remain regarding whether the exception to the rule should apply that would allow the Court to go beyond the evidence provided to the Board in its analysis of 10th Street's claims. Specifically, 10th Street contends that the Board prevented it from presenting sufficient information in support of its zoning variance request, due to the strict 20-minute time limitation the Board placed on 10th Street at the February 22, 2011, hearing. 10th Street contends that the 20-minute time limitation with a 5 minute rebuttal period did not allow it to sufficiently address the reasonable accommodation request while also necessarily addressing the other related concerns raised by the Board and the public at the hearing.
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