BOARDMAN v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
United States District Court, E.D. California.
December 6, 2012.
This first prong is satisfied "[o]nly if it is then manifest, under the most liberal view of the law and the facts, that the government cannot prove its claim." Thrower v. Miller, 440 F.2d 1186, 1187 (9th Cir. 1971). Although Plaintiff fails to provide an argument regarding the first prong, Defendant contends that "Plaintiff cannot establish that under no circumstance could [Defendant] ultimately prevail on the merits of the action." (ECF No. 7 at 11.) Specifically, Defendant responds to Plaintiff's Free Exercise claim by stating that "[n]eutral laws of general application (such as the federal tax laws in question) do not run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, even when they somehow burden religious practices." (Id. at 18.) Thus, Defendant argues that it could indeed prevail regarding whether existing tax administration framework violated Plaintiff's First Amendment rights. (Id. at 11.) "[T]he necessities of revenue collection under enactments of general applicability raise governmental interests sufficiently compelling to outweigh the free exercise rights of those who find the tax objectionable on bona fide religious grounds."
Franklet v. United States, 578 F.Supp. 1552, 1556 (N.D. Cal. 1984). "[E]ven a substantial burden [on free exercise] would be justified by the `broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system,' free of `myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs.'" Hernandez v. Comm'r Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989) (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, previous Supreme Court decisions "make it unmistakably clear that the constitutional nature of a taxpayer's claim, as distinct from its probability of success, is of no consequence under the [Act]." Alexander, 416 U.S. at 759. While Plaintiff's pleadings are somewhat unclear, Plaintiff apparently claims that the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 ("TRHCA"), which curtails the administrative appeals process for certain taxpayer claims, violates her free exercise rights. However, Plaintiff is unable to adequately demonstrate how the TRHCA is discriminatory or thwarting her religious practices. Moreover, the Court agrees with Defendant that the TRHCA advances the compelling government interest in efficiently collecting taxes by permitting the expedient disposal of meritless arguments. The TRHCA is also the least restrictive means of burdening religious freedom because the TRHCA only disregards arguments that have no legal basis. As a result, Plaintiff fails to establish that Defendant could not possibly prevail in regard to Plaintiff's Free Exercise claim.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant has violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), legislation reaffirming the right to practice religion without government interference.
In countering Plaintiff's argument, Defendant states that neutral laws substantially burdening religion in order to further a compelling government interest do not contravene the RFRA. (ECF No. 7 at 20-21.) Therefore, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff "cannot show that [Defendant] would not prevail under RFRA." (Id. at 20.) Even after Congress enacted the RFRA, the government's compelling interest in collecting taxes outweighs the burden imposed on an individual's religious freedom. Droz v. Comm'r Internal Revenue, 48 F.3d 1120, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 1995). Additionally, "[i]n the context of [the TRHCA], the Government's compelling interest in maintaining a sound and administratively workable tax system justifies the alleged restriction on free expression." Bradley v. United States, 817 F.2d 1400, 1403 (9thCir. 1987). Once again, although Plaintiff's pleadings are convoluted, Plaintiff appears to allege that the TRHCA violates the RFRA. As discussed above, the TRHCA uses the least restrictive means possible to further a compelling Government interest. It is also a neutral law, equally impacting all religions and beliefs. As a result, Plaintiff fails to establish that Defendant cannot possibly prevail in regard to Plaintiff's RFRA claim. Because Defendant could succeed on the merits, Plaintiff is unable to fulfill the first prong of the Act's judicial exception.
1. All further references to "Rule" or "Rules" are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.
2. Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).
3. The factual assertions in this section are based on the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint unless otherwise specified. (ECF No. 1.)
4. Plaintiff put forth several additional arguments as to why the Act should not bar the Court's jurisdiction over this case. After examining Plaintiff's theories, the Court finds them unpersuasive.
5. There appears to be some confusion over Defendant's use of the word "frivolous." Plaintiff mistakenly believes that Defendant utilizes "frivolous" as a means of discouraging religion. The Court finds that Defendant uses "frivolous" in its legal context, referring to an argument lacking a legal or factual basis. (ECF No. 12 at 7.)
6. Although the Court has duly considered Plaintiff's various arguments opposing the Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), these arguments are insufficient to warrant further discussion.