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POCONO MOUNTAIN CHARTER SCHOOL v. POCONO MOUNTAIN SCHOOL DISTRICT
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued: July 14, 2011.
The District Court should explore these issues on remand as it decides the question of whether, under Pennsylvania and federal law, a charter school can bring a cause of action under § 1983 against the school district. III.The District Court properly dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for monetary relief under the Pennsylvania Constitution. No Pennsylvania statute establishes, and no Pennsylvania court has recognized, a private cause of action for damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Jones v. City of Phila., 890 A.2d 1188, 1208 (Pa. Commw. 2006) ("[N]either Pennsylvania statutory authority nor appellate case law has authorized the award of money damages for violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution."). However, the District Court fails entirely to address plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief for violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution.8 Although monetary relief is barred for claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution, equitable remedies are available. See Moeller v. Bradford County, 444 F.Supp.2d 316, 320-21 (M.D. Pa. 2006) ("[I]t is well settled that individual plaintiffs may bring suit for injunctive relief under the Pennsylvania Constitution); Jones, 890 A.2d at 1216 ("[O]ther remedies, such as declaratory or injunctive relief . . . are . . . remedies under the Pennsylvania Constitution."). On remand, the District Court must consider whether plaintiffs have stated a valid claim for injunctive relief under Article I, § 3 or Article I, § 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.9 IV.The District Court dismissed plaintiffs' claim that the District violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in denying the benefits of Pennsylvania's charter school program to the School and its students and in subjecting the Charter School and its students to discrimination on the basis of race and national origin. We affirm its dismissal of the Charter School's Title VI claim. However, as to the individual plaintiffs' Title VI claim, the District Court should have granted them leave to amend their complaint, and we direct it to do so on remand. The Supreme Court has recognized a private right of action to enforce § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits any recipient of federal financial assistance from discriminating against a "person" on the basis of race, color, or national origin in any federally funded program.10 To state such a claim, a plaintiff must plead facts that establish discriminatory intent. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293-94 (1985).
1. For ease of reference, we will refer to the Pocono Mountain Charter School as "the Charter School" and to the students and parents as "the individual plaintiffs."
2. The District Court exercised jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and U.S.C. § 1415(I). We have jurisdiction over this appeal of the District Court's final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3. The Charter School alleged these constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
4. We have done our best to discern from plaintiffs' complaint and defendant's motion to dismiss precisely which plaintiffs brought which claims. In dismissing plaintiffs' claims, the District Court, for the most part, failed to expressly clarify which plaintiffs' claims it was addressing. Only in its treatment of the Title VI claims did it distinguish between the Charter School and the individual plaintiffs.
5. In dismissing the Charter School's § 1983 claims, the District Court did not address the individual plaintiffs' Due Process claim, which they set forth in their complaint, alleging that the District violated not only the Charter School's Due Process rights but also the students' Due Process rights by depriving them of liberty and property without due process of the law. To the extent that the District Court's judgment on the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims pertained to the individual plaintiffs' Due Process claim (the only § 1983 claim for which the students were also listed as plaintiffs), we affirm the Court's dismissal, as the students do not have a cognizable liberty or property interest in going to a school of their choice.
6. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Reg'l Transp. Auth., 653 F.2d 1149, 1153 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[T]he principle that a municipality may not challenge acts of the state under the Fourteenth Amendment applies `whether the defendant is the state itself or another of the state's political subdivisions.'" (quoting City of S. Lake Tahoe v. Cal. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 625 F.2d 231, 233 (9th Cir. 1980)).
7. Under the Pennsylvania Charter School Law, the board of school directors of the local school district grants a charter school's charter. See 24 P.S. § 17-1703-A. See also Complaint at 34 ("The Pocono Mountain Charter School was established as a public charter school in 2003. Its initial charter was approved by the Pocono Mountain School District (PMSD) in that year.").
8. See Complaint at 55-56 ("[P]laintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable Court: . . . (c) Enjoin Defendants from continuing the discriminatory practices set forth above.").
9. Judge Smith would conclude that the Charter School's claim for equitable relief under the Pennsylvania Constitution is inadequate under Laborers International Union of North America, AFLCIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) and has therefore been waived.
10. Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
42 U.S.C. § 2000(d).
11. To the extent the District Court suggests that the individual plaintiffs must show that they were the direct target of the District's discrimination, it should provide explanation and citation for that proposition. Other courts have upheld Title VI standing for plaintiffs who are not the direct targets of discrimination. See, e.g., Clemes v. Del Norte County Unified Sch. Dist., 843 F.Supp. 583 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (upholding standing for a white male teacher who alleged retaliation for his conduct in acting to protect the rights of Native American and female students).
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