|
View Case
|
|
Cited Cases
|
|
Citing Cases
|
|
Comment (0)
|
 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
E.E.O.C. v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.
693 F.3d 760 (2012)
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued October 20, 2011.
The EEOC invites this court to overturn Humiston-Keeling, arguing that Barnett undercuts the reasoning of Humiston-Keeling. In Barnett, the Supreme Court considered reassignment under the ADA in the context of a seniority system. 535 U.S. at 393-95, 122 S.Ct. 1516. Robert Barnett injured his back while working as a cargo-handler for U.S. Airways. Id. at 394, 122 S.Ct. 1516. He invoked seniority, not his disability status, and transferred to a mailroom position. Id. Later, at least two employees senior to Barnett intended to bid for the mailroom position. Id. Barnett argued he should be allowed to keep this position and claimed his reassignment was a reasonable accommodation mandated by the ADA because he was an individual with a disability capable of performing the essential functions of the mailroom job. Id. at 394-95, 122 S.Ct. 1516. The Supreme Court first noted that "[t]he simple fact that an accommodation would provide a `preference' — in the sense that it would permit the worker with a disability to violate a rule that others must obey — cannot, in and of itself, automatically show that the accommodation is not `reasonable.'" Id. at 398, 122 S.Ct. 1516 (emphasis in original). Instead, the Court outlined a two-step, case-specific approach. The "plaintiff/employee ... need only show that an `accommodation' seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases." Id. at 401, 122 S.Ct. 1516. Once the plaintiff has shown he seeks a reasonable method of accommodation, the burden shifts to the defendant/employer to "show special (typically case-specific) circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the particular circumstances." Id.
at 402, 122 S.Ct. 1516.1 While Barnett's request for assignment to the mailroom was a "reasonable accommodation" within the meaning of the statute, the violation of a seniority system "would not be reasonable in the run of cases." Id. at 403, 122 S.Ct. 1516. An "employer's showing of violation of the rules of a seniority system is by itself ordinarily sufficient" to demonstrate that the accommodation sought is unreasonable. Id. at 405, 122 S.Ct. 1516. However, the Court was careful to point out that it was not creating a per se exception for seniority systems, since "[t]he plaintiff ... nonetheless remains free to show that special circumstances warrant a finding that, despite the presence of a seniority system (which the ADA may not trump in the run of cases), the requested `accommodation' is `reasonable' on the particular facts." Id. The EEOC points out that U.S. Airways relied heavily on Humiston-Keeling and, more importantly, that the Barnett Court flatly contradicted much of the language of Humiston-Keeling. U.S. Airways argued that it was not required to grant a requested accommodation that would violate a disability-neutral rule, using the argument from Humiston-Keeling that the ADA is "not a mandatory preference act" but only a "nondiscrimination statute." 227 F.3d at 1028. The Barnett Court rejected this anti-preference interpretation of the ADA, noting that this argument "fails to recognize what the Act specifies, namely, that preferences will sometimes prove necessary to achieve the Act's basic equal opportunity goal." 535 U.S. at 397, 122 S.Ct. 1516. Merely following a "neutral rule" did not allow U.S. Airways to claim an "automatic exemption" from the accommodation requirement of the Act. Id. at 398, 122 S.Ct. 1516. Instead, U.S. Airways prevailed because its situation satisfied a much narrower, fact-specific exception based on the hardship that could be imposed on an employer utilizing a seniority system. Id. at 405, 122 S.Ct. 1516. The analysis of Barnett's impact on Humiston-Keeling is further complicated by the fact that we are not the first panel to consider this issue. This court considered Barnett's relationship to Humiston-Keeling, albeit in an abbreviated fashion and without the benefit of briefing, in Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866 (7th Cir.2002). In Mays, this court relied on Humiston-Keeling in finding that an employer did not violate the duty of reasonable accommodation in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., by giving an administrative nursing position to a better qualified applicant, rather than to a disabled employee needing reassignment.2 Mays, 301 F.3d at 871-72. The Mays Court interpreted the recently handed down Barnett decision actually to bolster Humiston-Keeling
by equating seniority systems with any other normal method of filling vacancies. Id. at 872. [Barnett] holds that an employer is not required to give a disabled employee superseniority to enable him to retain his job when a more senior employee invokes an entitlement to it conferred by the employer's seniority system. If for "more senior" we read "better qualified," for "seniority system" we read "the employer's normal method of filling vacancies," and for "superseniority" we read "a break," U.S. Airways becomes our case. Id. at 872 (internal citation omitted). The EEOC argues, and we agree, that the Mays Court incorrectly asserted that a best-qualified selection policy is essentially the same as a seniority system. In equating the two, the Mays Court so enlarged the narrow, fact-specific exception set out in Barnett as to swallow the rule. While employers may prefer to hire the best qualified applicant, the violation of a best-qualified selection policy does not involve the property-rights and administrative concerns (and resulting burdens) presented by the violation of a seniority policy. To strengthen this critique, the EEOC points out the relative rarity of seniority systems and the distinct challenges of mandating reassignment in a system where employees are already entitled to particular positions based on years of employment.
1. A helpful summary of the Barnett framework is provided in Shapiro v. Township of Lakewood, 292 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir.2002):
It therefore appears that the Court has prescribed the following two-step approach for cases in which a requested accommodation in the form of a job reassignment is claimed to violate a disability-neutral rule of the employer. The first step requires the employee to show that the accommodation is a type that is reasonable in the run of cases. The second step varies depending on the outcome of the first step. If the accommodation is shown to be a type of accommodation that is reasonable in the run of cases, the burden shifts to the employer to show that granting the accommodation would impose an undue hardship under the particular circumstances of the case. On the other hand, if the accommodation is not shown to be a type of accommodation that is reasonable in the run of cases, the employee can still prevail by showing that special circumstances warrant a finding that the accommodation is reasonable under the particular circumstances of the case.
2. Instead, the employer placed the disabled employee in a clerical position.
3. We do not believe this step will cause the district court any great difficulty. This is the very accommodation analyzed in Barnett. There, the Supreme Court "assume[d] that normally such a request would be reasonable within the meaning of the statute, were it not for one circumstance, namely, that the assignment would violate the rules of a seniority system." 535 U.S. at 403, 122 S.Ct. 1516. There is no seniority system at issue here. However, we suppose it is possible there is some comparable circumstance of which we are unaware. We note for completeness that if mandatory reassignment is not ordinarily a reasonable accommodation, the EEOC can still prevail if it shows that special factors make mandatory reassignment reasonable in this case.
4. It is also worth noting that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Huber, but the parties settled and the Supreme Court dismissed the case. 552 U.S. 1136, 128 S.Ct. 1116, 169 L.Ed.2d 801 (2008).
|
|
|
|
|