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FRANCO v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
422 F.Supp.2d 216 (2006)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
March 22, 2006.
The plaintiffs are owners and tenants of property located in the Skyland Shopping Center ("Skyland Center") in Southeast Washington, D.C. The Skyland Center is an 11.5 acre shopping center comprised of several individually owned parcels containing a range of local, regional, and national businesses. Am. Compl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff Samuel Franco is the fee simple owner of 2838 Alabama Avenue, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20020 ("Property 1"). Am. Compl. ¶ 2. Adjacent to that property, plaintiffs Samuel Franco, Nathan Franco, and Allen Franco are lessees of 2834 Alabama Avenue, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20020 ("Property 2"). Id. In addition, plaintiff D Mart operates a retail business on the combined grounds of both properties. Id. In 2004, the District of Columbia passed a series of legislation ("Skyland Legislation") which authorized NCRC to "acquire and assemble land, real property . . . through condemnation of property by eminent domain in furtherance of the public purposes." D.C.Code § 2-1219.19. Action taken pursuant to this statute is subject to an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the D.C. Council. Id. On April 5, 2005, the National Capital Revitalization Corporation Eminent Domain Clarification and Skyland Eminent Domain Approval Act of 2004 ("Skyland Act") became law. Am. Compl. at 10. Pursuant to the Skyland Act, the D.C. Council found the revitalization of the Skyland area to be "necessary and desirable for the public" and authorized NCRC to exercise eminent domain power to redevelop the Skyland Center. D.C.Code § 2-1219.19. B. Procedural HistoryOn May 25, 2005, the plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory judgment that the Skyland Legislation is unconstitutional and asking the court to permanently enjoin the defendants from commencing eminent domain proceedings. See generally Am. Compl. After the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005), the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add Fifth Amendment violations and separate violations of the D.C. Home Rules Act. Id. ¶¶ 51-93. On July 8, 2005, NCRC filed a condemnation proceeding in D.C. Superior Court to acquire Property 1, owned exclusively by plaintiff Samuel Franco. On July 11, 2005, plaintiff Samuel Franco removed that action to this court. On November 28, 2005, the court determined that the plaintiff had waived his right to remove the case and remanded it back to the D.C. Superior Court. No condemnation proceedings have yet commenced for Property 2. On August 1, 2005, the defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' amended complaint on the grounds that the court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction and that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss
Am. Compl. ("Defs.' Mot.") at 2. In addition, the defendants assert that the plaintiffs' complaint can be heard in Superior Court, and that this court, therefore, should abstain from proceeding with the instant suit. Defs.' Mot. at 2. The court now turns to the defendants' motion. III. ANALYSIS
1. Although the defendants ask the court to "abstain" pursuant to the Younger doctrine, the D.C. Circuit has distinguished the doctrines of "abstention" and "equitable restraint." The district court should refer to the Younger doctrine as a doctrine of "equitable restraint," by which a federal case is dismissed based on notions of comity and federalism. Bridges v. Kelly,84 F.3d 470, 475 n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1996). In contrast, the Pullman abstention doctrine contemplates a stay of a federal action to allow a state court to resolve pertinent issues of local law. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co.,312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). The idea is to give the state court an opportunity to resolve pertinent issues of local law that may "eliminate or materially alter the constitutional issue presented." Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory,431 U.S. 471, 481, 97 S.Ct. 1898, 52 L.Ed.2d 513 (1977). In this case, as noted infra, the Younger equitable restraint doctrine applies. 2. The court notes that, until recently, this circuit never decided expressly whether the District of Columbia qualifies as a "state" for Younger purposes. Indeed, "courts have generally indicated that the District of Columbia resembles a state within the framework of a comity analysis." Jenkins v. Wash. Convention Ctr.,59 F.Supp.2d 78, 81 (D.D.C.1999) (citing Silverman v. Barry,727 F.2d 1121, 1123 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1984)). Although District of Columbia is not a state, this circuit treats it as one for purposes of applying the Younger Doctrine. JMM Corp. v. Dist. of Columbia,378 F.3d 1117, 1122 (D.C.Cir.2004) (stating that "[t]here is no reason why these factors cannot be applied to District proceedings as readily as to state proceedings . . . [a]ccordingly, there is nothing about the equity source of the Younger doctrine that precludes its application to the District of Columbia."). 3. The condemnation action in D.C. Superior Court is only proceeding against plaintiff Samuel Franco as the fee simple owner of Property 1. As to the remaining plaintiffs, therefore, there is no ongoing state proceeding and the defendants' motion fails under the first prong of Younger. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,422 U.S. 922 at 928-29, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (stating that a mere commonality of interest is insufficient to apply to Younger to non-parties); Green v. City of Tucson,255 F.3d 1086, 1099-1104 (9th Cir.2001), cert. dismissed, 533 U.S. 966, 122 S.Ct. 4, 150 L.Ed.2d 787 (2001) (stating that federal court plaintiffs' claims are not barred merely because they share essentially identical interests and counsel, and they could intervene in the state action). 4. The court may still intervene to hear a constitutional claim when there is a showing of "bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate." Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n,457 U.S. 423, 435, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). Plaintiff Samuel Franco, however, has not alleged any improper actions upon which the court could determine that any of these elements are present.
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