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PEOPLE v. XINOS
192 Cal.App.4th 637 (2011)
Court of Appeals of California, Sixth District.
February 8, 2011.
(24) "When the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further." (People v. Flores, supra, 30 Cal.4th p. 1063.) Even when language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation and we resort to extrinsic aids, we "select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences." (People v. Jenkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 234, 246 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 893 P.2d 1224].) The purpose of the hit-and-run statute is to ensure that drivers do not leave the scene of a serious accident and comply with their statutory obligations, including rendering assistance to injured persons. The construction of the word "flee" advocated by defendant does not advance the statutory aims. (25) Defendant maintains that the word "flight" is a legal term of art, citing several Supreme Court cases discussing flight as evidence of consciousness of guilt. In People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544], the Supreme Court stated: "In general, a flight instruction `is proper where the evidence shows that the defendant departed the crime scene under circumstances suggesting that his movement was motivated by a consciousness of guilt.' (People v. Ray [(1996)] 13 Cal.4th [313,] 345 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846]; § 1127c.) `"[F]light requires neither the physical act of running nor the reaching of a far-away haven. [Citation.] Flight manifestly does require, however, a purpose to avoid being observed or arrested."' (People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 60 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388], quoting People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 869 [251 Cal.Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423].)" (26) Defendant has not cited any legislative history to show the Legislature had this special meaning of "flight" in mind when it added the enhancement provision to the hit-and-run statute for fleeing the scene after committing vehicular manslaughter. The hit-and-run statute is not at all related to proving another substantive offense at trial. If a person departs a crime scene without a purpose of avoiding observation or arrest it would be unreasonable to infer consciousness of guilt from that departure. This consideration is irrelevant in the context of the hit-and-run statute. The offense of hit-and-run (§ 20001, subd. (b)) is recognized to be a general intent crime. (People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1019 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 676].) Nothing in the legislative history of subdivision (c) of section 20001, which was added by statute in 1996 (Stats. 1996, ch. 645, § 4,
pp. 3630-3631), suggests that the flight enhancement under that subdivision requires any greater intent than that required for the criminal offense of hit-and-run, which is defined as a violation of section 20001, subdivision (a), that is, a failure to "immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident" as required. The legislative history of the Assembly bill that added subdivision (c) to section 20001 indicates that the purpose of the provision was to deter individuals from leaving the scene and penalize persons who fail to stay at the scene. In the arguments in support of the bill, it was stated that, according to the author's office, the judge in the fatal drunk driving case involving the victim after which the bill was named ("Courtney's Law") believed that "`the person who flees the scene should receive an additional five years because the effect of fleeing is to destroy evidence (by reducing the driver's BAC at time of testing) . . . .'" (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1985 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 7, 1996, p. 4; Sen. Com. on Crim. Proc., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1985 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 1, 1996, p. 4.) A Senate committee report stated: "The sponsor and the author believe this additional penalty is necessary because when a person who is DUI flees the scene of an accident where a death has occurred and they are not caught immediately, it is hard if not impossible to later prove that they were DUI. This will create an added deterrence to keep people from fleeing accidents where a death may have occurred." (Sen. Com. on Crim. Proc., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1985 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 1, 1996, p. 6.) According to the legislative committee reports explaining Senate Bill No. 1282, which amended section 20001 in 1999, the bill "[c]onforms the existing hit-and-run with death or serious injury statute to the original legislative intent to provide increased punishment when a driver leaves the scene." (Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1282 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 16, 1999, p. 1; see Assem. Com. on Transportation, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1282 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended April 29, 1999, p. 1; Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1282 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended April 29, 1999, p. 1.) Section 20001 was not amended again until after the 2006 collision at issue in this case. (See Stats. 2007, ch. 747, § 30.) The People were not required to establish that defendant acted with the purpose of avoiding observation or arrest to prove the enhancement allegation under section 20001, subdivision (c). (See CALCRIM No. 2160 (2009-2010) p. 195.)
1. All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise stated.
2. The Vetronix Corporation made this software technology publicly available in 2000. Bosch bought Vetronix in 2003.
3. Haight testified that, at the time of trial, there were 20 different GM (General Motors) airbag control modules.
4. Defendant represents in his briefs that on May 3, 2007, he pleaded no contest to felony hit-and-run (§ 20001, subds. (a), (b)(2)), misdemeanor driving under the influence (§ 23152, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor driving with an unlawful blood-alcohol level (§ 23152, subd. (b)), as alleged in a complaint filed in November 2006, and he was scheduled to be sentenced on July 3, 2007. According to defendant's briefs, the court vacated the plea on motion of the prosecutor following the download of the SDM's data. The record on appeal does not include records of all those proceedings. The appellate record does contain a complaint filed on November 22, 2006, which does not charge vehicular manslaughter, and a first amended complaint filed on July 6, 2007, which does charge vehicular manslaughter.
5. In People v. Superior Court (Nasmeh), supra, 151 Cal.App.4th 85, 99-100, this court determined, among other Fourth Amendment issues, that forensic examination of a vehicle completed 12 days after issuance of a search warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
6. Section 9951 provides: "(a) A manufacturer of a new motor vehicle sold or leased in this state that is equipped with one or more recording devices commonly referred to as `event data recorders (EDR)' or `sensing and diagnostic modules (SDM),' shall disclose that fact in the owner's manual for the vehicle. [¶] (b) As used in this section, `recording device' means a device that is installed by the manufacturer of the vehicle and does one or more of the following, for the purpose of retrieving data after an accident: [¶] (1) Records how fast and in which direction the motor vehicle is traveling. [¶] (2) Records a history of where the motor vehicle travels. [¶] (3) Records steering performance. [¶] (4) Records brake performance, including, but not limited to, whether brakes were applied before an accident. [¶] (5) Records the driver's seatbelt status. [¶] (6) Has the ability to transmit information concerning an accident in which the motor vehicle has been involved to a central communications system when an accident occurs." Section 9951 strictly limits the right to download or retrieve an SDM's data to the vehicle's registered owner with additional narrowly defined exceptions, including consent and court order. (§ 9951, subd. (c); see § 9951, subds. (d), (e).)
7. Horton v. California (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 130 [110 L.Ed.2d 112, 110 S.Ct. 2301] held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit warrantless seizure of evidence of crime observed in plain view from a lawful vantage point, even if discovery of evidence was not inadvertent.
8. The evidence at trial additionally showed that, at the time of the download, the investigating officers' investigation and accident reconstruction had led them to believe that defendant had not been speeding and he could not have prevented the collision.
9. A defendant may suppress only evidence obtained by search or seizure invalid under the federal Constitution (see In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886-887 [210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744]; Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f)(2) ["Right to Truth-in-Evidence"]). The last California Supreme Court case to mention the "instrumentality exception" is over two decades old.
10. "Personal infliction" within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a), which provides an enhancement where the defendant "personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony or attempted felony," requires direct causation. (See People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 68 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 373, 190 P.3d 706].) The word "willfully" in Penal Code section 1203, subdivision (e)(3), which renders a defendant presumptively ineligible for probation where the defendant "willfully inflicted great bodily injury or torture in the perpetration of the crime of which he or she has been convicted," means that the defendant intended to cause that result. (See People v. Lewis (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 837, 853-854 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 891].)
11. Under Penal Code former section 192, subdivision (c)(3), vehicular manslaughter included "[d]riving a vehicle in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code and in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, but without gross negligence; or driving a vehicle in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code and in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, but without gross negligence." (Stats. 1998, ch. 278, § 1, pp. 1228-1229.) Legislation in 2006 deleted former paragraph (3) of subdivision (c) of Penal Code section 192 (Stats. 2006, ch. 91, § 2) and rewrote subdivision (b) of Penal Code section 191.5 to describe the crime of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Stats. 2006, ch. 91, § 1). Legislation in 2007 amended section 20001 to omit any reference in subdivision (c) to Penal Code section 192, subdivision (c)(3). (Stats. 2007, ch. 747, § 30.) Section 20001, subdivision (c), applies to persons who flee the scene of the crime after committing a violation of Penal Code section 191.5 (gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated and vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated).
12. The legislation enacted in 2007 made nonsubstantive changes to section 20001, subdivision (a). (Stats. 2007, ch. 747, § 30.)
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