US AIRWAYS, INC. v. BARNETT
535 U.S. 391 (2002)
United States Supreme Court.
Argued December 4, 2001.
Unsurprisingly, most Courts of Appeals addressing the issue have held or assumed that the ADA does not mandate exceptions to a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy" such as a seniority system or a consistent policy of assigning the most qualified person to a vacant position. See, e. g., EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp.,237 F.3d 349, 353-355 (CA4 2001) (seniority system); EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc.,227 F.3d 1024, 1028-1029 (CA7 2000) (policy of assigning the most qualified applicant); Burns v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc.,222 F.3d 247, 257-258 (CA6 2000) (policy of reassigning employees only if they request a transfer to an advertised vacant position); Cravens v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City,
214 F.3d 1011, 1020 (CA8 2000) (assuming reassignment is not required if it would violate legitimate, nondiscriminatory policies); Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp.,120 F.3d 1222, 1225 (CA11 1997) (policy of not reassigning salaried workers to production positions covered by a collective-bargaining unit); Daugherty v. El Paso,56 F.3d 695, 700 (CA5 1995) (policy of giving full-time employees priority over part-time employees in assigning vacant positions). Even the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in at least some of its regulations, acknowledges that the ADA clears away only obstacles arising from a person's disability and nothing more. According to the agency, the term "reasonable accommodation" means
"(i) [m]odifications or adjustments to a job application process that enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such qualified applicant desires; or
"(ii) [m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment . . . that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position; or
"(iii) [m]odifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's employee with a disability to enjoy equalbenefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities." 29 CFR § 1630.2(o) (2001) (emphasis added).
See also 29 CFR pt. 1630, App. § 1630.9, at 364 ("reasonable accommodation requirement is best understood as a means by which barriers to . . . equal employment opportunity . . . are removed or alleviated").
Sadly, this analysis is lost on the Court, which mistakenly and inexplicably concludes, ante, at 398, that my position here is the same as that attributed to US Airways. In rejecting the argument that the ADA creates no "automatic exemption" for neutral workplace rules such as "breakfrom-work"
and furniture budget rules, ante, at 397-398, the Court rejects an argument I have not made.
* Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Air Transport Association of America, Inc., et al. by John J. Gallagher and Margaret H. Spurlin; and for the Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. by Ann Elizabeth Reesman.Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Jonathan P. Hiatt, Deborah Greenfield, James B. Coppess, Michael H. Gottesman, and Laurence Gold; and for the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. by Brian East and Paula A. Brantner.
Peter J. Petesch, Thomas J. Walsh, Jr., Timothy S. Bland, and David S. Harvey, Jr., filed a brief for the Society for Human Resource Management as amicus curiae.
1. Brief for Respondent 3 (quoting Lodging of Respondent 7-8 (letter, dated Mar. 8, 1994, from petitioner's counsel to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission)).
2. Brief for Petitioner 5 (citing App. 21 (declaration in support of petitioner's summary judgment motion)).
3. See post, at 409-410 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
4. See post, at 423 (Souter, J., dissenting).
5. See, e. g., ibid. ("There was no evidence in the District Court of any unmanageable ripple effects from Barnett's request").
1. It is evident from the legislative history that several provisions of Title VII were copied or incorporated by reference into the ADA. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 101-116, pp. 2, 25, 43 (1989); H. R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, pp. 54, 76-77 (1990).
2. The House Report singles out Hardison `s equation of "undue hardship" and anything more than a "de minimus [sic] cost" as being inapplicable to the ADA. By contrast, Hardison itself addressed seniority systems not only in its analysis of undue hardship, but also in its analysis of reasonable accommodation. 432 U. S., at 81, 84. Nonetheless, Congress's disavowal of Hardison in light of the "crucial role that reasonable accommodation plays in ensuring meaningful employment opportunities for people with disabilities," H. R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68, renders that case singularly inappropriate to bolster the Court's holding today.
3. The Court would allow a plaintiff to argue that a particular system was so riddled with exceptions so as not to engender expectations of consistent treatment. Ante, at 405-406.