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DORNER v. LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division Four.
Filed October 3, 2011.
DISCUSSION"Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, when the trial court reviews an administrative decision that substantially affects a fundamental vested right, the trial court `not only examines the administrative record for errors of law but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence . . . .' [Citations.]" (Sarka v. Regents of University of California (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 261, 270 (Sarka).) The right to practice one's trade or profession is a fundamental vested right. (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143; see also Barber v. Long Beach Civil Service Com. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 652, 658 [stating that the trial court is required to exercise its independent judgment where a case involves a police officer's vested property interest in his employment].) "Under the independent-judgment standard, `the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.' [Citation.] `[The] trial court must accord a "`strong presumption of . . . correctness'" to administrative findings . . . .' [Citation.] The trial court begins its review with the presumption that the administrative findings are correct, and then, after according the respect due these findings, the court exercises independent judgment in making its own findings. [Citation.] . . . [¶] On appeal, we review a trial court's exercise of independent review of an agency determination for substantial evidence. [Citation.]" (Sarka, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 270-271.) "`[O]ur review of the record is limited to a determination whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusions and, in making that determination, we must resolve all conflicts and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the party who prevailed in the trial court. [Citations.]'" (Wences v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 305, 318.) We review independently any legal interpretations made by the administrative agency and the trial court. (Breslin v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1064, 1077 (Breslin).) I. Burden of Proof Appellant's first contention is that the trial court erred in rejecting his argument that the Board improperly shifted the burden of proof from the employer to him. Whether the Board shifted the burden of proof is a legal question reviewed de novo. (Breslin, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1077.) We conclude that the Board did not improperly shift the burden of proof. The parties agree that respondents had the burden of proving the charges against appellant. (See California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1167 [explaining that a public employee's interest in his employment is protected by due process, which requires an administrative hearing at which "`the burden of proving the charges rests upon the party making the charges'"].) Thus, here, the LAPD was required to prove that appellant made a complaint he knew or should have known was false and that he made false statements during the investigation. In arguing that the Board improperly shifted the burden of proof, appellant focuses on the Board's statement that, after reviewing all the evidence, it could not "make a factual finding that the kicks occurred." Neither this statement nor anything else in the Board's decision indicates that the Board shifted the burden to appellant.
1. At the time of the hearing, he was a captain with the Lompoc Police Department.
2. Appellant left for a 13-month military deployment shortly after his graduation from the police academy.
3. Because we find the findings supported by substantial evidence, we need not consider respondents' assertion that appellant waived the substantial evidence issue.
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