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MARSO v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.
715 S.E.2d 871 (2011)
Shaun MARSO, Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., Defendant.
No. COA11-201.
Court of Appeals of North Carolina.
September 20, 2011.
Dees, Smith, Powell, Jarrett, Dees & Jones, by Tommy W. Jarrett, for plaintiff-appellant.
MARTIN, Chief Judge. Plaintiff Shaun Marso appeals from the trial court's 4 October 2010 order denying his
motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. ("defendant UPS"). We reverse summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. According to the record before us, in November 2008, plaintiff placed an advertisement in a Goldsboro newspaper to sell a ladies diamond engagement ring. Plaintiff was contacted by a man identifying himself as Karl Thompson, who agreed to purchase the ring from plaintiff for $12,000.00. On 14 November 2008, plaintiff visited a UPS Customer Center in Goldsboro, North Carolina, to make arrangements to ship the ring to Mr. Thompson, who was located in Lafayette, Louisiana. Plaintiff averred that, "[p]rior to the time [he had visited the UPS Customer Center, plaintiff] had called the same store and verified that UPS would take cash from the purchaser and not release the ring until the person delivered the cash for the ring." Plaintiff further asserted that "the person with whom [he] dealt directly at the UPS Center assured [him] that [defendant] UPS would collect cash only and that the collection was guaranteed," and that plaintiff "would be getting a check from [defendant] UPS, not from the purchaser." The parties do not dispute that plaintiff paid defendant UPS $145.23 to ship the ring by UPS Next Day Air Service, and that the package was shipped by C.O.D. ("Collect on Delivery") service, by which plaintiff requested that defendant collect $12,145.00 upon delivery of the package to cover the purchase price and shipping costs. The record includes a copy of the shipment receipt provided to plaintiff, which indicates that the package was shipped "COD=$12,145.00, Guaranteed." On 17 November 2008, defendant UPS delivered the package to the addressee and collected an instrument identified as a cashier's check drawn upon Compass Bank of Houston, Texas, in the amount of $12,145.00 made payable to plaintiff. Defendant UPS delivered the instrument by regular mail to plaintiff, who then brought it to his local bank. Because the check was drawn upon an out-of-state bank, and because of the amount of the check, the bank representative from plaintiff's bank stated by affidavit that she sought to verify the validity of the instrument before accepting the check for deposit. Plaintiff avers that he was then advised by the bank representative that the instrument was "a bogus check of no value." Plaintiff reported the incident to the Goldsboro Police Department, which closed the case after determining that "the actual crime occurred in another jurisdiction." According to a supplementary police report, the Goldsboro Police Department provided plaintiff with contact numbers for the Lafayette Police Department and advised plaintiff to file a report with that agency. The record does not indicate whether plaintiff filed a criminal complaint with the local police department in Louisiana. On 15 September 2009, plaintiff filed a complaint in Wayne County Superior Court seeking to recover $12,145.00 from defendant UPS on the grounds that defendant UPS "agreed to collect on delivery the sum of $12,145.00," "guaranteed that collection as a matter of contract," "did not collect the sum of $12,145.00," and thus "materially breached its contractual obligation." Defendant filed its answer denying plaintiff's claims and filed a motion for summary judgment. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court heard both motions and, on 4 October 2010, the court entered its order granting defendant UPS's motion for summary judgment, denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals. "Summary judgment is properly granted when the forecast of evidence `reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact, and when the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Dobson v. Harris, 352 N.C. 77, 83, 530 S.E.2d 829, 835 (2000) (quoting Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 518, 186 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1972)); see also N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2009) ("[Summary judgment is proper] if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."). "[T]he real purpose of summary judgment is to go beyond or to pierce the pleadings and determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact." Singleton v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460, 464, 186 S.E.2d 400, 403 (1972). "All facts asserted by the adverse party are taken as true, and their inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to that party." Dobson, 352 N.C. at 83, 530 S.E.2d at 835 (citation omitted). "[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment the court does not resolve issues of fact and must deny the motion if there is any issue of genuine material fact." Singleton, 280 N.C. at 464, 186 S.E.2d at 403. "On appeal, an order allowing summary judgment is reviewed de novo." Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 470, 597 S.E.2d 674, 693 (2004).
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