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CHENNAREDDY v. DODARO
VENKAREDDY CHENNAREDDY, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
GENE DODARO Acting Comptroller General, Defendant.
Civ. Action No. 87-3538 (EGS).
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
March 30, 2012.
VENKAREDDY CHENNAREDDY, General Class Complainant representing himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
SANDRA THIBAULT, Sub-Class Complainants, representing herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
ROGER CARROLL, Plaintiff, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
HECTOR ROJAS, Plaintiff, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
JAGDISH C. NARANG, Plaintiff, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
HENRY Q. JEONG, Plaintiff, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
JAMES B. DOWD, Plaintiff, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
LOUIS LUCAS, Plaintiff, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
VINCENT DE SANTI, Plaintiff, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
ESTATE OF WILLIAM A. MULLEN, (Deceased), Plaintiff, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
A. EUGENE REMEY, Plaintiff, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
GENE DODARO, Acting Comptroller General of the United States, Defendant, represented by John G. Interrante, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE.
MIKE ROSS, Movant, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
AMY HUTNER, Movant, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
RUDOLF PLESSING, Movant, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
GEORGE CULLEN, Movant, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
ERNEST ARCIELLO, Movant, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
MIKE JONES, Movant, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
PHIL ANDRES, Movant, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
JERRY AIELLO, Movant, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
JAMES MOORE, Movant, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
BRENDA TROTTER, Movant, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
EDNA SALTZMAN, Movant, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
GARRY ROEMER, Movant, represented by Walter T Charlton, WALTER T. CHARLTON & ASSOCIATES.
MEMORANDUM OPINIONEMMET G. SULLIVAN, District Judge. Pending before the Court1 is defendant's renewed Motion for a More Definite Statement or, in the alternative, to Dismiss or Strike plaintiffs' sixth amended complaint. Also pending before the Court is plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's denial of certain of plaintiffs' discovery requests. Upon consideration of the motions, the responses and replies thereto, the applicable law, the entire record in this case, and for the following reasons, the Court will GRANT the defendant's motion to strike plaintiffs' complaint and dismiss this action with prejudice. The Court will DENY plaintiffs' motion to reconsider the denial of their requests for discovery. I. BACKGROUND This case was originally filed in December 1987 by then-GAO-employee Venkareddy Chennareddy ("Chennareddy") as a general class complainant, and several other named and unnamed GAO employees, who sought to represent a class of GAO employees who had been allegedly discriminated against in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.2 During the initial stages of this case, the parties engaged in class discovery and plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to certify the case as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. See Mar. 20, 1995 Class Certification Order ("Class Cert. Order"), Docket No. 202. The Court found that plaintiffs had met the "numerosity" requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), id. at 3-4, but that plaintiffs had not established commonality or typicality, id. at 4-9. The Court also found that plaintiffs had failed to allege that the purported discrimination "manifested itself in a particular employment practice leveled against all members of the proposed class." Id. at 4 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982) ("Title VII prohibits discriminatory employment practices, not an abstract policy of discrimination.")); see also Class Cert. Order at 7 ("[P]laintiffs provide no basis for concluding that 1,500 employees suffer from a common discriminatory practice."). Plaintiffs' motion to alter the class-certification judgment was denied on March 31, 1999. A. Fourth and Fifth Amended Complaints
1. This case was randomly reassigned to this Court in November 2007 upon the death of the Honorable John G. Penn. Unless otherwise noted, this Memorandum Opinion will not distinguish between actions taken by Judge Penn and this Court.
2. The long and complicated history of this case has been discussed fully in several prior decisions of the Court. See, e.g., Docket Nos. 433, 461. Therefore, the background of this case will be discussed herein only to the extent it is relevant to the pending motions.
3. Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on August 20, 1992 and it was in connection with that complaint that plaintiffs were denied class certification in 1995. See Class Cert. Order at 1. Plaintiffs' subsequent motion for leave to file a third amended complaint was replaced by plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint, which was pending when the case was reassigned to this Court in 2007. The Court granted the plaintiffs leave to file a fourth amended complaint. See Minute Order, Dec. 10, 2007. As a result, no third amended complaint was ever filed in this case.
4. Magistrate Judge Robinson also denied without prejudice defendant's partial motion to dismiss and denied plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery.
5. The Court vacated the portion of Magistrate Judge Robinson's order that the Court interpreted as effectively barring plaintiffs from pursuing class claims for the remainder of the litigation. Dec. 18, 2009 Op. at 35. Noting that it appeared that plaintiffs' previous motions for reconsideration of the 1995 denial of class certification had not been considered on the merits by Judge Penn, the Court concluded that it would provide plaintiffs with one final opportunity to pursue class certification. Id. Plaintiffs would be permitted to show cause why the previous ruling denying class certification was in error and why such error mandates that plaintiffs be given a renewed opportunity to litigate the issue. Id. at 36. The Court made clear, however, that the briefing could proceed "only after plaintiffs file a complaint that comports with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. As explained more fully herein, the Court finds that plaintiffs have not successfully filed a complaint that comports with the Federal Rules. Accordingly, the Court does not reach any issues related to the reconsideration of the denial of class certification.
6. The Court's decision today does not rest on whether plaintiffs have stated a claim under the ADEA, although the Court does find that no such claims exist within the text of the complaint. Rather, the Court declines to reach this issue because of plaintiffs' failure to satisfy the requirement in Rule 8(a) and 8(d) that a complaint provide a "short and plain statement" that is "simple, concise, and direct" and for plaintiffs' failure to comply with the Court's prior orders. See Shallal, 254 F.R.D. at 143; McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179 ("The propriety of dismissal for failure to comply with Rule 8 does not depend on whether the complaint is wholly without merit . .. . [Rule 8], requiring each averment of a pleading to be `simple, concise, and direct,' applies to good claims as well as bad, and is a basis for dismissal independent of Rule 12(b)(6).")(citing prior version of Rule 8) (citations omitted).
7. Dismissal would also be proper under Rule 41(b). Rule 41(b) provides that "[i]f a plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Bristol Petroleum Corp. v. Harris, 901 F.2d 165, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (factors to consider when ascertaining if dismissal under Rule 41(b), rather than lesser sanctions, would be proper include "the effect of the plaintiff's dilatory or contumacious conduct on the court's docket, whether the plaintiff's behavior has prejudiced the defendant, and whether deterrence is necessary to protect the integrity of the judicial system"); Stella v. Mineta, 231 F.R.D. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 2005) (dismissing action under Rule 41(b) to protect integrity of court where plaintiff failed to comply with six of the court's orders regarding filing deadlines and Local Rule 7(h), and plaintiff's failure to comply had prejudiced the defendants and unnecessarily consumed the court's time); see also Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 802 F.Supp.2d 137 (D.D.C. 2011). In particular, the Court finds that plaintiffs' failure to comply with the Federal Rules and the Court's orders has required the Court and defendant to expend significant effort evaluating plaintiffs' successive failed attempts at amending their complaint. With respect to the element of the effect on the integrity of the Court, the Court finds that dismissal is particularly justified here, where plaintiffs have been explicitly warned by the Court that their failure to comply with the Court's February 17, 2011 Order would result in the dismissal of the case.
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