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ASTRUE v. CAPATO
132 S.Ct. 2021 (2012)
182 L. Ed. 2d 887
Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Petitioner
v.
Karen K. CAPATO, on behalf of B.N.C., et al.
No. 11-159.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued March 19, 2012.
Decided May 21, 2012.
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Bernard A. Kuttner, Millburn, NJ, Jeffrey A. Meyer, Yale Law School, Supreme Court Clinic, New Haven, CT, Charles A. Rothfeld, Counsel of Record, Andrew J. Pincus, Michael B. Kimberly, Paul W. Hughes, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC, for Respondents.
David F. Black, General Counsel, Social Security Administration, Baltimore, MD, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Eric D. Miller, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Michael S. Raab, Kelsi Brown Corkran, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. Karen and Robert Capato married in 1999. Robert died of cancer less than three years later. With the help of in vitro fertilization, Karen gave birth to twins 18 months after her husband's death. Karen's application for Social Security survivors benefits for the twins, which the Social Security Administration (SSA) denied,
prompted this litigation. The technology that made the twins' conception and birth possible, it is safe to say, was not contemplated by Congress when the relevant provisions of the Social Security Act (Act) originated (1939) or were amended to read as they now do (1965). Karen Capato, respondent here, relies on the Act's initial definition of "child" in 42 U.S.C. § 416(e): "`[C]hild' means . . . the child or legally adopted child of an [insured] individual." Robert was an insured individual, and the twins, it is uncontested, are the biological children of Karen and Robert. That satisfies the Act's terms, and no further inquiry is in order, Karen maintains. The SSA, however, identifies subsequent provisions, § 416(h)(2) and (h)(3)(C), as critical, and reads them to entitle biological children to benefits only if they qualify for inheritance from the decedent under state intestacy law, or satisfy one of the statutory alternatives to that requirement. We conclude that the SSA's reading is better attuned to the statute's text and its design to benefit primarily those supported by the deceased wage earner in his or her lifetime. And even if the SSA's longstanding interpretation is not the only reasonable one, it is at least a permissible construction that garners the Court's respect under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). IKaren Capato married Robert Capato in May 1999. Shortly thereafter, Robert was diagnosed with esophageal cancer and was told that the chemotherapy he required might render him sterile. Because the couple wanted children, Robert, before undergoing chemotherapy, deposited his semen in a sperm bank, where it was frozen and stored. Despite Robert's aggressive treatment regime, Karen conceived naturally and gave birth to a son in August 2001. The Capatos, however, wanted their son to have a sibling. Robert's health deteriorated in late 2001, and he died in Florida, where he and Karen then resided, in March 2002. His will, executed in Florida, named as beneficiaries the son born of his marriage to Karen and two children from a previous marriage. The will made no provision for children conceived after Robert's death, although the Capatos had told their lawyer they wanted future offspring to be placed on a par with existing children. Shortly after Robert's death, Karen began in vitro fertilization using her husband's frozen sperm. She conceived in January 2003 and gave birth to twins in September 2003, 18 months after Robert's death.
1. The District Court observed that Fla. Stat. Ann. § 732.106 (West 2010) defines "`afterborn heirs'" as "`heirs of the decedent conceived before his or her death, but born thereafter.'" App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a (emphasis added by District Court). The court also referred to § 742.17(4), which provides that a posthumously conceived child "`shall not be eligible for a claim against the decedent's estate unless the child has been provided for by the decedent's will.'" Id., at 28a.
2. Because the Third Circuit held that posthumously conceived children qualify for survivors benefits as a matter of federal law, it did not definitively determine "where [Robert] Capato was domiciled at his death or . . . delve into the law of intestacy of that state." 631 F.3d, at 632, n. 6. These issues, if preserved, may be considered on remand.
3. Applicants not in fact dependent on the insured individual may be "deemed dependent" when the Act so provides. For example, a "legitimate" child, even if she is not living with or receiving support from her parent, is ordinarily "deemed dependent" on that parent. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3). Further, applicants "deemed" the child of an insured individual under § 416(h)(2)(B) or (h)(3) are also "deemed legitimate," hence dependent, even if not living with or receiving support from the parent. § 402(d)(3). See also Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 499, n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 49 L.Ed.2d 651 (1976) (deeming dependent any child who qualifies under § 416(h)(2)(A)); Tr. of Oral Arg. 13-14 (counsel for the SSA stated, in response to the Court's question, that statutory presumptions of dependency are irrebuttable).
4. Section 416(h)(2)(A) also states that persons who, under the law of the insured's domicile, "would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be deemed such." Asked about this prescription, counsel for the SSA responded that it would apply to equitably adopted children. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9, 54; see 20 CFR § 404.359 (2011) (an equitably adopted child may be eligible for benefits if the agreement to adopt the child would be recognized under state law as enabling the child to inherit upon the intestate death of the adopting parent).
5. Respondent does not invoke any of the alternative criteria as a basis for the twins'"child" status.
6. The Commissioner of Social Security has acquiesced in the Ninth Circuit's conflicting interpretation for cases arising in that Circuit. See Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 05-1(9), 70 Fed.Reg. 55656 (2005).
7. Because the Court of Appeals found the statutory language unambiguous, it had no occasion to "determine whether the [SSA's] interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute." 631 F.3d, at 631, n. 5 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)).
8. Respondent urges that it would be bizarre to deny benefits to the Capato twins when, under § 416(h)(2)(B), they would have gained benefits had their parents gone through a marriage ceremony that would have been valid save for a legal impediment. Brief for Respondent 26, n. 10; see supra, at 2027-2028. Whether the Capatos' marriage ceremony was flawed or flawless, the SSA counters, no marital union was extant when the twins were conceived. Reply Brief 11.
9. But see N.Y. Est., Powers & Trusts Law Ann. § 4-1.1(c) (West 1998) ("Distributees of the decedent, conceived before his or her death but born alive thereafter, take as if they were born in his or her lifetime."). Similar provisions are contained in Ga.Code Ann. § 53-2-1(b)(1) (2011), Idaho Code § 15-2-108 (Lexis 2009), Minn.Stat. Ann. § 524.2-120(10) (West Supp.2012), S.C.Code Ann. § 62-2-108 (2009), and S.D. Codified Laws § 29A-2-108 (Supp.2011).
10. Ironically, while drawing an analogy to the "illogical and unjust" discrimination children born out of wedlock encounter, see Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-176, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972), respondent asks us to differentiate between children whose parents were married and children whose parents' liaisons were not blessed by clergy or the State. She would eliminate the intestacy test only for biological children of married parents.
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