DELACRUZ v. SCHRIRO
EDWARD LOPEZ DELACRUZ, Plaintiff-Appellant,
DORA B. SCHRIRO, Defendant, and
BENNIE ROLLINS, Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) Operations Director; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted December 19, 2011.**
Filed January 10, 2012.
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Edward Lopez Delacruz, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (summary judgment). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2003), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Delacruz's deliberate indifference to medical needs claim as to defendants Baird, Belcourt, Hegman, and Lesac for the reasons stated in its order entered on February 10, 2009. Dismissal of this claim as to defendants Greely and Schriro was also proper because Delacruz failed to allege facts showing that these defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive or substantial risk to his health. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (discussing the standard for establishing deliberate indifference to an inmate's health and safety).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants McWilliams, Melcher, and Rollins on Delacruz's deliberate indifference to safety claim for the reasons stated in its order entered on August 10, 2010. The district court also properly granted summary judgment for defendants Bartos, Grabrowski, and Haley on this claim because Delacruz failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether these defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his safety or responded unreasonably to such a risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 844-45 (1994) (explaining the subjective prong of deliberate indifference and noting that even if a prison official knew of a substantial risk, he is not liable if he "responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted"). The district court properly granted summary judgment on Delacruz's procedural due process claim because even assuming a protected liberty interest, Delacruz failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether he was denied the due process that was required. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-30 (2005). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Delacruz's request to reopen discovery because Delacruz failed to "`show how allowing additional discovery would have precluded summary judgment.'" Panatronic USA v. AT&T Corp., 287 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).