GARCIA v. CITY OF NEW YORK 1742, 18784/91, 1742A
72 A.D.3d 505 (2010)
900 N.Y.S.2d 17
EDDIE GARCIA, Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Respondents.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department.
Decided April 15, 2010.
Concur—MAZZARELLI, J.P., ANDRIAS and CATTERSON, JJ.
Plaintiff, who seeks damages in connection with alleged police misconduct, filed his note of issue in 1996. A pretrial conference was scheduled for July 20, 1998. Plaintiff asserts that his attorneys
Plaintiff claims that his attorneys never received the order provisionally denying his motion to restore. Nevertheless, plaintiff and his attorneys apparently made no effort to follow up on the status of the motion. Rather, they allowed over eight years to elapse. Then, on November 7, 2007, they moved to renew the original motion pursuant to the "leave" granted in the order of August 18, 1999. The court denied the motion. It applied the standard applicable when a plaintiff, having had its complaint marked off the trial calendar, fails, pursuant to CPLR 3404, to restore the case within one year from its striking. Under such circumstances, the court held, the plaintiff must establish that the action has merit; that a reasonable excuse exists for the delay in restoring the case; that there was no intent to abandon the action; and that the defendant has suffered no prejudice. The motion court held that plaintiff failed to satisfy this standard.
Plaintiff argues that the court erred by treating his application to restore as having been made more than one year after the action was marked off. He claims that the court should have focused not on the "renewal" motion made in 2007, but rather on the original motion made in 1999, which unquestionably was made within the one-year period allowed by CPLR 3404. Plaintiff's foundation for this contention is that, because the original order denying his motion to restore contained no deadline by which he was required to "renew upon proper papers," his time to do so did not begin to run until 30 days after he or defendant served a copy of that order with notice of entry. Since no notice of entry was ever served, plaintiff contends, his time to renew never began to run. Plaintiff also relies on cases where a party successfully moved to reargue or renew an order (Zhi Fang Shi v Sanchez,
Plaintiff's arguments are without merit. While a party's time to move to renew or reargue an order pursuant to CPLR 2221 does not begin to run until it is served with notice of entry of
Here, plaintiff does not state when he first realized that the 1999 motion to restore had been denied. Even if we were to assume that plaintiff only learned of the 1999 denial shortly before he made his motion to renew in 2007, that is not sufficient. Clearly, plaintiff had a duty to inquire into the status of the 1999 motion. Instead, he sat on his hands for eight years, and offers no explanation as to why he waited so long. Accordingly, the 2007 motion was barred by the doctrine of laches (see Feldman v New York City Tr. Auth.,
The dissent's position is based on the assumption that, with respect to the disposition of the motion to restore, defendant was the "prevailing party." That assumption is inaccurate, as demonstrated by the holding in Lyons v Butler (
The only distinction between Lyons and the instant case is that here plaintiff's motion was conditionally "denied" whereas the motion in Lyons was conditionally granted. This is a distinction without a difference. As plaintiff states, and defendant does not dispute, the original motion to restore was but a formality, as it was brought within one year of the striking of the case from the trial calendar (see Johnson v Rivera,
Under these circumstances, to deem plaintiff's 2007 motion as relating back, for timeliness purposes, to the 1999 motion to restore, would be improper. Accordingly, the motion court appropriately applied the standard used where a motion to restore is made more than one year after a case is marked off the calendar. Since plaintiff failed to show a lack of intent to abandon the action and a reasonable excuse for his delay, the 2007 motion was properly denied (see Katz v Robinson Silverman Pearce Aronsohn & Berman,
Saxe and Acosta, JJ., dissent in a memorandum by Acosta, J., as follows:
Since plaintiff's motion to renew was timely, and
Plaintiff alleges that in 1991 he was falsely arrested and assaulted by police officers in front of 562 West 175th Street. According to plaintiff, he was so severely beaten by police officers that he sustained fractures to his left arm and head and face injuries. Discovery was taken and, in 1996, plaintiff filed a notice of issue.
It is undisputed that after plaintiff filed his note of issue, the matter was scheduled for a pretrial conference on July 20, 1998. Plaintiff, who alleges that he was never given notice of the conference (an allegation which defendant does not dispute), did not appear and the action was dismissed. Neither party ever served this order with notice of entry.
By order to show cause, dated July 13, 1999—less than one year after the action was dismissed—plaintiff moved to vacate the dismissal and restore the action to the trial calender. The order to show cause was unopposed by defendants.
By order dated August 18, 1999, the application was denied without prejudice and with leave to renew upon proper papers "including proof of service of the Order to Show Cause and supporting papers." Significantly, defendants have never disputed that the order to show cause was served by certified mail or that it was received. Again, neither party served this order with notice of entry.
On November 7, 2007, some eight years later, plaintiff moved to renew the application to restore the action, arguing that the renewal motion was timely since the August 18, 1999 order denying his order to show cause had not been served with notice of entry. On June 4, 2008, Supreme Court denied plaintiff's motion to renew finding that plaintiff "is taking advantage of the fact that, as the moving party, he never entered the above order," and applied the standard put forth in CPLR 3404 for actions marked off the calendar and not restored within one year. In so doing, the court also found that plaintiff had failed to rebut the presumption of abandonment of the action as mandated by the statute. Plaintiff timely filed a notice of appeal from that order, and a judgment dismissing the complaint was entered on April 22, 2009.
Plaintiff argues on appeal that because no party was ever served with notice of entry of the order denying his motion to
Initially, it was error for Supreme Court to deny plaintiff's motion to restore the action to the calendar. Plaintiff's motion was made within a year after it was dismissed from the calendar, and as such, "plaintiff only had to request restoration . . . without any obstacles to hurdle" (Johnson v Rivera,
While it is odd that plaintiff would wait some eight years before moving to restore his action, I believe based on the facts of this case he is entitled to do so. It was error for Supreme Court to deem plaintiff's action as one marked off the calendar and not restored within one year. Despite the time lag, plaintiff's time to renew his first application had not begun to run. That is, no notice of entry was ever served (see Zhi Fang Shi v Sanchez,
I do not believe that it was plaintiff's burden to serve the order with notice of entry. In fact, it is often the prevailing party that is expected to serve an order with notice of entry. "The time to take an appeal of right is 30 days. The period starts
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