NOLOS v. HOLDERNo. 08-60786.
611 F.3d 279 (2010)
Roseller Osicos NOLOS, Petitioner,
Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.
Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
July 9, 2010.
Roseller O. Nolos, N. Las Vegas, NV, pro se. Joseph D. Hardy, Jr. and Claire L. Workman, Trial Attys., Tangerlia Cox, John Clifford Cunningham, I and Luis Enrique Perez, Sr. Lit. Counsels, Thomas Ward Hussey, Dir., U.S Dept. of Justice, OIL, Washington, DC, Guadalupe R. Gonzales, Imm. & Customs Enforcement, El Paso, TX, for Respondent.
Before JOLLY and DENNIS, Circuit Judges, and JORDAN, District Judge.
Roseller Osicos Nolos ("Nolos") petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeal's ("BIA") decision to uphold the immigration judge's ("IJ") order of removal and the BIA's subsequent denial of his separate motions to reconsider and to reopen. Nolos argues that he is not removable because (1) he derives United States citizenship from his parents, who he claims acquired United States citizenship by virtue of their births in the Philippine Islands ("Philippines") while the country was a United States territory, and (2) the Nevada theft conviction that forms the basis of the removal order does not qualify as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). For the following reasons, we DENY the petition for review.
Nolos was admitted to the United States in 1983 as a lawful permanent resident. In 2003, he pleaded guilty to a theft offense pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes § 205.0832 (2003) in Nevada state court and received a suspended prison sentence of between 18 and 48 months. In July 2006, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS")
Nolos, proceeding pro se, admitted the DHS's allegations and conceded his removability. In August 2006, the IJ determined that Nolos was removable because his Nevada conviction constituted an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) and ordered him removed to the Philippines. Nolos timely appealed the IJ's order to the BIA. After an initial dismissal and a subsequent grant of Nolos's motion to reopen in light of newly discovered evidence, the BIA determined that not all of the subsections of Nevada Revised Statutes § 205.0832 constituted aggravated felonies and that the judgment of conviction—the record of conviction the Government submitted to prove Nolos was convicted of a theft offense—did not specify which provision of Nevada Revised Statutes § 205.0832 Nolos was convicted of violating. As a result, it vacated its initial dismissal of Nolos's appeal and remanded the case to the IJ.
On remand, the DHS submitted the Nevada information charging Nolos with theft under Nevada Revised Statutes § 205.0832. After a review of this additional material, the IJ determined that Nolos was convicted under § 205.0832(1)(b); § 205.0832(1)(b) met the requirements of theft under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"); and Nolos was removable as an aggravated felon. The BIA agreed with the IJ's determination and dismissed Nolos's appeal.
Nolos filed a timely petition for review and also filed with the BIA a timely motion for reconsideration and a motion to reopen, asserting in part that he was a citizen of the United States. After the BIA's denial of those motions, Nolos filed an additional timely petition for review of this BIA decision.
Although our review of a final order of removal is limited under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, Marquez-Marquez v. Gonzales,
While we owe deference to the BIA's interpretation of the INA under the principles of Chevron USA, Inc. v. NRDC,
The Government argues initially that Nolos's petition should be dismissed in part on the procedural ground that he failed to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 because he did not present an application for relief and did not raise citizenship as a defense before the IJ. The BIA's decision, however, did not deny Nolos's motion on the ground of noncompliance with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. Although the BIA noted that Nolos "could and should have raised this claim during proceedings before the [IJ]" and "failed to support his claim with any evidence or to attach an application for the relief requested," it went on to consider and reject Nolos's claim that he was a United States citizen. Against this background, we decline the Government's invitation to dismiss in part Nolos's petition on the basis of noncompliance with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. Accord Lopez-Dubon v. Holder,
There are two sources of citizenship: birth and naturalization. Bustamante-Barrera v. Gonzales,
In Downes v. Bidwell,
Relying on Downes, the Rabang and Valmonte courts observed that "[l]ike the revenue clauses, the Citizenship Clause has an express territorial limitation which prevents its extension to every place over which the government exercises its sovereignty." Rabang, 35 F.3d at 1453 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
Against this background, the Rabang, Lacap and Valmonte courts held that "[i]t is ... incorrect to extend citizenship to
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court authority starting with the Insular Cases and the persuasive precedent from three of our sister circuits, Nolos counters that Downes, as one of the central cases of Rabang, Valmonte and Lacap, should not be followed because it never defined the phrase "the United States" in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment. Relying on United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
Valmonte, 136 F.3d at 920 (brackets in original) (quoting Rabang, 35 F.3d at 1454).
Against this background, we find the reasoning of our sister circuits persuasive and hold that "persons born in the Philippines during its status as a United States territory were not `born ... in the United States' under the Fourteenth Amendment." Valmonte, 136 F.3d at 920 (quoting Rabang, 35 F.3d at 1453). Accordingly, given that Nolos's parents did not acquire United States citizenship by virtue of their birth in the Philippines when it was a United States territory, Nolos could not have derived United States citizenship from them and is therefore removable if he is found to have been convicted of an aggravated felony.
Nolos argues next that even if he were not a United States citizen he is not removable because his conviction under Nevada Revised Statutes § 205.0832 does not qualify as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). Nolos and the Government agree that Nevada Revised Statutes § 205.0832 is divisible and describes crimes, of which only some qualify as aggravated felonies. But the Government
"Federal immigration law provides that any `alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.'" Nijhawan v. Holder, ___ U.S. ___,
To prove that Nolos was convicted of an aggravated felony theft offense, the Government submitted a copy of the Nevada information and judgment of conviction. After a review of the documents, the BIA determined that Nolos was convicted under Nevada Revised Statutes § 205.0832(1)(b) and that the provision qualified as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). The single-count information confirms this conclusion. It provides several examples of Nolos creating phony merchandise refunds that he would pay to his own credit card while he was employed as a salesperson at a Nordstrom's store and states that Nolos "did then and there knowingly, feloniously, and without lawful authority, commit theft by using services or property of another person entrusted to him or placed in his possession for a limited use, having a value of $250.00, or more, lawful money of the United States, belonging to Nordstrom's," thus tracking Nevada Revised Statutes § 205.0832(1)(b). Nevada Revised Statutes § 205.0832(1)(b) in turn meets our generic definition of theft. See Burke, 509 F.3d at 697 ("`[T]heft offense (including receipt of stolen property)' is a taking of property or an exercise of control over property without consent with the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent." (citations omitted)). This finding is also supported by the plea agreement which Nolos submitted into the record. Nolos appears to suggest that the guilty plea agreement fails to indicate the prong of the statute to which he had pleaded guilty. But it states that Nolos pleaded guilty to theft under Nevada Revised Statutes § 205.0832, "as more fully alleged in the
In sum, given that Nolos's term of imprisonment was over one year, the record of conviction establishes that Nolos was convicted of a theft offense pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) and is removable as an aggravated felon under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Nolos's petition for review.
- No Cases Found