I. NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from an order of the district court for Sarpy County, Nebraska, granting summary judgment for the State of Nebraska Department of Roads on an inverse condemnation claim filed by Leo W. Hike, Jr., and Joanna K. Hike. The court ruled that the action was barred by the 2-year statute of limitations set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-218 (Reissue 2016). We affirm.
This is the second case between the Hikes and the State. In the first case, Hike v. State (Hike I),
In August 2011, before the trial in Hike I, the State's independent contractor began construction on the property taken from the Hikes. The contractor used heavy machinery to make a 48-foot-deep roadway cut approximately 61 feet from the Hikes' home. That same month, Leo noticed damage to the brick veneer of the Hikes' residence.
The Hikes retained two experts to determine the cause and amount of the damage to their home. Both experts attributed the damage, estimated at $51,829, to the construction on Highway 75. After the Hikes disclosed the evidence of structural damage and that they intended to call their expert witnesses at trial, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude the evidence of damage to the residence. The court sustained the motion to preclude the Hikes from offering any evidence concerning the structural damage.
After the jury verdict, the Hikes timely appealed, alleging, among other things, that the district court erred by not allowing them to offer evidence of the structural damage. On May 9, 2014, in Hike I, we affirmed the district court's decision to exclude the evidence because it was "not the proximate result of the taking, but, rather, was caused by conduct that occurred after the taking" by the State.
On April 17, 2015, the Hikes filed the present action claiming the same structural damage that they attempted to offer evidence of in Hike I. On April 19, 2016, the State filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the Hikes' claim was barred by the 2-year statute of limitations in § 25-218. After a hearing, the court sustained the State's motion and dismissed the Hikes' complaint, finding that the claim was barred by § 25-218. The Hikes appealed.
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The Hikes assign, restated and reordered, that the court erred in (1) failing to judicially estop the State from raising the statute of limitations as a defense, (2) applying § 25-218 as the relevant statute of limitations, and (3) finding that their claim was time barred despite being raised in Hike I.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence admitted at the hearing disclose no genuine issue regarding any material fact or the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
 An appellate court reviews a court's application of judicial estoppel to the facts of a case for abuse of discretion and reviews its underlying factual findings for clear error.
[4-6] The determination of which statute of limitations applies is a question of law.
 Appellate courts independently review questions of law decided by a lower court.
1. STATE IS NOT JUDICIALLY ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE
The Hikes argue that the State is judicially estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense, because in Hike I, the State successfully argued that the present claim had to be brought as a separate action. The State asserts that its argument in Hike I, that the Hikes' evidence of structural damage was inadmissible because it was neither proximately caused by the condemnation nor relevant to the elements of a condemnation action, is not inconsistent with its current statute of limitations defense.
[8-10] Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that a court invokes at its discretion to protect the integrity of the judicial process.
 In Hike I, the Hikes sought to recover compensation for the State's acquisition of 1.05 acres of their property by eminent domain. "Eminent domain is `"[t]he inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property, esp[ecially] land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the taking."'"
While the Hikes attempted to offer evidence of the structural damage to their home at the trial on their condemnation action, they did not seek leave to amend their complaint to assert a separate claim of inverse condemnation and, instead, proceeded under their initial complaint. As a result, the trial court excluded the evidence of the structural damage.
On appeal, we held that although the Hikes may have had a remedy with respect to any such structural damage, it was not compensable in the condemnation proceeding because the damage occurred after the taking by eminent domain and the damage was not the proximate result of that taking.
In this appeal, the Hikes argue that the State has taken a position inconsistent with the one they successfully and unequivocally asserted in their prior proceeding. Specifically, the Hikes argue that in Hike I, the State asserted that the Hikes should have properly brought their claim of structural damage as a separate action and then, in this appeal, the State asserted that the separate action was time barred. However, the Hikes' contention is without merit.
In making this argument, the Hikes ignore the State's legal contentions that directly addressed why the evidence of structural damage was inadmissible. Specifically, the State contended that (1) the evidence was not relevant to the elements of the condemnation proceeding, (2) the evidence could not be shown to have been proximately caused by the condemnation, (3) the presentation of the evidence would unnecessarily delay the trial, and (4) the evidence would be prejudicial to the determination of damages for the condemnation. The district court's ruling merely determined the admissibility of the evidence in Hike I. It was unnecessary for the court to consider the Hikes' ability to bring their claim as a separate action at that time or in the future, nor did the court make such a ruling.
Further, the State's assertion that the Hikes' evidence of structural damage was inadmissible was not inconsistent with its current statute of limitations defense. When the court entered its order on the motion in limine on July 16, 2012, the Hikes still had more than 1 year to bring their inverse condemnation claim. Instead of timely filing an action to assert their inverse condemnation claim, the Hikes chose to pursue a remedy for the structural damage solely through an appeal. The Hikes' choice of how to proceed was not mandated by the State's assertion or the trial court's ruling.
The Hikes point to our holding in Sports Courts of Omaha v. Meginnis
In Sports Courts of Omaha, the plaintiff sued two defendants in the Douglas County District Court, seeking damages on a breach of a promissory note. The action was dismissed for want of prosecution, and the plaintiff appealed. While the matter was on appeal, the plaintiff sued one of the two defendants in the Lancaster County District Court in an action essentially identical to the Douglas County case. The Lancaster County District Court dismissed the action on several grounds, including that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of the pending appeal from Douglas County.
On appeal, we held that because the plaintiff's appeal before us involved an action maintained in a court distinct from the site of the previous action, our general rule of divested jurisdiction was inapplicable to preclude the district court's jurisdiction over the plaintiff's Lancaster County action.
In this matter, the Hikes had the option to file a separate action after the trial court ruled on the State's motion in limine, but they chose to wait and file an appeal instead. Further, the filing of the appeal neither precluded the Hikes from bringing a separate action for inverse condemnation nor divested the district court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear such an action.
Finally, the Hikes assert that judicial estoppel should apply because, on appeal in Hike I, the State maintained its contention that the evidence of structural damage should have been brought as a separate claim after the statute of limitations had run. However, our review on appeal considered only the district court's ruling in limine when it was made. Accordingly, it is irrelevant that the statute of limitations had run when the State made its argument before this court, because its argument concerned the facts in existence at the time of the district court's ruling in limine. Further, our decision rested only on the admissibility of the evidence. As a result, the existence of additional remedies available to the Hikes for their structural damage was beyond our consideration.
We conclude that the State's contentions in Hike I do not support the application of judicial estoppel in this appeal.
2. HIKES' CLAIM IS BARRED BY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
(a) Inverse Condemnation Actions Against State Are Subject to 2-Year
Statute of Limitations
 The Hikes argue that the district court incorrectly applied § 25-218, instead of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-202 (Reissue 2016), to determine the applicable statute of limitations for their inverse condemnation claim. Inverse condemnation is a shorthand description for a landowner suit to recover just compensation for a governmental taking of the landowner's property without the benefit of condemnation proceedings.
The relevant portion of § 25-218 reads as follows: "Every claim and demand against the state shall be forever barred unless action is brought thereon within two years after the claim arose."
The relevant portion of § 25-202 reads as follows: "An action for the recovery of the title or possession of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or for the foreclosure of mortgages or the foreclosure of deeds of trust as mortgages thereon, can only be brought within ten years after the cause of action accrues."
First, the Hikes contend that the application of § 25-218 in Bordy v. State
The State contends that Krambeck and Stueben are distinguishable from this current appeal, because those cases did not involve claims against the State. It also contends that § 25-218 is more specific than § 25-202, because the inverse condemnation claim herein is against the State.
In Bordy and Cznarick, we held that under § 25-218, a suit against the State for the taking or damaging of private property for public use must be commenced within 2 years from the time the taking or damaging of the property occurred.
All four cases cited by the parties concerned the applicable statute of limitations for inverse condemnation actions. While Krambeck and Stueben are more recent, the State is correct in its contention that they are factually distinguishable from Bordy, Czarnick, and the instant case. The inverse condemnation actions in Krambeck and Stueben were instituted against a local power district and a city, respectively, not the State. Because the actions in Krambeck and Stueben were not against the State, § 25-218 did not apply by its express terms and, as a result, we did not address that statute.
Nevertheless, we recognize that in Bordy and Czarnick, we did not expressly analyze whether § 25-202 should apply over § 25-218. Accordingly, we consider the parties' arguments concerning the applicable statute of limitations here.
 In determining which statute of limitations applies in a particular case, we have established the principle that a special statute of limitations controls and takes precedence over a general statute of limitations because the special statute is a specific expression of legislative will concerning a particular subject matter.
 Though article I, § 21, is a self-executing provision of the Constitution, which authorizes a landowner to bring an action in inverse condemnation,
Accordingly, we considered which of two general statutes of limitations should govern inverse condemnation actions.
We determined that § 25-206, which is explicitly limited in its application to "liabilities created by statute," could not apply to eminent domain actions, because the City's liability was not a statutorily created one, but a constitutional one pursuant to article I, § 21.
We then explained that inverse condemnation actions are "analogous to an action by a private landowner against another private individual or entity to recover the title to or possession of property," but, because the power of eminent domain precludes the property owner from compelling the return of the property taken, the owner is entitled to just compensation as a substitute.
[15,16] Consequently, § 25-202 is not a special statute of limitations, but only a general statute of limitations. While § 25-218 is also not a special statute of limitations for any specific type of claim, when the State is a defendant to a claim, it is a specific expression of the Legislature's will regarding the timeframe to bring such a claim.
 As a result of our analysis, we hold that the 2-year statute of limitations in § 25-218 is the applicable statute of limitations for claims of inverse condemnation against the State because § 25-218 is more specific on the subject than is § 25-202.
(b) Hikes Did Not Bring Their Claim Within 2 Years
The Hikes argue that even if § 25-218 is the applicable statute of limitations, they brought their claim within 2 years of its accrual by asserting it in Hike I. The Hikes' argument, however, is based on an incorrect understanding of what it means to bring an action.
 Bringing an action means to sue or institute legal proceedings.
The Hikes did not bring their inverse condemnation action, by asserting the claim in a complaint, until April 17, 2015. Further, the district court's finding that the Hikes' cause of action accrued in August 2011, more than 3 years before the Hikes brought their claim, was not clearly wrong. Therefore, the Hikes claim of inverse condemnation is barred by the 2-year statute of limitations.
(c) Hikes' Constitutional Argument Was Not Properly Raised
In their reply brief, the Hikes contend that they have an unequivocal right to compensation for the damage caused by the State under article I, § 21, because their rights thereunder are self-executing. However, the Hikes did not assign such as error in their initial brief.
[19,20] As we explained in Hike I, errors argued but not assigned will not be considered on appeal. Further, even if the argument could be construed as fitting into one of the Hikes' assigned errors, the purpose of an appellant's reply brief is to respond to the arguments the appellee has advanced against the errors assigned in the appellant's initial brief.
We conclude that the 2-year statute of limitations period set forth in § 25-218 governs inverse condemnation actions against the State. We determine that the district court did not err when it granted summary judgment for the State based on its determination that the Hikes' claim is barred by the 2-year statute of limitations.
CASSEL, J., participating on briefs.