Earl Parrish was tried by a jury, convicted of rape, and given a life sentence. His judgment of conviction was affirmed. See Parrish v. State, 237 Ga.App. 274 (514 S.E.2d 458) (1999). Since that time, Parrish has filed numerous motions with the trial court; he further contested rulings thereon through multiple appeals and a discretionary application — each of which this Court dismissed.
Parrish has failed to provide this Court with a copy of the motion underlying the contested order.
Even assuming that Parrish pursued the foregoing grounds in the underlying motion, such collateral attacks upon his judgment of conviction were not viable. As the Georgia Supreme Court has made clear, a motion seeking to set aside or vacate an allegedly void criminal conviction is not one of the established procedures for challenging the validity of a judgment in a criminal case, and an appeal from the trial court's ruling on such a petition should be dismissed. See Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532 (690 S.E.2d 150) (2010). A direct appeal may lie from an order denying or dismissing a motion to correct a void sentence if the defendant raises a colorable claim that the sentence is, in fact, void or illegal. See Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, n.1 (686 S.E.2d 786) (2009). However, "[m]otions to vacate a void sentence generally are limited to claims that — even assuming the existence and validity of the conviction for which the sentence was imposed — the law does not authorize that sentence, most typically because it exceeds the most severe punishment for which the applicable penal statute provides." von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 572 (2) (748 S.E.2d 446) (2013). When a sentence is within the statutory range of punishment, it is not void. Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 669, 670 (604 S.E.2d 483) (2004).
Parrish's application brief challenges only his conviction, and he has made no claim that his sentence fell outside the applicable statutory range. Because Parrish may not attack his conviction in this manner, this application is hereby DISMISSED.