MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JUDITH C. HERRERA, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Giovanni Montijo-Dominguez's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 29, or in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Procedure.
A two-week jury trial was held in this case beginning May 22, 2017. After the Government closed its case on May 26, 2017, Defendant Montijo-Dominguez moved for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29.
Defendant Montijo-Dominguez now argues that he is entitled to judgment of acquittal on the basis that there was no evidence to support any of the elements of the conspiracy of which he was convicted or, in the alternative, that he is entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice.
Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
In considering a motion for judgment of acquittal, the Court views "the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the government to determine whether there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Lopez, 576 F.2d 840, 843 (10th Cir. 1978). The Court does not "weigh conflicting evidence or consider the credibility of the witnesses, but simply determine[s] whether [the] evidence, if believed, would establish each element of the crime." United States v. Vallo, 238 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2001) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A Court will only reverse a conviction if "no reasonable juror could have reached the disputed verdict." United States v. Isaac-Sigala, 448 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[T]he evidence, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, must be substantial, but it need not conclusively exclude every other reasonable hypothesis and it need not negate all possibilities except guilt." United States v. Rufai, 732 F.3d 1175, 1188 (10th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
A conspiracy conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of: "(1) an agreement by two or more persons to violate the law; (2) knowledge of the objectives of the conspiracy; (3) knowing and voluntary involvement in the conspiracy; and (4) interdependence among co-conspirators." United States v. Foy, 641 F.3d 455, 465 (10th Cir. 2011). "[I]nterdependence exists where each co-conspirators' activities constituted essential and integral steps toward the realization of a common, illicit goal. United States v. Edwards, 69 F.3d 419, 431 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Evidence at trial demonstrated that Mr. Montijo-Dominguez voluntarily agreed to drive Mendoza-Alarcon to Albuquerque to deliver money to men they believed to be affiliated with the cartel. While Mr. Montijo-Dominguez has maintained that he did not know anything about the purchase of drugs, the Government presented evidence from which the jury could infer that he did. For example, as the Government points out, Mr. Montijo-Dominguez's actions in driving around the parking lot before arriving at the specified location of the undercover vehicle could be interpreted by the jury to be consistent with counter-surveillance, indicating that Mr. Montijo-Dominguez had experience in conducting such deals and his involvement may not have been accidental.
With regard to the remaining element, interdependence, Mr. Montijo-Dominguez contends that there is no evidence of a "shared mutual benefit" as required under United States v. Carnagie, 533 F.3d 1231, 1238 (10th Cir. 2008) and United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 671 (10th Cir. 1992) because there is no evidence that "Mr. Montijo-Dominguez had any benefit in this alleged conspiracy."
Accordingly, sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support Defendant Montijo-Dominguez's conspiracy conviction, and the Court will deny his motion for a judgment of acquittal.
Rule 33 Motion for New Trial
Defendant Montijo-Dominguez presents no argument supporting his request for a new trial, but requests such relief "in the interest of justice." Mr. Montijo-Dominguez does not allege any error that rendered the trial unfair, nor does he cite any newly discovered evidence that would mandate a new trial. Mr. Montijo-Dominguez's arguments concerning the sufficiency of the evidence do not support granting a new trial, because if the evidence was in fact insufficient and mandated an acquittal, a new trial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467, 125 S.Ct. 1129, 1134, 160 L. Ed. 2d 914 (2005) ("[S]ubjecting the defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
Aside from Mr. Montijo-Dominguez's arguments concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, Defendant includes only one other sentence about a potential trial issue, contending that "[t]he jurors themselves, during deliberation, expressed confusion over the concept of the elements of conspiracy."