JANE MAGNUS-STINSON, District Judge.
On July 10, 2017, Plaintiff Indiana Transportation Museum, Inc. ("
In its brief in support of its Petition for Temporary Restraining Order, ITM states that Hoosier Heritage prohibited ITM from "operating the 2016 Fair Train, Polar Bear Express and historical, education and entertainment excursions in 2016 and 2017 and 2018." [
Although ITM asks for a temporary restraining order and generally cites to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b), it completely ignores the standards and burdens that request entails. First of all, ITM requests that the Court issue a temporary restraining order without notice to Hoosier Heritage, but makes no effort to comply with the requirements that accompany such a request. Specifically, Federal Rule 65(b)(1) provides that the Court may only issue a temporary restraining order without notice if "specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition." Moreover, ITM's counsel must certify in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 65(b)(1)(B). Although ITM's Complaint is verified and certified by John McNichols, Chairman/President of ITM, ITM's counsel has not certified in writing why the pending request for a temporary restraining order was filed ex parte. ITM's statement that the temporary restraining order should issue without notice so ITM has time to "prepare and operate its Fair Train on August 4, 2017" is not adequate to support the ex parte issuance of a temporary restraining order. It appears from the Complaint that this lawsuit encompasses an ongoing dispute between ITM and Hoosier Heritage that dates back to at least one year ago. [See
Additionally, ITM's Petition for Temporary Restraining Order is substantively deficient. The Court may grant a temporary restraining order if the movant: (1) has some likelihood of succeeding on the merits, (2) has no adequate remedy at law, and (3) will suffer irreparable harm if the order is denied. See Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1992). If these three elements are met, the Court will consider any irreparable harm to the non-movant and balance it against the harm to the movant. See id. at 12. ITM does not set forth what specific claim it is asserting in its Complaint. While it alleges jurisdiction based on the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 49 U.S.C. § 103, and 49 C.F.R. 1.89 the Complaint wholly fails to specify how those laws and regulation support its claim in this case. Without even setting forth its specific legal theories, the Court cannot determine whether ITM has any likelihood of success on the merits. Additionally, ITM states that it will suffer financial harm in the absence of a temporary restraining order, but this is precisely the type of harm for which there is an adequate remedy at law. See, e.g., Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. Public Service Comm'n of Wisconsin, 95 F.3d 1359, 1369 (7th Cir. 1996) ("With the question being one of monetary compensation, a plaintiff would be hard pressed to demonstrate either irreparable harm of an inadequate remedy at law").
Finally, the Court notes that ITM refers to its Petition for Temporary Restraining Order in its brief as its "Verified Petition for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction Hearing." [
In sum, the Court