CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, opinion of the Court:
¶ 1 Defendant D. Chris Robertson was prosecuted and convicted by the federal government for possession of child pornography. The State of Utah subsequently charged him with twenty counts of sexual exploitation of a minor based on the same conduct. Mr. Robertson argues that Utah Code section 76-1-404 prohibits this subsequent state prosecution. That statute provides that "[i]f a defendant's conduct establishes the commission of one or more offenses within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state and of another jurisdiction, federal or state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this state if . . . the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution . . .; and  the subsequent prosecution is for the same offense or offenses."
¶ 2 Under our previous interpretation of section 404, this statute would present no barrier to the current prosecution. In State v. Franklin,
¶ 3 Today, we reassess that earlier interpretation and ultimately conclude that it was wrongly decided. Taking into account stare decisis considerations, we overrule Franklin as to that issue and hold that the legislature's use of the phrase "same offense" in section 404 is an express rejection of the dual sovereignty doctrine. Properly interpreted, section 404 requires courts to employ only the Blockburger-Sosa test for determining whether two offenses are the "same offense." Under this test, two offenses are not the same if each requires proof of an element that the other does not.
¶ 4 After articulating the correct interpretation of the statute, we apply it to this case. Because the charged offenses in his federal and state prosecutions are the "same offense" under the Blockburger-Sosa test, and because the record shows that the state prosecution is based on the same conduct that was at issue in the initial federal prosecution, we conclude that section 404, properly interpreted, prohibits the State from prosecuting Mr. Robertson. We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
¶ 5 In March 2009, one of Mr. Robertson's employees alerted authorities that Mr. Robertson was viewing child pornography on his workplace computer. The Utah Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force (ICAC) began an investigation. Detective Mark Buhman, a Salt Lake City Police Department (SLPD) Officer assigned to the Utah ICAC, was made lead investigator on the case. The Utah ICAC is a "multi-jurisdictional task force that investigates and prosecutes individuals who use the Internet to exploit children."
¶ 6 Detective Buhman eventually secured a warrant to search Mr. Robertson's business and seize his computers. During the search, officers seized a black, custom-built computer; a Dell computer; and several computer storage media. Examination of the computers revealed more than 24,000 still images of child pornography and approximately 380 child pornography videos. Mr. Robertson agreed to speak to Detective Buhman during the search and admitted to viewing and downloading child pornography. But he denied re-sending or producing any pornography. Detective Buhman was eventually reassigned and Special Agent Benjamin Lee of the Utah Attorney General's Office took over the case.
¶ 7 Agent Lee concluded the investigation and decided to have the case screened for federal prosecution. Before moving forward with federal screening, Agent Lee sought approval from the Assistant Utah Attorney General who oversaw ICAC cases. Seeking such approval was standard protocol, and the Assistant Utah Attorney General had no objection. The State sought federal prosecution in order to obtain a more severe sentence.
¶ 8 During federal screening, Agent Lee presented an attorney from the United States Attorney's Office with ten or eleven short digital videos depicting child pornography. Agent Lee testified that these videos "would have been from the Dell computer." The United States Attorney's Office concluded that there was probable cause to support federal prosecution.
¶ 9 Mr. Robertson was indicted by a federal grand jury in September 2009 on one count of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 2252A(a)(5)(B) (2008).
¶ 10 Upon learning of the federal sentence, an Assistant Utah Attorney General contacted Agent Lee to "discuss the possibility of filing state charges." After reviewing the evidence, the Assistant Utah Attorney General decided to proceed with state prosecution of Mr. Robertson. The State charged him with twenty counts of sexual exploitation of a minor in violation of Utah Code section 76-5a-3.
¶ 11 Mr. Robertson moved to dismiss the State charges, claiming that the State's prosecution violated his constitutional right to due process under the double jeopardy clause of the state and federal constitutions, violated Utah Code section 76-1-404's rule against double jeopardy, and was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. He also claimed that the State's prosecution was vindictive. The trial court denied Mr. Robertson's motion to dismiss, finding that the state prosecution following federal prosecution was permissible under current law and that the State's prosecution was not vindictive. As part of its order denying Mr. Robertson's motion, the court specifically found that Mr. Robertson's Utah prosecution was "[b]ased on the same body of evidence" as his federal prosecution. Mr. Robertson filed a petition for interlocutory appeal, which was denied.
¶ 12 After a bench trial where Mr. Robertson did not contest his guilt, he was convicted and sentenced to twenty concurrent terms of one to fifteen years in prison. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court described the case as "basically the same case that was had in federal court, it's based on the same facts." The court decided not to treat the prior federal conviction as an aggravating factor, reasoning that the federal conviction is "exactly the same case, same investigation, the same facts. . . . [and that] it would be unduly prejudicial . . . to consider it a prior criminal conviction when it's based on the same facts and circumstances."
¶ 13 Mr. Robertson appealed to the court of appeals, arguing "that the dual sovereignty doctrine should not apply under the circumstances of this case and that his state court convictions are therefore barred under the double jeopardy clauses of both the United States and Utah constitutions, as well as by state double jeopardy statutes and principles of res judicata."
Standard of Review
¶ 14 We granted certiorari to address whether the court of appeals erred in holding that Utah Code section 76-1-404 did not bar the State's subsequent prosecution of Mr. Robertson.
¶ 15 The double jeopardy clauses of both the Utah and federal constitutions limit the government's ability to prosecute or punish an individual multiple times for the same conduct.
¶ 16 First, we employ the test announced by the United States Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States
¶ 17 Second, we look to whether the successive prosecution is undertaken by the same sovereign. "[W]hen the same act transgresses the laws of two sovereigns, `it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offense; but only that by one act he has committed two offenses, for each of which he is justly punishable.'"
¶18 These two analyses—Blockburger-Sosa and dual sovereignty—together determine whether a defendant has been prosecuted or punished for the "same offense" under both federal and Utah constitutional law. Some states have departed from this approach by enacting statutes that limit the dual sovereignty doctrine.
¶ 19 Our discussion of this issue proceeds in three parts. First, we discuss our prior interpretation of section 404, found in State v. Franklin, and conclude that we squarely held that section 404 incorporated without limitation the dual sovereignty doctrine. Second, we discuss whether that interpretation should be overruled today. We hold that it should. We then interpret section 404's use of "same offense" as incorporating only the Blockburger-Sosa test, though we note that the relevant units of prosecution help to inform courts as to the conduct at issue in the prosecutions. Finally, we determine that our decision to overrule Franklin will apply retroactively to cases pending on direct and collateral review and that, under the proper interpretation of section 404, the State was barred from prosecuting Mr. Robertson. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' decision.
I. In State v. Franklin, We Held that Section 76-1-404 Incorporated the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
¶ 20 The heart of this case is the proper interpretation of Utah Code section 76-1-404. The statute reads as follows:
We have addressed this statute only once, in State v. Franklin.
¶ 21 The defendant in Franklin was "an avowed racist" who "shot and killed two black men who were jogging in Liberty Park with two white women."
¶ 22 On appeal, the defendant claimed that his subsequent "trial in state court after his conviction in federal court violated the prohibitions against double jeopardy contained in the United States Constitution and in the Utah Constitution and Code"—section 76-1-404.
¶ 23 Having reviewed whether the offenses were the same under the Blockburger-Sosa analysis, we then proceeded to the second analysis of whether the two offenses were the same: the dual sovereignty doctrine, which looks to whether the offenses were against the same sovereign. We concluded that "[d]efendant's convictions [were] also separate offenses because they were imposed under the laws of different sovereigns"—federal and state.
¶ 24 The defendant in Franklin argued that we should "abandon the dual sovereignty doctrine" because section 76-1-404 "compels that result."
¶ 25 Mr. Robertson argues that this second holding, our conclusion that section 404's use of "same offense" evidenced the legislative intent to incorporate both a Blockburger-Sosa analysis as well as the dual sovereignty doctrine, is dicta. "For a decision to become precedent and trigger stare decisis, `it must be (1) [a] deliberate or solemn decision of a court or judge  made after argument of a question of law fairly arising in a case, and  necessary to its determination.'"
¶ 26 When we say that a holding is binding only when it is "necessary," we do not mean that the holding must be the singular basis for our ultimate decision. Courts "often confront cases raising multiple issues that could be dispositive, yet they find it appropriate to resolve several, in order to avoid repetition of errors on remand or provide guidance for future cases. Or, [courts] will occasionally find it appropriate to offer alternative rationales for the results they reach."
¶ 27 Instead, "necessary" "means only that the court undeniably decided the issue, not that it was unavoidable for it do so."
Thus, when this court "confronts an issue germane to the eventual resolution of the case, and resolves it after reasoned consideration in a published opinion, that ruling becomes the law of the [state], regardless of whether doing so is necessary in some strict logical sense."
¶ 28 As discussed above, under traditional double jeopardy jurisprudence, the Blockburger-Sosa analysis and the dual sovereignty doctrine must both be satisfied for two offenses to be considered the same. In other words, two offenses are the same when they require proof of the same facts and are prosecuted by the same sovereign. Conversely, two offenses are not the same where each requires proof of a fact that the other does not or where they have been prosecuted by two different sovereigns. Failing either analysis means the offenses cannot be considered the "same" and, therefore, prosecution of both offenses is not barred by double jeopardy. In Franklin, we determined that the offenses were not the same under either analysis and that nothing in section 404 altered that result. As our discussion of one analysis did not preclude the consideration of the other, both analyses—Blockburger-Sosa and dual sovereignty—were germane to our ultimate decision. Thus, our second holding in Franklin, which specifically incorporated the dual sovereignty doctrine into our interpretation of section 76-1-404, was not dicta but an alternative holding that justified the result we reached. Accordingly, it is binding precedent. We turn now to the issue of whether that precedent should be overruled.
II. We Hold that "Same Offense" in Section 76-1-404 Incorporates the Blockburger-Sosa Test but Rejects the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, Overruling in Part State v. Franklin
¶ 29 Having clarified the precedential value of State v. Franklin,
A. We Are Persuaded that Franklin's Interpretation of Section 76-1-404 Should Be Overruled
¶ 30 We consider at least three factors when deciding whether to overrule a prior interpretation of a statute: "the plausibility of the existing interpretation given the statute, the degree to which that interpretation has worked itself into the state of the law, and the strength of the arguments for changing that interpretation."
1. The plausibility of the existing interpretation
¶ 31 The first factor that we consider is "the plausibility of the existing interpretation given the statute."
¶ 32 Our interpretation of section 404 in Franklin is undermined by the fact that we did not consider in any great depth any of the language of the statute other than the phrase "same offense."
¶ 33 The language of section 76-1-404 plainly bars a Utah prosecution if the defendant has already been prosecuted for the same offense in another jurisdiction.
2. The degree to which the prior interpretation has worked itself into the law
¶ 34 The second factor we consider in deciding whether to overrule a prior interpretation of a statute is "the degree to which that interpretation has worked itself into the state of the law."
¶ 35 Mr. Robertson argues that Franklin, while almost thirty years old, has not been "woven into the fabric of the law" because it has never again been cited for its interpretation of section 76-1-404. Although it is true that section 404 has only been addressed by Utah courts twice—once in Franklin and again in this case—and the dual sovereignty doctrine has only been addressed three times—Franklin, this case, and State v. Byrns,
¶ 36 Although the lack of citations is generally inconclusive, there are other ways of determining whether a particular interpretation has worked its way into the law. For example, in A.C. Financial, the prior interpretation had created a "widely accepted rule" that was repeatedly recognized in later cases.
¶ 37 There are no other cases reaffirming the interpretation we adopted in Franklin. There are no other statutes or common law doctrines that depend on or otherwise incorporate our interpretation of section 404. And we are not persuaded that there is any great reliance on Franklin's interpretation of section 404. There are no contractual, property, or similar vested rights created by our interpretation of section 404 that would be undermined by departing from Franklin today. Indeed, the effects of a departure from our interpretation in Franklin are both obvious and narrow: the State would be prohibited from prosecuting a defendant who has already been prosecuted in another jurisdiction for the same offense.
3. The strength of the arguments for changing the prior interpretation
¶ 38 The third factor we look to when deciding whether to overrule a prior interpretation of a statute is "the strength of the arguments for changing that interpretation."
¶ 39 The State argues that our prior interpretation of section 76-1-404 should be upheld because it best protects the interests of the State of Utah and its citizens. The State claims that if we interpret section 404 as rejecting the dual sovereignty doctrine, we would be "relinquish[ing] unnecessarily the power of the State to try and punish those who break its laws" based on prosecutions in other jurisdictions that may not satisfy Utah's sovereign interests.
¶ 40 Although the State's arguments have some merit—indeed, these were the very reasons why we originally incorporated the dual sovereignty doctrine into section 404—they do not outweigh our duty to respect our constitutionally limited role as interpreters and not creators of statutory law. Our constitution vests the legislative power of the State in the legislature and legal voters.
¶ 41 As we discussed above, the plain language of Utah Code section 76-1-404 indicates a legislative intent to preclude prosecutions by the State following a prosecution of the same offense in another jurisdiction. Thus, the intent of section 404 is to limit the dual sovereignty doctrine in Utah. To interpret the language "same offense" as incorporating the dual sovereignty doctrine would negate the intent of the statute, leaving it entirely superfluous. Indeed, if the statute provides no greater protections than those offered by the federal and Utah constitutions—protections which have long been recognized in our law—it is a pure redundancy. We assume the legislature intended something by enacting section 404, and we assume that intent is expressed in the language of the statute. We have "no power to rewrite [a] statute to conform to an intention not expressed."
¶ 42 Further, there are policy reasons that favor an expansion of double jeopardy principles. As the United States Supreme Court stated:
Double jeopardy principles provide vital protections to individuals, and the legislature's apparent intent to expand such protections beyond the constitutional minimum should be respected. These considerations—separation of powers and double jeopardy principles—are compelling arguments in favor of abandoning our prior interpretation of section 404.
¶ 43 Each of the three factors discussed above weighs in favor of overruling our prior interpretation that section 76-1-404 incorporated the dual sovereignty doctrine. Although we are generally reluctant to overrule precedent, this case is a prime example of a circumstance where revisiting a prior decision is both justified and appropriate. Accordingly, we hereby overrule our holding in Franklin that section 76-1-404 is simply "a legislative codification of traditional double jeopardy interpretation,"
B. Section 76-1-404's Inclusion of "Same Offense" Incorporates the Blockburger-Sosa Test
¶ 44 Utah Code section 76-1-404 states that "[i]f a defendant's conduct establishes the commission of one or more offenses within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state and of another jurisdiction, federal or state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this state if" two conditions are satisfied. First, the prior prosecution must have "resulted in an acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those terms are defined in Section 76-1-403." Second, the subsequent Utah prosecution must be "for the same offense or offenses." The central issue in this case is what the legislature meant by "same offense or offenses."
¶ 45 As we recognized in Franklin, "[w]hen the legislature uses a word with a well-established legal meaning, we assume that the legislature is aware of that meaning and has used the word in its proper sense."
¶ 46 "Generally, absent express direction to the contrary, we presume that a term of art used in a statute is to be given its usual legal definition."
¶ 47 The State urges us to modify the Blockburger-Sosa test by looking not only to the elements of the two criminal offenses, but also to the applicable "unit of prosecution." Under the State's approach, "the laws of different sovereigns cannot fairly be considered the `same'—even if elementally identical in the Blockburger sense—if the unit of prosecution of one is different than the other." For the reasons discussed below, however, we disagree. Although the relevant units of prosecution may inform the question of what specific conduct the State is seeking to prosecute the defendant for, and whether that conduct is the same as that for which the defendant has already been prosecuted in another jurisdiction, the fact that two criminal statutes identify two different units of prosecution does not mean that the offenses are different under Blockburger-Sosa for purposes of section 404.
¶ 48 "The allowable unit of prosecution for an offense determines whether a perpetrator's conduct constitutes one or more violations of that offense."
The State argues that, so long as two criminal statutes have different units of prosecution, they can never be considered the "same offense" under section 404.
¶ 49 The problem with this argument is that section 404 looks to whether "a defendant's conduct establishes the commission of one or more offenses" that are "the same offense."
¶ 50 Section 404 requires us to determine whether the defendant has been prosecuted for the same conduct constituting the same offense in another jurisdiction. And while the relevant units of prosecution help inform us as to what specific conduct the defendant was already prosecuted for, they do not answer the question of whether "the subsequent prosecution is for the same offense or offenses."
¶ 51 In Brown v. Ohio, the Supreme Court had to determine whether the prosecution of a lesser-included offense encompassed the same conduct as was subsequently prosecuted.
¶ 52 The Court held that the court of appeals was correct in concluding that the two offenses were the same under the traditional Blockburger test.
¶ 53 Accordingly, section 404 requires courts to analyze two separate issues to determine whether the statute prohibits a subsequent Utah prosecution: first, whether the offenses are the same under Blockburger-Sosa. If not, then section 404's protections do not apply. But if so, the court must also determine whether the conduct for which the defendant is being prosecuted in Utah is the same conduct that was at issue in the prior foreign prosecution. To answer this question, the court must look at the relevant units of prosecution, which define the chargeable conduct, and the evidence supporting the prosecutions. If the other jurisdiction's unit of prosecution defines the offense in such a way that the evidence relied upon to prove the criminal conduct in that jurisdiction encompasses the evidence necessary to prove the criminal conduct at issue in the Utah prosecution, section 404 prohibits the subsequent Utah prosecution.
¶ 54 Ultimately, in cases implicating section 404, the question is whether the conduct for which the defendant was prosecuted in the other jurisdiction constitutes the "same offense" both elementally (Blockburger-Sosa) and factually (relevant units of prosecution supported by evidence). When a defendant seeks dismissal under section 404—as does Mr. Robertson—he or she must demonstrate that the elements of the statute have been satisfied. To show that prosecutions are the "same offense" factually—that is, based on the same conduct—a defendant may rely on evidence from all aspects of the record in the previous and subsequent prosecutions, including any available information relating to the indictment, notices of forfeiture, a plea colloquy, or sentencing. We turn now to whether and how we should apply this test to the facts of this case.
III. Section 76-1-404 Prohibits the State's Subsequent Prosecution of Mr. Robertson
¶ 55 Prior to deciding whether section 76-1-404 prohibits the State's prosecution of Mr. Robertson, we must first address the State's argument that our decision to overrule Franklin should be applied prospectively only. We conclude that section 404 is a substantive statute that creates an affirmative defense to avoid the dual sovereignty exception to double jeopardy
A. Section 76-1-404 Is a Substantive Statute that Creates an Affirmative Defense to Avoid the Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy, and We Apply It Retroactively to Cases on Direct and Collateral Review
¶ 56 Mr. Robertson asks us to retroactively apply section 404 "as written" in both "this case and all non-final cases." Though we have established general rules governing the retroactive application of statutes,
¶ 57 As discussed below, we have not yet adopted a specific rule governing the retroactive application of new interpretations of substantive criminal statutes. After consulting the approaches taken by federal courts and our sister jurisdictions, we conclude that a new interpretation of a substantive criminal statute will apply retroactively to cases on direct and collateral review. We therefore apply our interpretation of section 404 to Mr. Robertson. We discuss each issue in turn.
¶ 58 Our recent retroactivity jurisprudence clarifies that whether a new rule of criminal law can be retroactively applied turns on whether it is procedural or substantive. In prior cases, we have almost exclusively addressed the retroactive application of "new rules of criminal procedure announced in judicial decisions."
¶ 59 Because Mr. Robertson asks us to retroactively apply the interpretation of section 404 announced in this decision—an interpretation that recognizes the legislature's intent to reject the dual sovereignty doctrine and provide broader protections to criminal defendants than we recognized in Franklin
¶ 60 And in articulating a rule of retroactivity governing new rules of substantive criminal law, we are guided by federal precedents and the approaches taken by our sister jurisdictions. Significant in this regard is Bousley v. United States.
¶61 In deciding whether to retroactively apply this interpretation of the statute to a defendant who was before the Court on collateral review, the Bousley Court reasoned that "decisions of [the Supreme Court] holding that a substantive federal criminal statute does not reach certain conduct" are new substantive rules.
¶ 62 State courts have generally adopted two different responses to Bousley. A majority of our sister jurisdictions follow Bousley in granting a new substantive rule—including a new interpretation of a substantive criminal statute—full retroactivity, applying it on direct and collateral review.
¶ 63 We are persuaded by Bousley and the majority of our sister jurisdictions to adopt a rule of full retroactivity—applying to cases on both direct and collateral review—for a new interpretation of a substantive criminal statute. Like the United States Supreme Court, we recognize that "it is only [the legislature], and not the courts, which can make conduct criminal."
¶ 64 Thus, we hold that new interpretations of substantive criminal statutes have automatic full retroactivity, subject of course to our law of preservation.
B. The Record Shows that the State Premised Its Prosecution of Mr. Robertson on Conduct that Constitutes the "Same Offense" for Which He Was Prosecuted Federally
¶ 65 As discussed, Utah Code section 76-1-404 prohibits the State from prosecuting a defendant if the defendant has already been prosecuted in another jurisdiction provided two conditions are satisfied. First, "the former prosecution [must] result in an acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution."
¶ 66 As we have explained, determining whether a prior foreign prosecution qualifies as the "same offense" under section 404 requires a two-part analysis: whether the offenses for which an individual was prosecuted are the same under Blockburger-Sosa and, if they are, whether the conduct establishing the offenses is also the same. In this case, there is no dispute that the two relevant statutes are the "same offense" under a Blockburger-Sosa analysis. Mr. Robertson was charged in both federal and state court with possession of child pornography. The federal child pornography statute, 18 U.S.C. section 2252A(a)(5)(B) (2008), criminalizes the "knowing possess[ion]" of "any . . . material that contains an image of child pornography that has been . . . transported using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce." The equivalent Utah statute, section 76-5a-3 (2004),
¶ 67 We must next determine whether the prosecutions were based on the same conduct. If they are not, then the State is free to prosecute based on any previously uncharged criminal conduct. This analysis, as we described above, is informed by the relevant units of prosecution. Under federal law, the unit of prosecution "is each `material,' or medium, containing an image of child pornography."
¶ 68 The State argues that because Mr. Robertson was charged with only one count of violating the federal statute, he was federally prosecuted only for possessing one medium containing child pornography—the federal unit of prosecution. The State claims that the medium that served as the basis for the federal prosecution was the Dell computer because the Utah agent provided the federal attorney with videos solely from that computer during the federal screening process. So because Mr. Robertson owned several media containing child pornography—two computers and several other storage devices—the State argues that it is free to prosecute him for possessing the child pornography contained in the other media. Although we agree that were the federal prosecution truly limited to prosecuting Mr. Robertson's possession of child pornography on one computer, section 404 would not prohibit the subsequent state prosecution, we disagree that the federal prosecution was so limited.
¶ 69 The one-count federal indictment returned by the grand jury charged Mr. Robertson with knowing possession of multiple media—"computer disks and other materials containing images of child pornography." The forfeiture notice included with the indictment stated that all of the media—not just the one computer—were used "to commit and to facilitate the commission of [the] violation" of the federal child pornography statute. Thus, though the federal indictment could have rested solely on Mr. Robertson's possession of one medium containing child pornography, it appears that the prosecution was based on his possession of multiple media, with no distinction made between any of the various media. Indeed, the trial court in the Utah case specifically determined that this was the case, finding that the Utah prosecution—which charged Mr. Robertson with multiple counts of possession of child pornography based on images found on both computers—was "[b]ased on the same body of evidence" as the previous federal prosecution. Because the federal prosecution was based on evidence of Mr. Robertson's possession of all the media containing child pornography, it encompassed the evidence of the conduct that was at issue in the Utah prosecution. Therefore, the two prosecutions were for the same conduct.
¶ 70 In sum, the federal and Utah criminal statutes constitute the "same offense" under Blockburger-Sosa. The evidence of criminal conduct supporting the federal prosecution encompassed the evidence of criminal conduct used to support the subsequent Utah prosecution. Thus, Mr. Robertson was prosecuted for the same conduct, constituting the "same offense," twice. Accordingly, section 76-1-404 bars the State's subsequent prosecution of Mr. Robertson. We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
¶ 71 Our conclusion in State v. Franklin that Utah Code section 76-1-404's use of "same offense" incorporated the dual sovereignty doctrine is overruled. The language of the statute unmistakably operates as a legislative rejection of the dual sovereignty doctrine. We accordingly clarify today that section 404's use of "same offense" encompasses only the Blockburger-Sosa test. Thus, section 404 prohibits Utah prosecutions following prosecutions in other jurisdictions so long as the offenses are the same under Blockburger-Sosa and the conduct at issue in the previous prosecution encompasses the same conduct at issue in the Utah prosecution, as informed by the relevant units of prosecution and evidence. The interpretation of section 404 that we announce today applies retroactively and, applying this interpretation to Mr. Robertson's case, we hold that section 404 prohibited the State from prosecuting him after the federal prosecution. We therefore reverse the court of appeals' decision.