SUE WALKER, Justice.
Appellants Richard and Linda Seim sued Appellees Allstate Texas Lloyds and its adjuster, Lisa Scott, following Allstate's denial of a claim under the Seims' homeowners' policy. Appellees moved for summary judgment on the Seims' claims, asserting limitations and that the Seims had no evidence to support certain elements of their claims. The trial court granted summary judgment in Appellees' favor without specifying the grounds on which the judgment was based. In two issues, the Seims argue that summary judgment was improper because their claims are not barred by limitations and because they presented a genuine issue of material fact on each of the challenged elements of their claims. We will affirm.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Allstate provided the Seims with a homeowners' policy covering their property in Bedford, Texas. The policy period began on April 27, 2013, and ended on April 27, 2014. On August 28, 2013, the Seims notified Allstate that their home had been damaged by a storm that occurred earlier in August. Scott, an adjuster for Allstate, inspected the Seims' property on or about September 10, 2013.
On February 11, 2014, the Seims brought suit against Allstate alleging certain causes of action arising from Allstate's denial of their homeowners' claim. In their original petition, the Seims claimed that the damage to their property resulted from the August 2013 storm. On April 15, 2014, the Seims amended their petition. In their first amended petition, the Seims removed all references to the August 2013 storm and asserted that the damage to their property stemmed from an April 2007 storm.
On October 28, 2015, the Seims amended their petition one last time. In their third amended petition, the Seims removed references to the April 2007, April 2008, and May 2012 storms, and once again asserted that the damage to their property stemmed from an August 2013 storm. The Seims alleged the following claims in their third amended petition: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing; (3) unfair settlement practices in violation of the Texas Insurance Code; (4) violation of the prompt-payment provisions of the Texas Insurance Code; and (5) violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA).
Appellees moved for summary judgment on both traditional and no-evidence grounds. Appellees argued that the Seims' claims were barred by limitations, asserting that the October 28, 2015 filing date of the third amended petition, rather than the February 11, 2014 filing date of the original petition, should be considered the date in which the Seims' claims were filed.
The Seims filed their response to Appellees' motion for summary judgment seven days prior to the summary judgment hearing. Due to what the Seims describe as a "technical failure," their response did not include any attached summary judgment evidence. On the day of the summary judgment hearing, the Seims filed a response that included attached summary judgment evidence. Six days after the hearing, the Seims once again filed their response with attached summary judgment evidence.
The trial court ultimately granted Appellees' no-evidence and traditional motion for summary judgment. The summary judgment order reflected that the trial court had considered "all responses [and] all competent summary judgment evidence." The order did not specify the grounds on which the judgment was based. This appeal ensued following the entry of the summary judgment order.
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT?
When a party seeks both a traditional and no-evidence summary judgment on the nonmovant's claims, we first review the trial court's summary judgment under the no-evidence standard of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i). Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). Thus, we will first address the Seims' second issue—whether they presented a genuine issue of material fact on each the challenged elements of their claims.
A. Standard of Review
After an adequate time for discovery, the party without the burden of proof may, without presenting evidence, move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence to support an essential element of the nonmovant's claim or defense. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). The motion must specifically state the elements for which there is no evidence. Id.; Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009). The trial court must grant the motion unless the nonmovant produces summary judgment evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) & cmt.; Hamilton v. Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008).
When reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment, we examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion. Sudan v. Sudan, 199 S.W.3d 291, 292 (Tex. 2006). We review a no-evidence summary judgment for evidence that would enable reasonable and fair-minded jurors to differ in their conclusions. Hamilton, 249 S.W.3d at 426 (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005)). We credit evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could, and we disregard evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could not. Timpte Indus., 286 S.W.3d at 310 (quoting Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006)). If the nonmovant brings forward more than a scintilla of probative evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact, then a no-evidence summary judgment is not proper. Smith v. O'Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Tex. 2009); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1030 (2004).
B. Appellees' Motion
In their motion, Appellees argued that summary judgment was proper on the Seims' breach of contract claim because the Seims had no evidence that their loss occurred during the policy period.
Appellees then argued that because the Seims had no evidence to support their breach of contract claim, summary judgment was proper on their extracontractual claims. See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 542.060 (providing that in order to be liable for a prompt-payment violation, the insurer must also be "liable for a claim under an insurance policy"); State Farm Lloyds v. Page, 315 S.W.3d 525, 532 (Tex. 2010) ("When the issue of coverage is resolved in the insurer's favor, extra-contractual claims do not survive."); Archer v. Med. Protective Co. of Fort Wayne, Indiana, 197 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2006, pet. denied) (holding insured could not maintain claims against insurer for unfair settlement practices where insurer had no liability for underlying policy claim); Lundstrom v. United Servs. Ass'n-CIC, 192 S.W.3d 78, 95-97 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (holding insurer was not liable for insureds' claims of bad faith, violation of the DTPA, and unfair insurance practices when the policy did not provide coverage for the claimed loss); Toonen v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 935 S.W.2d 937, 941 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ) ("As a general rule, an insured does not have a bad faith claim in the absence of a breach of contract by the insurer.").
C. The Seims' Responses
Seven days prior to the summary judgment hearing, the Seims filed their summary judgment response. In their response, the Seims referenced an expert report made by Dr. Neil B. Hall, an affidavit made by Dr. Hall, and certain deposition testimony of Linda Seim to support their claim that their property damage stemmed from an August 2013 storm. While this evidence was referenced in their response, no evidence was actually attached to the Seims' initial summary judgment response.
On the day of the summary judgment hearing, the Seims once again filed their summary judgment response. Again, the Seims referenced Dr. Hall's report, Dr. Hall's affidavit, and Linda Seim's deposition testimony to support their claim that their property damage stemmed from an August 2013 storm. The Seims attached two reports made by Dr. Hall to their summary judgment response. In his initial report, Dr. Hall is equivocal as to the cause of the Seims' property damage, acknowledging that some of their property damage occurred prior to the August 2013 storm. In his second report, Dr. Hall emphatically states that the damage to the Seims' property "resulted from [an] August 13, 2013, windstorm." Notably, neither of Dr. Hall's reports are verified. Also of note, the Seims did not attach any of Linda Seim's deposition testimony to their response. The Seims did, however, attach Dr. Hall's affidavit to their summary judgment response. Dr. Hall's affidavit states:
Six days after the summary judgment hearing, the Seims filed another summary judgment response. This response did not contain any summary judgment evidence that was not already included in the summary judgment response filed the morning of the summary judgment hearing.
As a preliminary matter, we address Appellees' argument that summary judgment was proper because the Seims' summary judgment evidence was untimely. Appellees correctly point out that a summary judgment response, including opposing summary judgment evidence, may be filed no later than the seventh day before the date of the summary judgment hearing except on leave of court. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). The record must contain an affirmative indication that the trial court permitted the late filing of a response or the response is a nullity. K-Six Television, Inc. v. Santiago, 75 S.W.3d 91, 96 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.). Permission to file a late response may be reflected in a recital in the summary judgment order. Id.
Here, the order on Appellees' motion for summary judgment reflects that the trial court considered "all responses [and] all competent summary judgment evidence." We hold that that this recital in the summary judgment order is an affirmative indication that the trial court permitted the Seims' various untimely summary judgment responses and evidence. See Auten v. DJ Clark, Inc., 209 S.W.3d 695, 702-03 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (considering, on appeal, late-filed affidavit where trial court's order recited that it considered affidavit); K-Six Television, 75 S.W.3d at 96 (considering, on appeal, late-filed summary judgment response where trial court's order recited that it considered the response); Hendricks v. Thornton, 973 S.W.2d 348, 371 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, pet. denied) ("[T]he trial court's order granting the summary judgment specifically states the trial judge reviewed the investors' responses. We conclude, therefore, the record indicates the trial court permitted the late response."). Accordingly, we will also consider the Seims' various untimely summary judgment responses and evidence.
We next turn to whether the Seims brought forth more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether their loss occurred during the policy period—namely whether it occurred between April 27, 2013, and April 27, 2014. The only evidence that the Seims pointed to in their various summary judgment responses to establish when their loss occurred was Dr. Hall's reports, Dr. Hall's affidavit, and Linda Seim's deposition testimony.
Linda Seim's deposition testimony was not attached to any of the Seims' summary judgment responses; it, therefore, does nothing to raise a fact issue as to whether the Seims' loss occurred during the policy period.
We next turn to Dr. Hall's affidavit. We begin by noting that the affidavit does not explain how the Seims' loss was caused by an August 2013 storm.
As the Seims have produced no competent evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether their loss occurred during the policy period, summary judgment was proper as to all of the Seims' claims. See Page, 315 S.W.3d at 532; Allied Pilots Ass'n, 262 S.W.3d at 778; Block, 744 S.W.2d at 944; Archer, 197 S.W.3d at 426; Lundstrom, 192 S.W.3d at 95-97; Toonen, 935 S.W.2d at 941. We thus overrule the Seims' second issue.
Having overruled the Seims' second issue,