KENNY ARMSTRONG, J.
This is a mechanic's lien case. Appellee/auto repair shop agreed to repair Appellant's vehicle for $5,267.30. Appellant paid this amount, but Appellee raised the estimate to $9,489.30. Appellant did not pay the additional costs. Under a purported mechanic's lien, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 66-19-103, Appellee sold Appellant's vehicle for $4,500.00. Appellant filed a complaint, seeking damages for conversion and for violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court dismissed Appellant's Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim. Concerning the conversion claim, the trial court held that Appellee did not have a valid mechanic's lien and had converted the property. The trial court awarded $10,000.00 in damages to Appellant. Appellant appeals, arguing that the damage award is insufficient. Discerning no error, we affirm.
On January 3, 2014, Appellant Wondimu Borena purchased a 2012 Honda Odyssey minivan from an online car dealer for $7,041.93. The vehicle had been totaled, and Mr. Borena took the vehicle to Limon Auto Repair.
On January 8, 2015, Greenleaf allegedly sent notice to Mr. Borena that he owed $19,241.10 for repairs, storage fees, and processing fees, and informed him that, if the balance was not paid in full within ten days, Greenleaf would sell the vehicle to satisfy the debt. Appellant testified that he never received a letter from Greenleaf. On or about March 17, 2015, Greenleaf sold the vehicle for $4,500.00.
On June 3, 2015, Appellant, acting pro se, filed a warrant in the general sessions court against an employee of Greenleaf, Jason Jacocks, seeking a return of Appellant's vehicle, which he valued at $29,000.00; this warrant was dismissed, without explanation. Appellant refiled the case against Appellee Greenleaf. On July 13, 2015, the general sessions court dismissed the Greenleaf warrant, again without explanation. On July 17, 2015, Appellant filed a notice of appeal of the general sessions' judgment.
On August 3, 2015, Mr. Borena, who was represented by counsel at the time, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Davidson County ("trial court") against Jason Jacocks and Appellee Greenleaf. Mr. Borena sought damages, costs, and attorney's fees, alleging: (1) violation of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 66-19-104(a)(1)(B), which requires an automobile repair facility to inform a consumer of his or her rights; (2) violation of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 66-14-102, which requires notice to the owner of a vehicle prior to sale on a lien; (3) violation of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 66-14-106, which requires the proceeds of a sale on a lien, if a balance remains, to be delivered to the former owner; (4) violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), Tennessee Code Annotated Section 47-18-104; and (5) conversion of Appellant's property. On January 20, 2016, Appellee filed its answer to the complaint, alleging that it was entitled to sell Appellant's vehicle because Appellant had not paid the $9,489.20 repair cost. Appellee denied Appellant's statutory claims and claim for conversion and sought damages for the repairs and storage charges.
On January 20, 2016, the trial court heard the case. Appellant voluntarily dismissed Jason Jacocks as a party. At the close of proof, Greenleaf moved to dismiss Appellant's claims. The trial court dismissed Mr. Borena's TCPA claim, on the ground that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 47-18-104(b)(27) does not provide a private right of action and vests enforcement solely in the attorney general. The trial court denied Greenleaf's motion as to all other claims. On February 2, 2016, the trial court entered its order, finding:
We restate Appellant's issues, as follows
Greenleaf asks this Court to award its attorney's fees and costs for this appeal on the ground that the appeal is frivolous, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-1-122.
III. Standard of Review
Because this case was tried by the trial court, sitting without a jury, we review the trial court's findings of fact de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of these findings, unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d);
To the extent that the issues require us to interpret and apply statutes, this Court reviews questions of statutory construction de novo with no presumption of correctness.
Before turning to the issues, we note that Appellant is self-represented in this appeal. However, "pro se litigants are held to the same procedural and substantive standards to which lawyers must adhere."
A. Dismissal of Appellant's Tennessee Consumer Protection Act Claims
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. At trial, Appellant stated that he was proceeding under the "catch-all provision" of the TCPA, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated Section 47-18-104(b)(27)
B. Applicability of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 66-19-104
Tennessee Code Annotated Section 66-19-104 provides, in relevant part, that:
The trial court found that Greenleaf violated Section 66-19-104 and committed conversion by selling Appellant's vehicle. The trial court explained from the bench:
Turning to the record, both Appellant and Larry Jacocks testified that Appellee provided Appellant with a "preliminary estimate" of $5,267.30 on June 7, 2014. At some point thereafter, Appellee informed Mr. Borena that the repair cost would be $9,489.20. Pursuant to Section 66-19-104, an automotive repair facility (such as Appellee) must obtain consent from a consumer to complete repairs that are twenty-five percent or higher than the original estimate; if the consumer is informed orally instead of in writing, the repair shop must create a written record of the notification. Larry Jacocks testified that Appellee never has customers "sign [anything] else once they sign us to repair [on the preliminary estimate;]" therefore, all future repair cost increases are by oral notification. Greenleaf made no record of any "good faith attempts" to obtain Appellant's consent to the additional repairs. Additionally, the estimate forms used by Greenleaf do not list the statutory notice of consumer's rights as required in Section 66-19-104(b). Accordingly, the record does not preponderate against the trial court's finding that Appellee did not comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 66-19-104; therefore, pursuant to subsection 66-19-104(d), we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Appellee was not authorized to sell Appellant's vehicle and that the sale was a conversion.
C. Amount of Damages
We now address the trial court's damages award. Mr. Borena argues that the $10,000.00 damages "award... is less than half of the total expenses incurred," and, therefore, the trial court erred because its award was insufficient. As a threshold matter, in a bench trial, the trial court's determination of damages is a question of fact, and "we review the amount of damages awarded by the trial court with a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates otherwise."
Although Appellee sold Appellant's vehicle for $4,500.00, the trial court found that the sale was not commercially reasonable. The record indicates that Larry Jacocks testified that he did not sell the vehicle at auction; rather, Greenleaf placed a "For Sale" sign in the window and took the first offer without apparent negotiation. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the $4,500.00 amount was the fair market value for Appellant's vehicle at the time and place of conversion. Appellant testified that he values the vehicle at $29,000.00. As held by this Court, "an owner is not required to prove, but is presumed to know, the value of owned property."
D. Appellee's Request for Damages
Greenleaf asks that this Court to award damages for frivolous appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-1-122, which provides:
The decision whether to award damages for a frivolous appeal rests solely in this Court's discretion.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We remand the case for such further proceedings as may be necessary and are consistent with this opinion. Costs of the appeal are taxed to the Appellant, Wondimu Borena, for all of which execution may issue if necessary.
Additionally, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider his claims under the following statutes: Tennessee Code Annotated Section 66-14-106, which provides for distribution of proceeds from a lien sale in excess of the debt; and Tennessee Code Annotated Section 66-14-102, which provides for written notice before sale on a lien. Appellant did not pursue these claims at trial, and "[i]t is well-settled that issues are considered waived on appeal by the failure to present them at trial."