McDONALD v. CITY OF CHICAGO, ILL. No. 08-1521.
130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010)
Otis McDONALD, et al., Petitioners, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, et al.
Supreme Court of United States.
Decided June 28, 2010.
Alan Gura for the petitioners.
Paul D. Clement for the respondents Nat. Rifle Association, Inc., et al. in support of the petitioners.
James A. Feldman for the respondents City of Chicago, Ill.
Stephen P. Halbrook, Fairfax, VA, Counsel for the National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Robert Klein Engler, Dr. Gene Reisinger, Dr. Kathryn Tyler, Van F. Welton, and Brett Benson. Stephen D. Poss, Counsel of Record, Kevin P. Martin, Joshua S. Lipshutz, Goodwin Procter LLP, Boston, MA, Paul D. Clement, King & Spalding, Washington, DC, Counsel for the National Rifle Association of America, Inc.
David G. Sigale, Law Firm of David G. Sigale, P.C., Lisle, Illinois, Alan Gura, Counsel of Record, Alexandria, Virginia for the Seventh Circuit.
Charles M. Dyke, Counsel of Record, Yi-Yi Chang, Nixon Peabody LLP, San Francisco, CA, for the Board of Education of the City of Chicago, Institute of Medicine of Chicago, Wayman African Methodist Episcopal Church of Chicago, Illinois Council Against Handgun Violence, Legal Community Against Violence, Violence Policy Center, States United to Prevent Gun Violence, Freedom States Alliance, Connecticut Against Gun Violence, Maine Citizens Against Gun Violence, Citizens for a Safer Minnesota, Ohio Coalition Against Gun Violence, Wisconsin Anti-Violence Effort Educational Fund, and Gunfreekids.org in Support of Respondents City of Chicago and Village of Oak Park.
James A. Feldman, Special Assistant, Corporation Counsel, Washington, D.C., Mara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago, Benna Ruth Solomon, Counsel of Record, Deputy Corporation Counsel, Myriam Zreczny Kasper, Chief Assistant Corporation Counsel, Suzanne M. Loose, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Andrew W. Worseck, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Chicago, Illinois, Counsel for the City of Chicago; Raymond L. Heise, Village Attorney of Oak Park, Oak Park, Illinois, Counsel for the Village of Oak Park, Hans Germann, Ranjit Hakim, Alexandra Shea, Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for Respondents City of Chicago and Village of Oak Park.
Two years ago, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. ___,
Otis McDonald, Adam Orlov, Colleen Lawson, and David Lawson (Chicago petitioners) are Chicago residents who would like to keep handguns in their homes for self-defense but are prohibited from doing so by Chicago's firearms laws. A City ordinance provides that "[n]o person shall... possess ... any firearm unless such person is the holder of a valid registration certificate for such firearm." Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code § 8-20-040(a) (2009). The Code then prohibits registration of most handguns, thus effectively banning handgun possession by almost all private citizens who reside in the City. § 8-20-050(c). Like Chicago, Oak Park makes it "unlawful for any person to possess ... any firearm," a term that includes "pistols, revolvers, guns and small arms ... commonly known as handguns." Oak Park, Ill., Municipal Code §§ 27-2-1 (2007), 27-1-1 (2009).
Chicago enacted its handgun ban to protect its residents "from the loss of property and injury or death from firearms." See Chicago, Ill., Journal of Proceedings of the City Council, p. 10049 (Mar. 19, 1982). The Chicago petitioners and their amici, however, argue that the handgun ban has left them vulnerable to criminals. Chicago Police Department statistics, we are told, reveal that the City's handgun murder rate has actually increased since the ban was enacted
Several of the Chicago petitioners have been the targets of threats and violence. For instance, Otis McDonald, who is in his
After our decision in Heller, the Chicago petitioners and two groups
The District Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the Chicago and Oak Park laws are unconstitutional. See App. 83-84; NRA, Inc. v. Oak Park,
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, relying on three 19th-century cases—United States v. Cruikshank,
Petitioners argue that the Chicago and Oak Park laws violate the right to keep and bear arms for two reasons. Petitioners' primary submission is that this right is among the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" and that the narrow interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause adopted in the Slaughter-House Cases, supra, should now be rejected. As a secondary argument, petitioners contend that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause "incorporates" the Second Amendment right.
Chicago and Oak Park (municipal respondents) maintain that a right set out in the Bill of Rights applies to the States only if that right is an indispensable attribute of any "`civilized'" legal system. Brief for Municipal Respondents 9. If it is possible to imagine a civilized country that does not recognize the right, the municipal respondents tell us, then that right is not protected by due process. Ibid. And since there are civilized countries that ban or strictly regulate the private possession of handguns, the municipal respondents maintain that due process does not preclude such measures. Id., at 21-23. In light of the parties' far-reaching arguments, we begin by recounting this Court's analysis over the years of the relationship between the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the States.
The Bill of Rights, including the Second Amendment, originally applied only to the Federal Government. In Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833), the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, explained that this question was "of great importance" but "not of much difficulty." Id., at 247. In less than four pages, the Court firmly rejected the proposition that the first eight Amendments operate as limitations on the States, holding that they apply only to the Federal Government. See also Lessee of Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469, 551-552, 8 L.Ed. 751 (1833) ("[I]t is now settled that those amendments [in the Bill of Rights] do not extend to the states").
The constitutional Amendments adopted in the aftermath of the Civil War fundamentally altered our country's federal system. The provision at issue in this case, § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides, among other things, that a State may not abridge "the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" or deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
Four years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court was asked to interpret the Amendment's reference to "the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." The Slaughter-House Cases, supra, involved challenges to a Louisiana law permitting the creation of a state-sanctioned monopoly on the butchering of animals within the city of New Orleans. Justice Samuel Miller's opinion for the Court concluded that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only those rights "which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws." Id., at 79. The Court held that other fundamental rights—rights that predated the creation of the Federal Government and that "the State governments were created to establish and secure"— were not protected by the Clause. Id., at 76.
In drawing a sharp distinction between the rights of federal and state citizenship,
Under the Court's narrow reading, the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects such things as the right
Finding no constitutional protection against state intrusion of the kind envisioned by the Louisiana statute, the Court upheld the statute. Four Justices dissented. Justice Field, joined by Chief Justice Chase and Justices Swayne and Bradley, criticized the majority for reducing the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause to "a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited Congress and the people on its passage." Id., at 96; see also id., at 104. Justice Field opined that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects rights that are "in their nature ... fundamental," including the right of every man to pursue his profession without the imposition of unequal or discriminatory restrictions. Id., at 96-97. Justice Bradley's dissent observed that "we are not bound to resort to implication ... to find an authoritative declaration of some of the most important privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. It is in the Constitution itself." Id., at 118. Justice Bradley would have construed the Privileges or Immunities Clause to include those rights enumerated in the Constitution as well as some unenumerated rights. Id., at 119. Justice Swayne described the majority's narrow reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as "turn[ing] ... what was meant for bread into a stone." Id., at 129 (dissenting opinion).
Today, many legal scholars dispute the correctness of the narrow Slaughter-House interpretation. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe,
Three years after the decision in the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court decided Cruikshank, the first of the three 19th-century cases on which the Seventh Circuit relied.
The Court reversed all of the convictions, including those relating to the deprivation of the victims' right to bear arms. Cruikshank, 92 U.S., at 553, 559. The Court wrote that the right of bearing arms for a lawful purpose "is not a right granted by the Constitution" and is not "in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence." Id., at 553. "The second amendment," the Court continued, "declares that it shall not be infringed; but this ... means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress." Ibid. "Our later decisions in Presser v. Illinois,
As previously noted, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller doomed petitioners' claims at the Court of Appeals level. Petitioners argue, however, that we should overrule those decisions and hold that the right to keep and bear arms is one of the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." In petitioners' view, the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects all of the rights set out in the Bill of Rights, as well as some others, see Brief for Petitioners 10, 14, 15-21, but petitioners are unable to identify the Clause's full scope, Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6, 8-11. Nor is there any consensus on that question among the scholars who agree that the Slaughter-House Cases' interpretation is flawed. See Saenz, supra, at 522, n. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1518 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).
We see no need to reconsider that interpretation here. For many decades, the question of the rights protected by the
At the same time, however, this Court's decisions in Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller do not preclude us from considering whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment right binding on the States. See Heller, 554 U.S., at ___, n. 23, 128 S.Ct., at 2813 n. 23. None of those cases "engage[d] in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases." Ibid. As explained more fully below, Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller all preceded the era in which the Court began the process of "selective incorporation" under the Due Process Clause, and we have never previously addressed the question whether the right to keep and bear arms applies to the States under that theory.
Indeed, Cruikshank has not prevented us from holding that other rights that were at issue in that case are binding on the States through the Due Process Clause. In Cruikshank, the Court held that the general "right of the people peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes," which is protected by the First Amendment, applied only against the Federal Government and not against the States. See 92 U.S., at 551-552. Nonetheless, over 60 years later the Court held that the right of peaceful assembly was a "fundamental righ[t] ... safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." De Jonge v. Oregon,
In the late 19th century, the Court began to consider whether the Due Process Clause prohibits the States from infringing rights set out in the Bill of Rights. See Hurtado v. California,
First, the Court viewed the due process question as entirely separate from the question whether a right was a privilege or immunity of national citizenship. See Twining v. New Jersey,
Second, the Court explained that the only rights protected against state infringement by the Due Process Clause were those rights "of such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process of law." Ibid. See also, e.g., Adamson v. California,
Third, in some cases decided during this era the Court "can be seen as having asked, when inquiring into whether some particular procedural safeguard was required of a State, if a civilized system could be imagined that would not accord the particular protection." Duncan v. Louisiana,
Fourth, the Court during this era was not hesitant to hold that a right set out in the Bill of Rights failed to meet the test for inclusion within the protection of the Due Process Clause. The Court found that some such rights qualified. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York,
Finally, even when a right set out in the Bill of Rights was held to fall within the conception of due process, the protection or remedies afforded against state infringement sometimes differed from the protection or remedies provided against abridgment by the Federal Government. To give one example, in Betts the Court held that, although the Sixth Amendment required the appointment of counsel in all federal criminal cases in which the defendant was unable to retain an attorney, the Due Process Clause required appointment of counsel in state criminal proceedings only where "want of counsel in [the] particular case ... result[ed] in a conviction lacking in ... fundamental fairness." 316 U.S., at 473, 62 S.Ct. 1252. Similarly, in Wolf v. Colorado,
An alternative theory regarding the relationship between the Bill of Rights and
While Justice Black's theory was never adopted, the Court eventually moved in that direction by initiating what has been called a process of "selective incorporation," i.e., the Court began to hold that the Due Process Clause fully incorporates particular rights contained in the first eight Amendments. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright,
The decisions during this time abandoned three of the previously noted characteristics of the earlier period.
The Court also shed any reluctance to hold that rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights met the requirements for protection under the Due Process Clause. The Court eventually incorporated almost all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.
Finally, the Court abandoned "the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights," stating that it would be "incongruous" to apply different standards "depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court." Malloy, 378 U.S., at 10-11, 84 S.Ct. 1489 (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the Court decisively held that incorporated Bill of Rights protections "are all to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment." Id., at 10, 84 S.Ct. 1489; see also Mapp v. Ohio,
With this framework in mind, we now turn directly to the question whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated in the concept of due process. In answering that question, as just explained, we must decide whether the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty, Duncan, 391 U.S., at 149, 88 S.Ct. 1444, or as we have said in a related context, whether this right is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," Washington v. Glucksberg,
Our decision in Heller points unmistakably to the answer. Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day,
Heller makes it clear that this right is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Glucksberg, supra, at 721, 117 S.Ct. 2302 (internal quotation marks omitted). Heller explored the right's origins, noting that the 1689 English Bill of Rights explicitly protected a right to keep arms for self-defense, 554 U.S., at ___ - ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2797-2798, and that by 1765, Blackstone was able to assert that the right to keep and bear arms was "one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen," id., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2798.
The right to keep and bear arms was considered no less fundamental by those who drafted and ratified the Bill of Rights. "During the 1788 ratification debates, the fear that the federal government would disarm the people in order to impose rule through a standing army or select militia was pervasive in Antifederalist rhetoric." Heller, supra, at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2801 (citing Letters from the Federal Farmer III (Oct. 10, 1787), in 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 234, 242 (H. Storing ed.1981)); see also Federal Farmer: An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican, Letter XVIII (Jan. 25, 1788), in 17 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 360, 362-363 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds.1995); S. Halbrook, The Founders' Second Amendment 171-278 (2008). Federalists responded, not by arguing that the right was insufficiently important to warrant protection but by contending that the right was adequately protected by the Constitution's assignment of only limited powers to the Federal Government. Heller, supra, at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2801-2802; cf. The Federalist No. 46, p. 296 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). Thus, Antifederalists and Federalists alike agreed that the right to bear arms was fundamental to the newly formed system of government. See Levy 143-149; J. Malcolm, To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right 155-164 (1994). But those who were fearful that the new Federal Government would infringe traditional rights such as the right to keep and bear arms insisted on the adoption of the Bill of Rights as a condition for ratification of the Constitution. See 1 J. Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 327-331 (2d ed. 1854); 3 id., at 657-661; 4 id., at 242-246, 248-249; see also Levy 26-34; A. Kelly & W. Harbison, The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development 110, 118 (7th ed.1991). This is surely powerful evidence that the right was regarded as fundamental in the sense relevant here.
This understanding persisted in the years immediately following the ratification of the Bill of Rights. In addition to the four States that had adopted Second Amendment analogues before ratification, nine more States adopted state constitutional provisions protecting an individual right to keep and bear arms between 1789 and 1820. Heller, supra, at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2802-2804. Founding-era legal commentators confirmed the importance of the right to early Americans. St. George Tucker, for example, described the right to keep and bear arms as "the true palladium of liberty" and explained that prohibitions on the right would place liberty "on the brink of destruction." 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, Editor's App. 300 (S. Tucker ed. 1803); see also W. Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America, 125-126 (2d ed. 1829) (reprint
By the 1850's, the perceived threat that had prompted the inclusion of the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights—the fear that the National Government would disarm the universal militia—had largely faded as a popular concern, but the right to keep and bear arms was highly valued for purposes of self-defense. See M. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War 87-90 (2003); Amar, Bill of Rights 258-259. Abolitionist authors wrote in support of the right. See L. Spooner, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery 66 (1860) (reprint 1965); J. Tiffany, A Treatise on the Unconstitutionality of American Slavery 117-118 (1849) (reprint 1969). And when attempts were made to disarm "Free-Soilers" in "Bloody Kansas," Senator Charles Sumner, who later played a leading role in the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, proclaimed that "[n]ever was [the rifle] more needed in just self-defense than now in Kansas." The Crime Against Kansas: The Apologies for the Crime: The True Remedy, Speech of Hon. Charles Sumner in the Senate of the United States 64-65 (1856). Indeed, the 1856 Republican Party Platform protested that in Kansas the constitutional rights of the people had been "fraudulently and violently taken from them" and the "right of the people to keep and bear arms" had been "infringed." National Party Platforms 1840-1972, p. 27 (5th ed.1973).
After the Civil War, many of the over 180,000 African Americans who served in the Union Army returned to the States of the old Confederacy, where systematic efforts were made to disarm them and other blacks. See Heller, 554 U.S., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2810; E. Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution 1863-1877, p. 8 (1988) (hereinafter Foner). The laws of some States formally prohibited African Americans from possessing firearms. For example, a Mississippi law provided that "no freedman, free negro or mulatto, not in the military service of the United States government, and not licensed so to do by the board of police of his or her county, shall keep or carry fire-arms of any kind, or any ammunition, dirk or bowie knife." Certain Offenses of Freedmen, 1865 Miss. Laws p. 165, § 1, in 1 Documentary History of Reconstruction 289 (W. Fleming ed.1950); see also Regulations for Freedmen in Louisiana, in id., at 279-280; H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 70, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 233, 236 (1866) (describing a Kentucky law); E. McPherson, The Political History of the United States of America During the Period of Reconstruction 40 (1871) (describing a Florida law); id., at 33 (describing an Alabama law).
Union Army commanders took steps to secure the right of all citizens to keep and bear arms,
The most explicit evidence of Congress' aim appears in § 14 of the Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866, which provided that "the right ... to have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security, and the acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of estate, real and personal, including the constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citizens... without respect to race or color, or previous condition of slavery." 14 Stat. 176-177 (emphasis added).
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, which was considered at the same time as the Freedmen's Bureau Act, similarly sought to protect the right of all citizens to keep and bear arms.
Congress, however, ultimately deemed these legislative remedies insufficient. Southern resistance, Presidential vetoes, and this Court's pre-Civil-War precedent persuaded Congress that a constitutional amendment was necessary to provide full protection for the rights of blacks.
In debating the Fourteenth Amendment, the 39th Congress referred to the right to keep and bear arms as a fundamental right deserving of protection. Senator Samuel Pomeroy described three "indispensable" "safeguards of liberty under our form of Government." 39th Cong. Globe 1182. One of these, he said, was the right to keep and bear arms:
Even those who thought the Fourteenth Amendment unnecessary believed that blacks, as citizens, "have equal right to protection, and to keep and bear arms for self-defense." Id., at 1073 (Sen. James Nye); see also Foner 258-259.
Evidence from the period immediately following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment only confirms that the right to keep and bear arms was considered fundamental. In an 1868 speech addressing the disarmament of freedmen, Representative Stevens emphasized the necessity of the right: "Disarm a community and you rob them of the means of defending life. Take away their weapons of defense and you take away the inalienable right of defending liberty." "The fourteenth amendment, now so happily adopted, settles the whole question." Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 1967. And in debating the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Congress routinely
The right to keep and bear arms was also widely protected by state constitutions at the time when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. In 1868, 22 of the 37 States in the Union had state constitutional provisions explicitly protecting the right to keep and bear arms. See Calabresi & Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions when the Fourteenth Amendment was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition? 87 Texas L.Rev. 7, 50 (2008).
In sum, it is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.
Despite all this evidence, municipal respondents contend that Congress, in the years immediately following the Civil War, merely sought to outlaw "discriminatory measures taken against freedmen, which it addressed by adopting a non-discrimination principle" and that even an outright ban on the possession of firearms was regarded as acceptable, "so long as it was not done in a discriminatory manner." Brief for Municipal Respondents 7. They argue that Members of Congress overwhelmingly viewed § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment "as an antidiscrimination rule," and they cite statements to the effect
First, while § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contains "an antidiscrimination rule," namely, the Equal Protection Clause, municipal respondents can hardly mean that § 1 does no more than prohibit discrimination. If that were so, then the First Amendment, as applied to the States, would not prohibit nondiscriminatory abridgments of the rights to freedom of speech or freedom of religion; the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States, would not prohibit all unreasonable searches and seizures but only discriminatory searches and seizures—and so on. We assume that this is not municipal respondents' view, so what they must mean is that the Second Amendment should be singled out for special—and specially unfavorable—treatment. We reject that suggestion.
Second, municipal respondents' argument ignores the clear terms of the Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866, which acknowledged the existence of the right to bear arms. If that law had used language such as "the equal benefit of laws concerning the bearing of arms," it would be possible to interpret it as simply a prohibition of racial discrimination. But § 14 speaks of and protects "the constitutional right to bear arms," an unmistakable reference to the right protected by the Second Amendment. And it protects the "full and equal benefit" of this right in the States. 14 Stat. 176-177. It would have been nonsensical for Congress to guarantee the full and equal benefit of a constitutional right that does not exist.
Third, if the 39th Congress had outlawed only those laws that discriminate on the basis of race or previous condition of servitude, African Americans in the South would likely have remained vulnerable to attack by many of their worst abusers: the state militia and state peace officers. In the years immediately following the Civil War, a law banning the possession of guns by all private citizens would have been nondiscriminatory only in the formal sense. Any such law—like the Chicago and Oak Park ordinances challenged here—presumably would have permitted the possession of guns by those acting under the authority of the State and would thus have left firearms in the hands of the militia and local peace officers. And as the Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction revealed, see supra, at 3039, those groups were widely involved in harassing blacks in the South.
Fourth, municipal respondents' purely antidiscrimination theory of the Fourteenth Amendment disregards the plight of whites in the South who opposed the Black Codes. If the 39th Congress and the ratifying public had simply prohibited racial discrimination with respect to the bearing of arms, opponents of the Black Codes would have been left without the means of self-defense—as had abolitionists in Kansas in the 1850's.
Fifth, the 39th Congress' response to proposals to disband and disarm the Southern militias is instructive. Despite recognizing and deploring the abuses of these militias, the 39th Congress balked at a proposal to disarm them. See 39th Cong. Globe 914; Halbrook, Freedmen, supra, 20-21. Disarmament, it was argued, would violate the members' right to bear arms, and it was ultimately decided to disband the militias but not to disarm their members. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, § 6, 14 Stat. 485, 487; Halbrook, Freedmen 68-69; Cramer 858-861. It cannot be doubted that the right to bear arms was regarded as a substantive guarantee, not a prohibition that could be ignored so long as the
Municipal respondents' remaining arguments are at war with our central holding in Heller: that the Second Amendment protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, most notably for self-defense within the home. Municipal respondents, in effect, ask us to treat the right recognized in Heller as a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees that we have held to be incorporated into the Due Process Clause.
Municipal respondents' main argument is nothing less than a plea to disregard 50 years of incorporation precedent and return (presumably for this case only) to a bygone era. Municipal respondents submit that the Due Process Clause protects only those rights "`recognized by all temperate and civilized governments, from a deep and universal sense of [their] justice.'" Brief for Municipal Respondents 9 (quoting Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 166 U.S., at 238, 17 S.Ct. 581). According to municipal respondents, if it is possible to imagine any civilized legal system that does not recognize a particular right, then the Due Process Clause does not make that right binding on the States. Brief for Municipal Respondents 9. Therefore, the municipal respondents continue, because such countries as England, Canada, Australia, Japan, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, and New Zealand either ban or severely limit handgun ownership, it must follow that no right to possess such weapons is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 21-23.
This line of argument is, of course, inconsistent with the long-established standard we apply in incorporation cases. See Duncan, 391 U.S., at 149, and n. 14, 88 S.Ct. 1444. And the present-day implications of municipal respondents' argument are stunning. For example, many of the rights that our Bill of Rights provides for persons accused of criminal offenses are virtually unique to this country.
Municipal respondents maintain that the Second Amendment differs from all of the other provisions of the Bill of Rights because it concerns the right to possess a deadly implement and thus has implications for public safety. Brief for Municipal Respondents 11. And they note that there is intense disagreement on the question whether the private possession of guns in the home increases or decreases gun deaths and injuries. Id., at 11, 13-17.
The right to keep and bear arms, however, is not the only constitutional right that has controversial public safety implications. All of the constitutional provisions that impose restrictions on law enforcement and on the prosecution of crimes fall into the same category. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan,
We likewise reject municipal respondents' argument that we should depart from our established incorporation methodology on the ground that making the
There is nothing new in the argument that, in order to respect federalism and allow useful state experimentation, a federal constitutional right should not be fully binding on the States. This argument was made repeatedly and eloquently by Members of this Court who rejected the concept of incorporation and urged retention of the two-track approach to incorporation. Throughout the era of "selective incorporation," Justice Harlan in particular, invoking the values of federalism and state experimentation, fought a determined rearguard action to preserve the two-track approach. See, e.g., Roth v. United States,
Time and again, however, those pleas failed. Unless we turn back the clock or adopt a special incorporation test applicable only to the Second Amendment, municipal respondents' argument must be rejected. Under our precedents, if a Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental from an American perspective, then, unless stare decisis counsels otherwise,
Municipal respondents assert that, although most state constitutions protect firearms rights, state courts have held that these rights are subject to "interest-balancing" and have sustained a variety of restrictions. Brief for Municipal Respondents 23-31. In Heller, however, we expressly rejected the argument that the scope of the Second Amendment right should be determined by judicial interest balancing, 554 U.S., at ___ - ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2820-2821, and this Court decades ago abandoned "the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights," Malloy, supra, at 10-11, 84 S.Ct. 1489 (internal quotation marks omitted).
As evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment has not historically been understood to restrict the authority of the States to regulate firearms, municipal respondents and supporting amici cite a variety of state and local firearms laws that courts have upheld. But what is most striking about their research is the paucity of precedent sustaining bans comparable to those at issue here and in Heller. Municipal respondents cite precisely one case (from the late 20th century) in which such a ban was sustained. See Brief for Municipal Respondents 26-27 (citing Kalodimos v. Morton Grove,
Municipal respondents argue, finally, that the right to keep and bear arms is unique among the rights set out in the first eight Amendments "because the reason for codifying the Second Amendment (to protect the militia) differs from the purpose (primarily, to use firearms to engage in self-defense) that is claimed to make the right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Brief for Municipal Respondents 36-37. Municipal respondents suggest that the Second Amendment right differs
We turn, finally, to the two dissenting opinions. Justice STEVENS' eloquent opinion covers ground already addressed, and therefore little need be added in response. Justice STEVENS would "`ground the prohibitions against state action squarely on due process, without intermediate reliance on any of the first eight Amendments.'" Post, at 3092 (quoting Malloy, 378 U.S., at 24, 84 S.Ct. 1489 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). The question presented in this case, in his view, "is whether the particular right asserted by petitioners applies to the States because of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, standing on its own bottom." Post, at 3103. He would hold that "[t]he rights protected against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause need not be identical in shape or scope to the rights protected against Federal Government infringement by the various provisions of the Bill of Rights." Post, at 3093.
As we have explained, the Court, for the past half-century, has moved away from the two-track approach. If we were now to accept Justice STEVENS' theory across the board, decades of decisions would be undermined. We assume that this is not what is proposed. What is urged instead, it appears, is that this theory be revived solely for the individual right that Heller recognized, over vigorous dissents.
The relationship between the Bill of Rights' guarantees and the States must be governed by a single, neutral principle. It is far too late to exhume what Justice Brennan, writing for the Court 46 years ago, derided as "the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights." Malloy, supra, at 10-11, 84 S.Ct. 1489 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Justice BREYER's dissent makes several points to which we briefly respond. To begin, while there is certainly room for disagreement about Heller's analysis of the history of the right to keep and bear arms, nothing written since Heller persuades us to reopen the question there decided. Few other questions of original meaning have been as thoroughly explored.
Justice BREYER's conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate
First, we have never held that a provision of the Bill of Rights applies to the States only if there is a "popular consensus" that the right is fundamental, and we see no basis for such a rule. But in this case, as it turns out, there is evidence of such a consensus. An amicus brief submitted by 58 Members of the Senate and 251 Members of the House of Representatives urges us to hold that the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental. See Brief for Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison et al. as Amici Curiae 4. Another brief submitted by 38 States takes the same position. Brief for State of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae 6.
Second, petitioners and many others who live in high-crime areas dispute the proposition that the Second Amendment right does not protect minorities and those lacking political clout. The plight of Chicagoans living in high-crime areas was recently highlighted when two Illinois legislators representing Chicago districts called on the Governor to deploy the Illinois National Guard to patrol the City's streets.
Finally, Justice BREYER is incorrect that incorporation will require judges to assess the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions and thus to make difficult empirical judgments in an area in which they lack expertise. As we have noted, while his opinion in Heller recommended an interest-balancing test, the Court specifically rejected that suggestion. See supra, at 3046-3047. "The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon." Heller, supra, at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2821.
* * *
In Heller, we held that the Second Amendment protects the right to possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense. Unless considerations of stare decisis counsel otherwise, a provision of the Bill of Rights that protects a right that is fundamental from an American perspective applies equally to the Federal Government and the States. See Duncan, 391 U.S., at 149, and n. 14, 88 S.Ct. 1444. We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
Justice SCALIA, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion. Despite my misgivings about Substantive Due Process as an original matter, I have acquiesced in the Court's incorporation of certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights "because it is both long established and narrowly limited." Albright v. Oliver,
I write separately only to respond to some aspects of Justice STEVENS' dissent. Not that aspect which disagrees with the majority's application of our precedents to this case, which is fully covered by the Court's opinion. But much of what Justice STEVENS writes is a broad condemnation of the theory of interpretation which underlies the Court's opinion, a theory that makes the traditions of our people paramount. He proposes a different theory, which he claims is more "cautiou[s]" and respectful of proper limits on the judicial role. Post, at 3119-3120. It is that claim I wish to address.
After stressing the substantive dimension of what he has renamed the "liberty
That Justice STEVENS is not applying any version of Palko is clear from comparing, on the one hand, the rights he believes are covered, with, on the other hand, his conclusion that the right to keep and bear arms is not covered. Rights that pass his test include not just those "relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education," but also rights against "[g]overnment action that shocks the conscience, pointlessly infringes settled expectations, trespasses into sensitive private realms or life choices without adequate justification, [or] perpetrates gross injustice." Post, at 3101 (internal quotation marks omitted). Not all such rights are in, however, since only "some fundamental aspects of personhood, dignity, and the like" are protected, post, at ___ (emphasis added). Exactly what is covered is not clear. But whatever else is in, he knows that the right to keep and bear arms is out, despite its being as "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," Washington v. Glucksberg,
The subjective nature of Justice STEVENS' standard is also apparent from his claim that it is the courts' prerogative— indeed their duty—to update the Due Process Clause so that it encompasses new freedoms the Framers were too narrow-minded to imagine, post, at 3098-3099, and n. 21. Courts, he proclaims, must "do justice to [the Clause's] urgent call and its open texture" by exercising the "interpretive discretion the latter embodies." Post,
Justice STEVENS resists this description, insisting that his approach provides plenty of "guideposts" and "constraints" to keep courts from "injecting excessive subjectivity" into the process.
He begins with a brief nod to history, post, at 3099-3100, but as he has just made clear, he thinks historical inquiry unavailing, post, at 3098-3099. Moreover, trusting the meaning of the Due Process Clause to what has historically been protected is circular, see post, at 3098-3099, since that would mean no new rights could get in.
Justice STEVENS moves on to the "most basic" constraint on subjectivity his theory offers: that he would "esche[w] attempts to provide any all-purpose, top-down, totalizing theory of `liberty.'" Post, at 3100. The notion that the absence of a coherent theory of the Due Process Clause will somehow curtail judicial caprice is at war with reason. Indeterminacy means opportunity for courts to impose whatever rule they like; it is the problem, not the solution. The idea that interpretive pluralism would reduce courts' ability to impose their will on the ignorant masses is not merely naive, but absurd. If there are no right answers, there are no wrong answers either.
Justice STEVENS also argues that requiring courts to show "respect for the
The next constraint Justice STEVENS suggests is harder to evaluate. He describes as "an important tool for guiding judicial discretion" "sensitivity to the interaction between the intrinsic aspects of liberty and the practical realities of contemporary society." Post, at 3101. I cannot say whether that sensitivity will really guide judges because I have no idea what it is. Is it some sixth sense instilled in judges when they ascend to the bench? Or does it mean judges are more constrained when they agonize about the cosmic conflict between liberty and its potentially harmful consequences? Attempting to give the concept more precision, Justice STEVENS explains that "sensitivity is an aspect of a deeper principle: the need to approach our work with humility and caution." Ibid. Both traits are undeniably admirable, though what relation they bear to sensitivity is a mystery. But it makes no difference, for the first case Justice STEVENS cites in support, see ibid., Casey, 505 U.S., at 849, 112 S.Ct. 2791, dispels any illusion that he has a meaningful form of judicial modesty in mind.
Justice STEVENS offers no examples to illustrate the next constraint: stare decisis, post, at 3102. But his view of it is surely not very confining, since he holds out as a "canonical" exemplar of the proper approach, see post, at 3097, 3118, Lawrence, which overruled a case decided a mere 17 years earlier, Bowers v. Hardwick,
Justice STEVENS also relies on the requirement of a "careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest" to limit judicial discretion. Post, at 3102 (internal quotation marks omitted). I certainly agree with that requirement, see Reno v. Flores,
If Justice STEVENS' account of the constraints of his approach did not demonstrate that they do not exist, his application of that approach to the case before us leaves no doubt. He offers several reasons for concluding that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is not fundamental enough to be applied against the States.
Justice STEVENS begins with the odd assertion that "firearms have a fundamentally ambivalent relationship to liberty," since sometimes they are used to cause (or sometimes accidentally produce) injury to others. Post, at 3107. The source of the
Justice STEVENS next suggests that the Second Amendment right is not fundamental because it is "different in kind" from other rights we have recognized. Post, at 3108-3109. In one respect, of course, the right to keep and bear arms is different from some other rights we have held the Clause protects and he would recognize: It is deeply grounded in our nation's history and tradition. But Justice STEVENS has a different distinction in mind: Even though he does "not doubt for a moment that many Americans . . . see [firearms] as critical to their way of life as well as to their security," he pronounces that owning a handgun is not "critical to leading a life of autonomy, dignity, or political equality."
No determination of what rights the Constitution of the United States covers would be complete, of course, without a survey of what other countries do. Post, at 3110-3111. When it comes to guns, Justice STEVENS explains, our Nation is already an outlier among "advanced democracies"; not even our "oldest allies" protect as robust a right as we do, and we should not widen the gap. Ibid. Never mind that he explains neither which countries
Justice STEVENS also argues that since the right to keep and bear arms was codified for the purpose of "prevent[ing] elimination of the militia," it should be viewed as "`a federalism provision'" logically incapable of incorporation. Post, at 3111 (quoting Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow,
Justice STEVENS next argues that even if the right to keep and bear arms is "deeply rooted in some important senses," the roots of States' efforts to regulate guns run just as deep. Post, at 3112-3113 (internal quotation marks omitted). But this too is true of other rights we have held incorporated. No fundamental right—not even the First Amendment—is absolute. The traditional restrictions go to show the scope of the right, not its lack of fundamental character. At least that is what they show (Justice STEVENS would agree) for other rights. Once again, principles are applied selectively.
Justice STEVENS' final reason for rejecting incorporation of the Second Amendment reveals, more clearly than any of the others, the game that is afoot. Assuming that there is a "plausible constitutional basis" for holding that the right to keep and bear arms is incorporated, he asserts that we ought not to do so for prudential reasons. Post, at 3114. Even if we had the authority to withhold rights that are within the Constitution's command (and we assuredly do not), two of the reasons Justice STEVENS gives for abstention show just how much power he would hand to judges. The States'"right to experiment" with solutions to the problem of gun violence, he says, is at its apex here because "the best solution is far from clear." Post, at 3114 (internal quotation marks omitted). That is true of most serious
A second reason Justice STEVENS says we should abstain is that the States have shown they are "capable" of protecting the right at issue, and if anything have protected it too much. Post, at 3115. That reflects an assumption that judges can distinguish between a proper democratic decision to leave things alone (which we should honor), and a case of democratic market failure (which we should step in to correct). I would not—and no judge should— presume to have that sort of omniscience, which seems to me far more "arrogant," post, at 3111, than confining courts' focus to our own national heritage.
Justice STEVENS' response to this concurrence, post, at 3116-3119, makes the usual rejoinder of "living Constitution" advocates to the criticism that it empowers judges to eliminate or expand what the people have prescribed: The traditional, historically focused method, he says, reposes discretion in judges as well.
I will stipulate to that.
And the Court's approach intrudes less upon the democratic process because the rights it acknowledges are those established by a constitutional history formed by democratic decisions; and the rights it fails to acknowledge are left to be democratically adopted or rejected by the people, with the assurance that their decision is not subject to judicial revision. Justice STEVENS' approach, on the other hand, deprives the people of that power, since whatever the Constitution and laws may say, the list of protected rights will be whatever courts wish it to be. After all, he notes, the people have been wrong before, post, at 3119, and courts may conclude they are wrong in the future. Justice STEVENS abhors a system in which "majorities or powerful interest groups always get their way," post, at 3119, but replaces it with a system in which unelected and life-tenured judges always get their way. That such usurpation is effected unabashedly, see post, at 3117-3118—with "the judge's cards . . . laid on the table," ibid.—makes it even worse. In a vibrant democracy, usurpation should have to be accomplished in the dark. It is Justice STEVENS' approach, not the Court's, that puts democracy in peril.
Justice THOMAS, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the right to keep and bear arms set forth in the Second Amendment "fully applicable to the States." Ante, at 3026. I write separately because I believe there is a more straightforward path to this conclusion, one that is
Applying what is now a well-settled test, the plurality opinion concludes that the right to keep and bear arms applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause because it is "fundamental" to the American "scheme of ordered liberty," ante, at 3036 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana,
In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. ___,
As the Court explains, if this case were litigated before the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption in 1868, the answer to that question would be simple. In Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833), this Court held that the Bill of Rights applied only to the Federal Government. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall recalled that the founding generation added the first eight Amendments to the Constitution in response to Antifederalist concerns regarding the extent of federal—not state— power, and held that if "the framers of these amendments [had] intended them to be limitations on the powers of the state governments," "they would have declared this purpose in plain and intelligible language." Id., at 250. Finding no such language in the Bill, Chief Justice Marshall held that it did not in any way restrict state authority. Id., at 248-250; see Lessee of Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469, 551-552, 8 L.Ed. 751 (1833) (reaffirming Barron's holding); Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans, 3 How. 589, 609-610, 11 L.Ed. 739 (1845) (same).
Nearly three decades after Barron, the Nation was splintered by a civil war fought principally over the question of slavery. As was evident to many throughout our Nation's early history, slavery, and the measures designed to protect it, were irreconcilable with the principles of equality, government by consent, and inalienable rights proclaimed by the Declaration of Independence and embedded in our constitutional structure. See, e.g., 3 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 212 (M. Farrand ed.1911) (remarks of Luther Martin) ("[S]lavery is inconsistent with the genius of republicanism, and has a tendency to destroy those principles on which it is supported, as it lessens the sense of the equal rights of mankind" (emphasis deleted)); A. Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, Ill. (Oct. 16, 1854), reprinted in 2 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 266 (R. Basler ed. 1953) ("[N]o man is good enough to govern another man, without that other's consent. I say this is the leading principle—the sheet anchor of American republicanism. . . . Now the relation
After the war, a series of constitutional amendments were adopted to repair the Nation from the damage slavery had caused. The provision at issue here, § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, significantly altered our system of government. The first sentence of that section provides that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." This unambiguously overruled this Court's contrary holding in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 15 L.Ed. 691 (1857), that the Constitution did not recognize black Americans as citizens of the United States or their own State. Id., at 405-406.
The meaning of § 1's next sentence has divided this Court for many years. That sentence begins with the command that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." On its face, this appears to grant the persons just made United States citizens a certain collection of rights—i.e., privileges or immunities—attributable to that status.
This Court's precedents accept that point, but define the relevant collection of rights quite narrowly. In the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873), decided just five years after the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption, the Court interpreted this text, now known as the Privileges or Immunities Clause, for the first time. In a closely divided decision, the Court drew a sharp distinction between the privileges and immunities of state citizenship and those of federal citizenship, and held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected only the latter category of rights from state abridgment. Id., at 78. The Court defined that category to include only those rights "which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws." Id., at 79. This arguably left open the possibility that certain individual rights enumerated in the Constitution could be considered privileges or immunities of federal citizenship. See ibid. (listing "[t]he right to peaceably assemble" and "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus" as rights potentially protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause). But the Court soon rejected that proposition, interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause even more narrowly in its later cases.
Chief among those cases is United States v. Cruikshank,
That circular reasoning effectively has been the Court's last word on the Privileges
As a consequence of this Court's marginalization of the Clause, litigants seeking federal protection of fundamental rights turned to the remainder of § 1 in search of an alternative fount of such rights. They found one in a most curious place—that section's command that every State guarantee "due process" to any person before depriving him of "life, liberty, or property." At first, litigants argued that this Due Process Clause "incorporated" certain procedural rights codified in the Bill of Rights against the States. The Court generally rejected those claims, however, on the theory that the rights in question were not sufficiently "fundamental" to warrant such treatment. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California,
That changed with time. The Court came to conclude that certain Bill of Rights guarantees were sufficiently fundamental to fall within § 1's guarantee of "due process." These included not only procedural protections listed in the first eight Amendments, see, e.g., Benton v. Maryland,
While this Court has at times concluded that a right gains "fundamental" status only if it is essential to the American "scheme of ordered liberty" or "`deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,'"
All of this is a legal fiction. The notion that a constitutional provision that guarantees only "process" before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property could define the substance of those rights strains credulity for even the most casual user of words. Moreover, this fiction is a particularly dangerous one. The one theme that links the Court's substantive due process precedents together is their lack of a guiding principle to distinguish "fundamental" rights that warrant protection from nonfundamental rights that do not. Today's decision illustrates the point. Replaying a debate that has endured from the inception of the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence, the dissents laud the "flexibility" in this Court's substantive due process doctrine, post, at 3096 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); see post, at 3122-3123 (BREYER, J., dissenting), while the plurality makes yet another effort to impose principled restraints on its exercise, see ante, at 3044-3048. But neither side argues that the meaning they attribute to the Due Process Clause was consistent with public understanding at the time of its ratification.
To be sure, the plurality's effort to cabin the exercise of judicial discretion under the Due Process Clause by focusing its inquiry on those rights deeply rooted in American history and tradition invites less opportunity for abuse than the alternatives. See post, at 3123 (BREYER, J., dissenting) (arguing that rights should be incorporated against the States through the Due Process Clause if they are "well-suited to the carrying out of . . . constitutional promises"); post, at 3100 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (warning that there is no "all-purpose, top-down, totalizing theory of `liberty'" protected by the Due Process Clause). But any serious argument over the scope of the Due Process Clause must acknowledge that neither its text nor its history suggests that it protects the many substantive rights this Court's cases now claim it does.
I cannot accept a theory of constitutional interpretation that rests on such tenuous footing. This Court's substantive due process framework fails to account for both the text of the Fourteenth Amendment and the history that led to its adoption, filling that gap with a jurisprudence devoid of a guiding principle. I believe the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment offers a superior alternative, and that a return to that meaning would allow this Court to enforce the rights the Fourteenth Amendment is designed to protect with greater clarity and predictability than the substantive due process framework has so far managed.
I acknowledge the volume of precedents that have been built upon the substantive due process framework, and I further acknowledge the importance of stare decisis to the stability of our Nation's legal system.
"It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) (Marshall, C. J.). Because the Court's Privileges or Immunities Clause precedents have presumed just that, I set them aside for the moment and begin with the text.
The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment declares that "[n]o State . . . shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." In interpreting this language, it is important to recall that constitutional provisions are "`written to be understood by the voters.'" Heller, 554 U.S., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2788 (quoting United States v. Sprague,
At the time of Reconstruction, the terms "privileges" and "immunities" had an established meaning as synonyms for "rights." The two words, standing alone or paired together, were used interchangeably with the words "rights," "liberties," and "freedoms," and had been since the time of Blackstone. See 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *129 (describing the "rights and liberties" of Englishmen as "private immunities" and "civil privileges"). A number of antebellum judicial decisions used the terms in this manner. See, e.g., Magill v. Brown, 16 F. Cas. 408, 428 (No. 8,952) (CC ED Pa. 1833) (Baldwin, J.) ("The words `privileges and immunities' relate to the rights of persons, place or property; a privilege is a peculiar right, a private law, conceded to particular persons or places"). In addition, dictionary definitions confirm that the public shared this understanding. See, e.g., N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 1039 (C. Goodrich & N. Porter rev. 1865) (defining "privilege" as "a right or immunity not enjoyed by others or by all" and listing among its synonyms the words "immunity," "franchise," "right," and "liberty"); id., at 661 (defining "immunity" as "[f]reedom from an obligation" or "particular privilege"); id., at 1140 (defining "right" as "[p]rivilege or immunity granted by authority").
The fact that a particular interest was designated as a "privilege" or "immunity,"
The group of rights-bearers to whom the Privileges or Immunities Clause applies is, of course, "citizens." By the time of Reconstruction, it had long been established that both the States and the Federal Government existed to preserve their citizens' inalienable rights, and that these rights were considered "privileges" or "immunities" of citizenship.
This tradition begins with our country's English roots. Parliament declared the basic liberties of English citizens in a series of documents ranging from the Magna Carta to the Petition of Right and the English Bill of Rights. See 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 8-16, 19-21, 41-46 (1971) (hereinafter Schwartz). These fundamental rights, according to the English tradition, belonged to all people but became legally enforceable only when recognized in legal texts, including acts of Parliament and the decisions of common-law judges. See B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 77-79 (1967). These rights included many that later would be set forth in our Federal Bill of Rights, such as the right to petition for redress of grievances, the right to a jury trial, and the right of "Protestants" to "have arms for their defence." English Bill of Rights (1689), reprinted in 1 Schwartz 41, 43.
As English subjects, the colonists considered themselves to be vested with the same fundamental rights as other Englishmen. They consistently claimed the rights of English citizenship in their founding documents, repeatedly referring to these rights as "privileges" and "immunities." For example, a Maryland law provided that
As tensions between England and the Colonies increased, the colonists adopted protest resolutions reasserting their claim to the inalienable rights of Englishmen. Again, they used the terms "privileges" and "immunities" to describe these rights. As the Massachusetts Resolves declared:
After declaring their independence, the newly formed States replaced their colonial charters with constitutions and state bills of rights, almost all of which guaranteed the same fundamental rights that the former colonists previously had claimed by virtue of their English heritage. See, e.g., Pa. Declaration of Rights (1776), reprinted in 5 Thorpe 3081-3084 (declaring that "all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights," including the "right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences" and the "right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state").
Several years later, the Founders amended the Constitution to expressly protect many of the same fundamental rights against interference by the Federal Government. Consistent with their English heritage, the founding generation generally did not consider many of the rights identified in these amendments as new entitlements, but as inalienable rights of all men, given legal effect by their codification in the Constitution's text. See, e.g., 1 Annals of Cong. 431-432, 436-437, 440-442 (1834) (statement of Rep. Madison) (proposing Bill of Rights in the first Congress); The Federalist No. 84, pp. 531-533 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A.Hamilton); see also Heller, 554 U.S., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2797 ("[I]t has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right"). The Court's subsequent decision in Barron, however, made plain that the codification of these rights in the Bill made them legally enforceable only against the Federal Government, not the States. See 7 Pet., at 247.
Even though the Bill of Rights did not apply to the States, other provisions of the Constitution did limit state interference with individual rights. Article IV, § 2, cl. 1 provides that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." The text of this provision resembles the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and it can be assumed that the public's understanding of the latter was informed by its understanding of the former.
Article IV, § 2 was derived from a similar clause in the Articles of Confederation, and reflects the dual citizenship the Constitution provided to all Americans after replacing that "league" of separate sovereign States. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 187, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824); see 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1800, p. 675 (1833). By virtue of a person's citizenship in a particular State, he was guaranteed whatever rights and liberties that State's constitution
What were the "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States"? That question was answered perhaps most famously by Justice Bushrod Washington sitting as Circuit Justice in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-552 (No. 3,230) (CC ED Pa. 1825). In that case, a Pennsylvania citizen claimed that a New Jersey law prohibiting nonresidents from harvesting oysters from the State's waters violated Article IV, § 2 because it deprived him, as an out-of-state citizen, of a right New Jersey availed to its own citizens. Id., at 550. Justice Washington rejected that argument, refusing to "accede to the proposition" that Article IV, § 2 entitled "citizens of the several states . . . to participate in all the rights which belong exclusively to the citizens of any other particular state." Id., at 552 (emphasis added). In his view, Article IV, § 2 did not guarantee equal access to all public benefits a State might choose to make available to its citizens. See id., at 552. Instead, it applied only to those rights "which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments." Id., at 551 (emphasis added). Other courts generally agreed with this principle. See, e.g., Abbot v. Bayley, 23 Mass. 89, 92-93 (1827) (noting that the "privileges and immunities" of citizens in the several States protected by Article IV, § 2 are "qualified and not absolute" because they do not grant a traveling citizen the right of "suffrage or of eligibility to office" in the State to which he travels).
When describing those "fundamental" rights, Justice Washington thought it "would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate" them all, but suggested that they could "be all comprehended under" a broad list of "general heads," such as "[p]rotection by the government," "the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind," "the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus," and the right of access to "the courts of the state," among others.
Notably, Justice Washington did not indicate whether Article IV, § 2 required States to recognize these fundamental rights in their own citizens and thus in sojourning citizens alike, or whether the Clause simply prohibited the States from discriminating against sojourning citizens with respect to whatever fundamental rights state law happened to recognize. On this question, the weight of legal authorities at the time of Reconstruction indicated
* * *
The text examined so far demonstrates three points about the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in § 1. First, "privileges" and "immunities" were synonyms for "rights." Second, both the States and the Federal Government had long recognized the inalienable rights of their citizens. Third, Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution protected traveling citizens against state discrimination with respect to the fundamental rights of state citizenship.
Two questions still remain, both provoked by the textual similarity between § 1's Privileges or Immunities Clause and Article IV, § 2. The first involves the nature of the rights at stake: Are the privileges or immunities of "citizens of the United States" recognized by § 1 the same as the privileges and immunities of "citizens in the several States" to which Article IV, § 2 refers? The second involves the restriction imposed on the States: Does § 1, like Article IV, § 2, prohibit only discrimination with respect to certain rights if the State chooses to recognize them, or does it require States to recognize those rights? I address each question in turn.
I start with the nature of the rights that § 1's Privileges or Immunities Clause protects. Section 1 overruled Dred Scott's holding that blacks were not citizens of either the United States or their own State and, thus, did not enjoy "the privileges and immunities of citizens" embodied in the Constitution. 19 How., at 417. The Court in Dred Scott did not distinguish between privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States and citizens in the several States, instead referring to the rights of citizens generally. It did, however, give examples of what the rights of citizens were—the constitutionally enumerated rights of "the full liberty of speech" and the right "to keep and carry arms." Ibid.
Section 1 protects the rights of citizens "of the United States" specifically. The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the privileges and immunities of such citizens included individual rights enumerated in the Constitution, including the right to keep and bear arms.
Nineteenth-century treaties through which the United States acquired territory from other sovereigns routinely promised inhabitants of the newly acquired territories
Commentators of the time explained that the rights and immunities of "citizens of the United States" recognized in these treaties "undoubtedly mean[t] those privileges that are common to all citizens of this republic." Marcus, An Examination of the Expediency and Constitutionality of Prohibiting Slavery in the State of Missouri 17 (1819). It is therefore altogether unsurprising that several of these treaties identify liberties enumerated in the Constitution as privileges and immunities common to all United States citizens.
For example, the Louisiana Cession Act of 1803, which codified a treaty between the United States and France culminating in the Louisiana Purchase, provided that
Daniel Webster was among the leading proponents of the antislavery position. In his "Memorial to Congress," Webster argued that "[t]he rights, advantages and immunities here spoken of [in the Cession Act] must . . . be such as are recognized or communicated by the Constitution of the United States," not the "rights, advantages and immunities, derived exclusively from the State governments. . . ." D. Webster, A Memorial to the Congress of the United States on the Subject of Restraining the Increase of Slavery in New States to be Admitted into the Union 15 (Dec. 15, 1819) (emphasis added). "The obvious meaning" of the Act, in Webster's view, was that "the rights derived under the federal Constitution shall be enjoyed by the inhabitants of [the territory]." Id., at 15-16 (emphasis added). In other words, Webster articulated a distinction between the rights of United States citizenship and the rights of state citizenship, and argued that the former included those rights "recognized or communicated by the Constitution." Since the right to hold slaves was not mentioned in the Constitution, it was not a right of federal citizenship.
Webster and his allies ultimately lost the debate over slavery in Missouri and the territory was admitted as a slave State as part of the now-famous Missouri Compromise. Missouri Enabling Act of March 6, 1820, ch. 22, § 8, 3 Stat. 548. But their arguments continued to inform public understanding of the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship. In 1854, Webster's Memorial was republished in a pamphlet discussing the Nation's next major debate on slavery—the proposed repeal of the Missouri Compromise through the Kansas-Nebraska Act, see The Nebraska Question: Comprising Speeches in the United States Senate: Together with the History of the Missouri Compromise 9-12 (1854). It was published again in 1857 in a collection of famous American speeches. See The Political Text-Book, or Encyclopedia: Containing Everything Necessary for the Reference of the Politicians and Statesmen of the United States 601-604 (M. Cluskey ed. 1857); see also Lash, 98 Geo. L. J., at 1294-1296 (describing Webster's arguments and their influence).
Evidence from the political branches in the years leading to the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption demonstrates broad public understanding that the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship included rights set forth in the Constitution, just as Webster and his allies had argued. In 1868, President Andrew Johnson issued a proclamation granting amnesty to former Confederates, guaranteeing "to all and to every person who directly or indirectly participated in the late insurrection or rebellion, a full pardon and amnesty for the offence of treason . . . with restoration of all rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution and the laws which have been made in pursuance thereof." 15 Stat. 712.
Records from the 39th Congress further support this understanding.
After the Civil War, Congress established the Joint Committee on Reconstruction to investigate circumstances in the Southern States and to determine whether, and on what conditions, those States should be readmitted to the Union. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 6, 30 (1865) (hereinafter 39th Cong. Globe); M. Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights 57 (1986) (hereinafter Curtis). That Committee would ultimately recommend the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, justifying its recommendation by submitting a report to Congress that extensively catalogued the abuses of civil rights in the former slave States and argued that "adequate security for future peace and safety. . . can only be found in such changes of the organic law as shall determine the civil rights and privileges of all citizens in all parts of the republic." See Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, S.Rep. No. 112, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 15 (1866); H. R. Rep. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. XXI (1866).
As the Court notes, the Committee's Report "was widely reprinted in the press and distributed by members of the 39th Congress to their constituents." Ante, at 3039; B. Kendrick, Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction 264-265 (1914) (noting that 150,000 copies of the Report were printed and that it was widely distributed as a campaign document in the election of 1866). In addition, newspaper coverage suggests that the wider public was aware of the Committee's work even before the Report was issued. For example, the Fort Wayne Daily Democrat (which appears to have been unsupportive of the Committee's work) paraphrased a motion instructing the Committee to
Statements made by Members of Congress leading up to, and during, the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment point in the same direction. The record of these debates has been combed before. See Adamson v. California,
Three speeches stand out as particularly significant. Representative John Bingham, the principal draftsman of § 1, delivered a speech on the floor of the House in February 1866 introducing his first draft of the provision. Bingham began by discussing Barron and its holding that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the States. He then argued that a constitutional amendment was necessary to provide "an express grant of power in Congress to enforce by penal enactment these great canons of the supreme law, securing to all the citizens in every State all the privileges and immunities of citizens, and to all the people all the sacred rights of person." 39th Cong. Globe 1089-1090 (1866). Bingham emphasized that § 1 was designed "to arm the Congress of the United States, by the consent of the people of the United States, with the power to enforce the bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution today. It `hath that extent—no more.'" Id., at 1088.
Bingham's speech was printed in pamphlet form and broadly distributed in 1866 under the title, "One Country, One Constitution, and One People," and the subtitle, "In Support of the Proposed Amendment to Enforce the Bill of Rights."
Bingham's first draft of § 1 was different from the version ultimately adopted. Of particular importance, the first draft granted Congress the "power to make all laws . . . necessary and proper to secure" the "citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States," rather than restricting state power to "abridge" the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.
That draft was met with objections, which the Times covered extensively. A
Critically, Hale did not object to the draft insofar as it purported to protect constitutional liberties against state interference. Indeed, Hale stated that he believed (incorrectly in light of Barron) that individual rights enumerated in the Constitution were already enforceable against the States. See 39th Cong. Globe 1064 ("I have, somehow or other, gone along with the impression that there is that sort of protection thrown over us in some way, whether with or without the sanction of a judicial decision that we are so protected"); see N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1866, at 1. Hale's misperception was not uncommon among members of the Reconstruction generation. See infra, at 3047-3048. But that is secondary to the point that the Times' coverage of this debate over § 1's meaning suggests public awareness of its main contours —i.e., that § 1 would, at a minimum, enforce constitutionally enumerated rights of United States citizens against the States.
Bingham's draft was tabled for several months. In the interim, he delivered a second well-publicized speech, again arguing that a constitutional amendment was required to give Congress the power to enforce the Bill of Rights against the States. That speech was printed in pamphlet form, see Speech of Hon. John A. Bingham, of Ohio, on the Civil Rights Bill, Mar. 9, 1866 (Cong.Globe); see 39th Cong. Globe 1837 (remarks of Rep. Lawrence) (noting that the speech was "extensively published"), and the New York Times covered the speech on its front page. Thirty-Ninth Congress, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1866, p. 1.
By the time the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment resumed, Bingham had amended his draft of § 1 to include the text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause that was ultimately adopted. Senator Jacob Howard introduced the new draft on the floor of the Senate in the third speech relevant here. Howard explained that the Constitution recognized "a mass of privileges, immunities, and rights, some of them secured by the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution, . . . some by the first eight amendments of the Constitution," and that "there is no power given in the Constitution to enforce and to carry out any of these guarantees" against the States. 39th Cong. Globe 2765. Howard then stated that "the great object" of § 1 was to "restrain the power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these great fundamental guarantees." Id., at 2766. Section 1, he indicated, imposed "a general prohibition upon all the States, as such, from abridging the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States." Id., at 2765.
In describing these rights, Howard explained that they included "the privileges
News of Howard's speech was carried in major newspapers across the country, including the New York Herald, see N.Y. Herald, May 24, 1866, p. 1, which was the best-selling paper in the Nation at that time, see A. Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 187 (1998) (hereinafter Amar).
As a whole, these well-circulated speeches indicate that § 1 was understood to enforce constitutionally declared rights against the States, and they provide no suggestion that any language in the section other than the Privileges or Immunities Clause would accomplish that task.
When read against this backdrop, the civil rights legislation adopted by the 39th Congress in 1866 further supports this view. Between passing the Thirteenth Amendment—which outlawed slavery alone—and the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress passed two significant pieces of legislation. The first was the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which provided that "all persons born in the United States" were "citizens of the United States" and that "such citizens, of every race and color, . . . shall have the same right" to, among other things, "full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens." Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
Both proponents and opponents of this Act described it as providing the "privileges" of citizenship to freedmen, and defined those privileges to include constitutional rights, such as the right to keep and bear arms. See 39th Cong. Globe 474 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull) (stating that the "the late slaveholding States" had enacted laws "depriving persons of African descent of privileges which are essential to freemen," including "prohibit[ing] any negro or mulatto from having fire-arms" and stating that "[t]he purpose of the bill under consideration is to destroy all these discriminations"); id., at 1266-1267 (remarks
Three months later, Congress passed the Freedmen's Bureau Act, which also entitled all citizens to the "full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty" and "personal security." Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, § 14, 14 Stat. 176. The Act stated expressly that the rights of personal liberty and security protected by the Act "includ[ed] the constitutional right to bear arms." Ibid.
There is much else in the legislative record. Many statements by Members of Congress corroborate the view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause enforced constitutionally enumerated rights against the States. See Curtis 112 (collecting examples). I am not aware of any statement that directly refutes that proposition. That said, the record of the debates—like most legislative history—is less than crystal clear. In particular, much ambiguity derives from the fact that at least several Members described § 1 as protecting the privileges and immunities of citizens "in the several States," harkening back to Article IV, § 2. See supra, at 3041 (describing Sen. Howard's speech). These statements can be read to support the view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects some or all the fundamental rights of "citizens" described in Corfield. They can also be read to support the view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause, like Article IV, § 2, prohibits only state discrimination with respect to those rights it covers, but does not deprive States of the power to deny those rights to all citizens equally.
I examine the rest of the historical record with this understanding. But for purposes of discerning what the public most likely thought the Privileges or Immunities Clause to mean, it is significant that the most widely publicized statements by the legislators who voted on § 1—Bingham, Howard, and even Hale—point unambiguously toward the conclusion that the Privileges or Immunities Clause enforces at least those fundamental rights enumerated in the Constitution against the States, including the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.
Interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment in the period immediately following its ratification help to establish the public understanding of the text at the time of its adoption.
Some of these interpretations come from Members of Congress. During an 1871 debate on a bill to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, Representative Henry Dawes listed the Constitution's first eight Amendments, including "the right to keep and bear arms," before explaining that after the Civil War, the country "gave the most grand of all these rights, privileges, and immunities, by one single amendment to the Constitution, to four millions of American citizens" who formerly were slaves. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 475-476 (1871). "It is all these," Dawes explained, "which are comprehended in the words `American citizen.'" Ibid.; see also id., at 334 (remarks of Rep. Hoar) (stating that the Privileges or Immunities Clause referred to those rights "declared to belong to the citizen by the Constitution itself"). Even opponents of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation acknowledged that the Privileges or Immunities
Legislation passed in furtherance of the Fourteenth Amendment demonstrates even more clearly this understanding. For example, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, which was titled in pertinent part "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States," and which is codified in the still-existing 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute prohibits state officials from depriving citizens of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution." Rev. Stat.1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). Although the Judiciary ignored this provision for decades after its enactment, this Court has come to interpret the statute, unremarkably in light of its text, as protecting constitutionally enumerated rights. Monroe v. Pape,
A Federal Court of Appeals decision written by a future Justice of this Court adopted the same understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 82 (No. 15,282) (CC SD Ala. 1871) (Woods, J.) ("We think, therefore, that the . . . rights enumerated in the first eight articles of amendment to the constitution of the United States, are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States"). In addition, two of the era's major constitutional treatises reflected the understanding that § 1 would protect constitutionally enumerated rights from state abridgment.
Another example of public understanding comes from United States Attorney Daniel Corbin's statement in an 1871 Ku Klux Klan prosecution. Corbin cited Barron and declared:
* * *
This evidence plainly shows that the ratifying public understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect constitutionally enumerated rights, including the right to keep and bear arms. As the Court demonstrates, there can be no doubt that § 1 was understood to enforce the Second Amendment against the States. See ante, at 3038-3044. In my view, this is because the right to keep and bear arms was understood to be a privilege of American citizenship guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
The next question is whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause merely prohibits States from discriminating among citizens if they recognize the Second Amendment's right to keep and bear arms, or whether the Clause requires States to recognize the right. The municipal respondents, Chicago and Oak Park, argue for the former interpretation. They contend that the Second Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth, authorizes a State to impose an outright ban on handgun possession such as the ones at issue here so long as a State applies it to all citizens equally.
I begin, again, with the text. The Privileges or Immunities Clause opens with the command that "No State shall" abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. Amdt. 14, § 1 (emphasis added). The very same phrase opens Article I, § 10 of the Constitution, which prohibits the States from "pass[ing] any Bill of Attainder" or "ex post facto Law," among other things. Article I, § 10 is one of the few constitutional provisions that limits state authority. In Barron, when Chief Justice Marshall interpreted the Bill of Rights as lacking "plain and intelligible language" restricting state power to infringe upon individual liberties, he pointed to Article I, § 10 as an example of text that would have accomplished that task. 7 Pet., at 250. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall would later describe Article I, § 10 as "a bill of rights for the people of each state." Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 138, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810). Thus, the fact that the Privileges or Immunities Clause uses the command "[n]o State shall"—which Article
This interpretation is strengthened when one considers that the Privileges or Immunities Clause uses the verb "abridge," rather than "discriminate," to describe the limit it imposes on state authority. The Webster's dictionary in use at the time of Reconstruction defines the word "abridge" to mean "[t]o deprive; to cut off; . . . as, to abridge one of his rights." Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language, at 6. The Clause is thus best understood to impose a limitation on state power to infringe upon pre-existing substantive rights. It raises no indication that the Framers of the Clause used the word "abridge" to prohibit only discrimination.
This most natural textual reading is underscored by a well-publicized revision to the Fourteenth Amendment that the Reconstruction Congress rejected. After several Southern States refused to ratify the Amendment, President Johnson met with their Governors to draft a compromise. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1867, p. 5. Their proposal eliminated Congress' power to enforce the Amendment (granted in § 5), and replaced the Privileges or Immunities Clause in § 1 with the following:
Significantly, this proposal removed the "[n]o State shall" directive and the verb "abridge" from § 1, and also changed the class of rights to be protected from those belonging to "citizens of the United States" to those of the "citizens in the several States." This phrasing is materially indistinguishable from Article IV, § 2, which generally was understood as an antidiscrimination provision alone. See supra, at 3066-3068. The proposal thus strongly indicates that at least the President of the United States and several southern Governors thought that the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which they unsuccessfully tried to revise, prohibited more than just state-sponsored discrimination.
The argument that the Privileges or Immunities Clause prohibits no more than discrimination often is followed by a claim that public discussion of the Clause, and of § 1 generally, was not extensive. Because of this, the argument goes, § 1 must not have been understood to accomplish such a significant task as subjecting States to federal enforcement of a minimum baseline of rights. That argument overlooks critical aspects of the Nation's history that underscored the need for, and wide agreement upon, federal enforcement of constitutionally enumerated rights against the States, including the right to keep and bear arms.
I turn first to public debate at the time of ratification. It is true that the congressional debates over § 1 were relatively brief. It is also true that there is little evidence of extensive debate in the States. Many state legislatures did not keep records of their debates, and the few records that do exist reveal only modest discussion. See Curtis 145. These facts are not surprising.
First, however consequential we consider the question today, the nationalization of constitutional rights was not the most
Second, the congressional debates on the Fourteenth Amendment reveal that many representatives, and probably many citizens, believed that the Thirteenth Amendment, the 1866 Civil Rights legislation, or some combination of the two, had already enforced constitutional rights against the States. Justice Black's dissent in Adamson chronicles this point in detail. 332 U.S., at 107-108, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (Appendix to dissenting opinion). Regardless of whether that understanding was accurate as a matter of constitutional law, it helps to explain why Congressmen had little to say during the debates about § 1. See ibid.
Third, while Barron made plain that the Bill of Rights was not legally enforceable against the States, see supra, at 3059, the significance of that holding should not be overstated. Like the Framers, see supra, at 3066, many 19th-century Americans understood the Bill of Rights to declare inalienable rights that pre-existed all government. Thus, even though the Bill of Rights technically applied only to the Federal Government, many believed that it declared rights that no legitimate government could abridge.
Chief Justice Henry Lumpkin's decision for the Georgia Supreme Court in Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846), illustrates this view. In assessing state power to regulate firearm possession, Lumpkin wrote that he was "aware that it has been decided, that [the Second Amendment], like other amendments adopted at the same time, is a restriction upon the government of the United States, and does not extend to the individual States." Id., at 250. But he still considered the right to keep and bear arms as "an unalienable right, which lies at the bottom of every free government," and thus found the States bound to honor it. Ibid. Other state courts adopted similar positions with respect to the right to keep and bear arms and other enumerated rights.
In sum, some appear to have believed that the Bill of Rights did apply to the States, even though this Court had squarely rejected that theory. See, e.g., supra, at 3072-3073 (recounting Rep. Hale's argument to this effect). Many others believed that the liberties codified in the Bill of Rights were ones that no State should abridge, even though they understood that the Bill technically did not apply to States. These beliefs, combined with the fact that most state constitutions recognized many, if not all, of the individual rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, made the need for federal enforcement of constitutional liberties against the States an afterthought. See ante, at ___ (opinion of the Court) (noting that, "[i]n 1868, 22 of the 37 States in the Union had state constitutional provisions explicitly protecting the right to keep and bear arms"). That changed with the national conflict over slavery.
In the contentious years leading up to the Civil War, those who sought to retain the institution of slavery found that to do so, it was necessary to eliminate more and more of the basic liberties of slaves, free blacks, and white abolitionists. Congressman Tobias Plants explained that slaveholders "could not hold [slaves] safely where dissent was permitted," so they decided that "all dissent must be suppressed by the strong hand of power." 39th Cong. Globe 1013. The measures they used were ruthless, repressed virtually every right recognized in the Constitution, and demonstrated that preventing only discriminatory state firearms restrictions would have been a hollow assurance for liberty. Public reaction indicates that the American people understood this point.
The overarching goal of pro-slavery forces was to repress the spread of abolitionist thought and the concomitant risk of a slave rebellion. Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the extent to which fear of a slave uprising gripped slaveholders and dictated the acts of Southern legislatures. Slaves and free blacks represented a substantial percentage of the population and posed a severe threat to Southern order if they were not kept in their place. According to the 1860 Census, slaves represented one quarter or more of the population in 11 of the 15 slave States, nearly half the population in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana, and more than 50% of the population in Mississippi and South Carolina. Statistics of the United States (Including Mortality, Property, &c.,) in 1860, The Eighth Census 336-350 (1866).
The Southern fear of slave rebellion was not unfounded. Although there were others, two particularly notable slave uprisings heavily influenced slaveholders in the South. In 1822, a group of free blacks and slaves led by Denmark Vesey planned a rebellion in which they would slay their masters and flee to Haiti. H. Aptheker, American Negro Slave Revolts 268-270 (1983). The plan was foiled, leading to the swift arrest of 130 blacks, and the execution of 37, including Vesey. Id., at 271. Still, slaveowners took notice—it was reportedly feared that as many as 6,600 to 9,000 slaves and free blacks were involved in the plot. Id., at 272. A few years later,
The fear generated by these and other rebellions led Southern legislatures to take particularly vicious aim at the rights of free blacks and slaves to speak or to keep and bear arms for their defense. Teaching slaves to read (even the Bible) was a criminal offense punished severely in some States. See K. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-bellum South 208, 211 (1956). Virginia made it a crime for a member of an "abolition" society to enter the State and argue "that the owners of slaves have no property in the same, or advocate or advise the abolition of slavery." 1835-1836 Va. Acts ch. 66, p. 44. Other States prohibited the circulation of literature denying a master's right to property in his slaves and passed laws requiring postmasters to inspect the mails in search of such material. C. Eaton, The Freedom-of-Thought Struggle in the Old South 118-143, 199-200 (1964).
Many legislatures amended their laws prohibiting slaves from carrying firearms
Southern blacks were not alone in facing threats to their personal liberty and security during the antebellum era. Mob violence in many Northern cities presented dangers as well. Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 Geo. L.J. 309, 340 (1991) (hereinafter Cottrol) (recounting a July 1834 mob attack against "churches, homes, and businesses of white abolitionists and blacks" in New York that involved "upwards of twenty thousand people and required the intervention of the militia to suppress"); ibid. (noting an uprising in Boston nine years later in which a confrontation between a group of white sailors and four blacks led "a mob of several hundred whites" to "attac[k] and severely beat every black they could find").
After the Civil War, Southern anxiety about an uprising among the newly freed slaves peaked. As Representative Thaddeus Stevens is reported to have said, "[w]hen it was first proposed to free the slaves, and arm the blacks, did not half the nation tremble? The prim conservatives,
As the Court explains, this fear led to "systematic efforts" in the "old Confederacy" to disarm the more than 180,000 freedmen who had served in the Union Army, as well as other free blacks. See ante, at 3038. Some States formally prohibited blacks from possessing firearms. Ante, at 3038-3039 (quoting 1865 Miss. Laws p. 165, § 1, reprinted in 1 Fleming 289). Others enacted legislation prohibiting blacks from carrying firearms without a license, a restriction not imposed on whites. See, e.g., La. Statute of 1865, reprinted in id., at 280. Additionally, "[t]hroughout the South, armed parties, often consisting of ex-Confederate soldiers serving in the state militias, forcibly took firearms from newly freed slaves." Ante, at 3039.
As the Court makes crystal clear, if the Fourteenth Amendment "had outlawed only those laws that discriminate on the basis of race or previous condition of servitude, African-Americans in the South would likely have remained vulnerable to attack by many of their worst abusers: the state militia and state peace officers." Ante, at 3043. In the years following the Civil War, a law banning firearm possession outright "would have been nondiscriminatory only in the formal sense," for it would have "left firearms in the hands of the militia and local peace officers." Ibid.
Evidence suggests that the public understood this at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. The publicly circulated Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction extensively detailed these abuses, see ante, at 3038-3039 (collecting examples), and statements by citizens indicate that they looked to the Committee to provide a federal solution to this problem, see, e.g., 39th Cong. Globe 337 (remarks of Rep. Sumner) (introducing "a memorial from the colored citizens of the State of South Carolina" asking for, inter alia, "constitutional protection in keeping arms, in holding public assemblies, and in complete liberty of speech and of the press").
One way in which the Federal Government responded was to issue military orders countermanding Southern arms legislation. See, e.g., Jan. 17, 1866, order from Major General D.E. Sickles, reprinted in E. McPherson, The Political History of the United States of America During the Period of Reconstruction 37 (1871) ("The constitutional rights of all loyal and well-disposed inhabitants to bear arms will not be infringed"). The significance of these steps was not lost on those they were designed to protect. After one such order was issued, The Christian Recorder, published by the African Methodist Episcopal Church, published the following editorial:
The same month, The Loyal Georgian carried a letter to the editor asking "Have colored persons a right to own and carry
These statements are consistent with the arguments of abolitionists during the antebellum era that slavery, and the slave States' efforts to retain it, violated the constitutional rights of individuals—rights the abolitionists described as among the privileges and immunities of citizenship. See, e.g., J. Tiffany, Treatise on the Unconstitutionality of American Slavery 56 (1849) (reprint 1969) ("pledg[ing] ... to see that all the rights, privileges, and immunities, granted by the constitution of the United States, are extended to all"); id., at 99 (describing the "right to keep and bear arms" as one of those rights secured by "the constitution of the United States"). The problem abolitionists sought to remedy was that, under Dred Scott, blacks were not entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens under the Federal Constitution and that, in many States, whatever inalienable rights state law recognized did not apply to blacks. See, e.g., Cooper v. Savannah, 4 Ga. 68, 72 (1848) (deciding, just two years after Chief Justice Lumpkin's opinion in Nunn recognizing the right to keep and bear arms, see supra, at 3079-3080, that "[f]ree persons of color have never been recognized here as citizens; they are not entitled to bear arms").
Section 1 guaranteed the rights of citizenship in the United States and in the several States without regard to race. But it was understood that liberty would be assured little protection if § 1 left each State to decide which privileges or immunities of United States citizenship it would protect. As Frederick Douglass explained before § 1's adoption, "the Legislatures of the South can take from him the right to keep and bear arms, as they can—they would not allow a negro to walk with a cane where I came from, they would not allow five of them to assemble together." In What New Skin Will the Old Snake Come Forth? An Address Delivered in New York, New York, May 10, 1865, reprinted in 4 The Frederick Douglass Papers 79, 83-84 (J. Blassingame & J. McKivigan eds., 1991) (footnote omitted). "Notwithstanding the provision in the Constitution of the United States, that the right to keep and bear arms shall not be abridged," Douglass explained that "the black man has never had the right either to keep or bear arms." Id., at 84. Absent a constitutional amendment to enforce that right against the States, he insisted that "the work of the Abolitionists [wa]s not finished." Ibid.
This history confirms what the text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause most naturally suggests: Consistent with its command that "[n]o State shall ... abridge" the rights of United States citizens, the Clause establishes a minimum baseline of federal rights, and the constitutional right to keep and bear arms plainly was among them.
My conclusion is contrary to this Court's precedents, which hold that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is not a privilege of United States citizenship. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S., at 548-549, 551-553. I must, therefore, consider whether stare decisis requires retention of those precedents. As mentioned at the outset, my inquiry is limited to the right at issue here. Thus, I do not endeavor to decide in this case whether, or to what extent, the Privileges or Immunities Clause applies any other rights enumerated in the Constitution against the States.
This inquiry begins with the Slaughter-House Cases. There, this Court upheld a Louisiana statute granting a monopoly on livestock butchering in and around the city of New Orleans to a newly incorporated company. 16 Wall. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394. Butchers excluded by the monopoly sued, claiming that the statute violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause because it interfered with their right to pursue and "exercise their trade." Id., at 60. This Court rejected the butchers' claim, holding that their asserted right was not a privilege or immunity of American citizenship, but one governed by the States alone. The Court held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected only rights of federal citizenship—those "which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws," id., at 79—and did not protect any of the rights of state citizenship, id., at 74. In other words, the Court defined the two sets of rights as mutually exclusive.
After separating these two sets of rights, the Court defined the rights of state citizenship as "embrac[ing] nearly every civil right for the establishment and protection of which organized government is instituted"—that is, all those rights listed in Corfield. 16 Wall., at 76 (referring to "those rights" that "Judge Washington" described). That left very few rights of
I reject that understanding. There was no reason to interpret the Privileges or Immunities Clause as putting the Court to the extreme choice of interpreting the "privileges and immunities" of federal citizenship to mean either all those rights listed in Corfield, or almost no rights at all. 16 Wall., at 76. The record is scant that the public understood the Clause to make the Federal Government "a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States" as the Slaughter-House majority feared. Id., at 78. For one thing, Corfield listed the "elective franchise" as one of the privileges and immunities of "citizens of the several states," 6 F. Cas., at 552, yet Congress and the States still found it necessary to adopt the Fifteenth Amendment—which protects "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote"—two years after the Fourteenth Amendment's passage. If the Privileges or Immunities Clause were understood to protect every conceivable civil right from state abridgment, the Fifteenth Amendment would have been redundant.
The better view, in light of the States and Federal Government's shared history of recognizing certain inalienable rights in their citizens, is that the privileges and immunities of state and federal citizenship overlap. This is not to say that the privileges and immunities of state and federal citizenship are the same. At the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, States performed many more functions than the Federal Government, and it is unlikely that, simply by referring to "privileges or immunities," the Framers of § 1 meant to transfer every right mentioned in Corfield to congressional oversight. As discussed, "privileges" and "immunities" were understood only as synonyms for "rights." See supra, at 3063-3064. It was their attachment to a particular group that gave them content, and the text and history recounted here indicate that the rights of United States citizens were not perfectly identical to the rights of citizens "in the several States." Justice Swayne, one of the dissenters in Slaughter-House, made the point clear:
Because the privileges and immunities of American citizenship include rights enumerated in the Constitution, they overlap to at least some extent with the privileges and immunities traditionally recognized in citizens in the several States.
A separate question is whether the privileges and immunities of American citizenship include any rights besides those enumerated in the Constitution. The four
Still, it is argued that the mere possibility that the Privileges or Immunities Clause may enforce unenumerated rights against the States creates "`special hazards'" that should prevent this Court from returning to the original meaning of the Clause.
Finding these impediments to returning to the original meaning overstated, I reject Slaughter-House insofar as it precludes any overlap between the privileges and immunities of state and federal citizenship. I next proceed to the stare decisis considerations surrounding the precedent that expressly controls the question presented here.
Three years after Slaughter-House, the Court in Cruikshank squarely held that the right to keep and bear arms was not a privilege of American citizenship, thereby overturning the convictions of militia members responsible for the brutal Colfax Massacre. See supra, at 3027-3028. Cruikshank is not a precedent entitled to any respect. The flaws in its interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause are made evident by the preceding evidence of its original meaning, and I would reject the holding on that basis alone. But, the consequences of Cruikshank warrant mention as well.
Take, for example, the Hamburg Massacre of 1876. There, a white citizen militia sought out and murdered a troop of black militiamen for no other reason than that they had dared to conduct a celebratory Fourth of July parade through their mostly black town. The white militia commander, "Pitchfork" Ben Tillman, later described this massacre with pride: "[T]he leading white men of Edgefield" had decided "to seize the first opportunity that the negroes might offer them to provoke a riot and teach the negroes a lesson by having the whites demonstrate their superiority by killing as many of them as was justifiable." S. Kantrowitz, Ben Tillman & the Reconstruction of White Supremacy 67 (2000) (ellipsis, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). None of the perpetrators of the Hamburg murders was ever brought to justice.
Organized terrorism like that perpetuated by Tillman and his cohorts proliferated in the absence of federal enforcement of constitutional rights. Militias such as the Ku Klux Klan, the Knights of the White Camellia, the White Brotherhood, the Pale Faces, and the '76 Association spread terror among blacks and white Republicans by breaking up Republican meetings, threatening political leaders, and whipping black militiamen. Era of Reconstruction, 199-200; Curtis 156. These groups raped, murdered, lynched, and robbed as a means of intimidating, and instilling pervasive fear in, those whom they despised. A. Trelease, White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction 28-46 (1995).
Although Congress enacted legislation to suppress these activities,
The use of firearms for self-defense was often the only way black citizens could protect themselves from mob violence. As Eli Cooper, one target of such violence, is said to have explained, "`[t]he Negro has been run over for fifty years, but it must stop now, and pistols and shotguns are the only weapons to stop a mob.'" Church Burnings Follow Negro Agitator's Lynching, Chicago Defender, Sept. 6, 1919, in id., at 124. Sometimes, as in Cooper's case, self-defense did not succeed. He was dragged from his home by a mob and killed as his wife looked on. Ibid. But at other times, the use of firearms allowed targets of mob violence to survive. One man recalled the night during his childhood when his father stood armed at a jail until morning to ward off lynchers. See Cottrol, 354. The experience left him with a sense, "not `of powerlessness, but of the "possibilities of salvation"'" that came from standing up to intimidation. Ibid.
In my view, the record makes plain that the Framers of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the ratifying-era public understood—just as the Framers of the Second Amendment did—that the right to keep and bear arms was essential to the preservation of liberty. The record makes equally plain that they deemed this right necessary to include in the minimum baseline of federal rights that the Privileges or Immunities Clause established in the wake of the War over slavery. There is nothing about Cruikshank's contrary holding that warrants its retention.
* * *
I agree with the Court that the Second Amendment is fully applicable to the States. I do so because the right to keep and bear arms is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment as a privilege of American citizenship.
Justice STEVENS, dissenting.
In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. ___, ___,
Before the District Court, petitioners focused their pleadings on the special considerations raised by domestic possession, which they identified as the core of their asserted right. In support of their claim that the city of Chicago's handgun ban violates the Constitution, they now rely primarily on the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brief for Petitioners 9-65. They rely
I agree with the plurality's refusal to accept petitioners' primary submission. Ante, at 3030-3031. Their briefs marshal an impressive amount of historical evidence for their argument that the Court interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause too narrowly in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873). But the original meaning of the Clause is not as clear as they suggest
I further agree with the plurality that there are weighty arguments supporting petitioners' second submission, insofar as
This is a substantive due process case.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment decrees that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The Court has filled thousands of pages expounding that spare text. As I read the vast corpus of substantive due process opinions, they confirm several important principles that ought to guide our resolution of this case. The principal opinion's lengthy summary of our "incorporation" doctrine, see ante, at 3028-3030, 3031-3036 (majority opinion), 3030-3031 (plurality opinion), and its implicit (and untenable) effort to wall off that doctrine from the rest of our substantive due process jurisprudence, invite a fresh survey of this old terrain.
The first, and most basic, principle established by our cases is that the rights protected by the Due Process Clause are not merely procedural in nature. At first glance, this proposition might seem surprising, given that the Clause refers to "process." But substance and procedure are often deeply entwined. Upon closer inspection, the text can be read to "impos[e] nothing less than an obligation to give substantive content to the words `liberty' and `due process of law,'" Washington v. Glucksberg,
I have yet to see a persuasive argument that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought otherwise. To the contrary, the historical evidence suggests that, at least by the time of the Civil War if not much earlier, the phrase "due process of law" had acquired substantive content as a term of art within the legal community.
If text and history are inconclusive on this point, our precedent leaves no doubt: It has been "settled" for well over a century that the Due Process Clause "applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure." Whitney v. California,
The second principle woven through our cases is that substantive due process is fundamentally a matter of personal liberty. For it is the liberty clause of the Fourteenth
It follows that the term "incorporation," like the term "unenumerated rights," is something of a misnomer. Whether an asserted substantive due process interest is explicitly named in one of the first eight Amendments to the Constitution or is not mentioned, the underlying inquiry is the same: We must ask whether the interest is "comprised within the term liberty." Whitney, 274 U.S., at 373, 47 S.Ct. 641 (Brandeis, J., concurring). As the second Justice Harlan has shown, ever since the Court began considering the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the States, "the Court's usual approach has been to ground the prohibitions against state action squarely on due process, without intermediate reliance on any of the first eight Amendments." Malloy v. Hogan,
The third precept to emerge from our case law flows from the second: The rights protected against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause need not be identical in shape or scope to the rights protected against Federal Government infringement by the various provisions of the Bill of Rights. As drafted, the Bill of Rights directly constrained only the Federal Government. See Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833). Although the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment profoundly altered our legal order, it "did not unstitch the basic federalist pattern woven into our constitutional fabric." Williams v. Florida,
It is true, as the Court emphasizes, ante, at 3034-3036, that we have made numerous provisions of the Bill of Rights fully applicable to the States. It is settled, for
It is true, as well, that during the 1960's the Court decided a number of cases involving procedural rights in which it treated the Due Process Clause as if it transplanted language from the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland,
Notwithstanding some overheated dicta in Malloy, 378 U.S., at 10-11, 84 S.Ct. 1489, it is therefore an overstatement to say that the Court has "abandoned," ante, at 3034, 3035 (majority opinion), 3047 (plurality opinion), a "two-track approach to incorporation," ante, at 3046 (plurality opinion). The Court moved away from that approach in the area of criminal procedure. But the Second Amendment differs in fundamental respects from its neighboring provisions in the Bill of Rights, as I shall explain in Part V, infra;
I do not mean to deny that there can be significant practical, as well as esthetic, benefits from treating rights symmetrically with regard to the State and Federal Governments. Jot-for-jot incorporation of a provision may entail greater protection of the right at issue and therefore greater freedom for those who hold it; jot-for-jot incorporation may also yield greater clarity about the contours of the legal rule. See Johnson v. Louisiana,
Furthermore, there is a real risk that, by demanding the provisions of the Bill of Rights apply identically to the States, federal courts will cause those provisions to "be watered down in the needless pursuit of uniformity." Duncan v. Louisiana,
So far, I have explained that substantive due process analysis generally requires us to consider the term "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment, and that this inquiry may be informed by but does not depend upon the content of the Bill of Rights. How should a court go about the analysis, then? Our precedents have established, not an exact methodology, but rather a framework for decisionmaking. In this respect, too, the Court's narrative fails to capture the continuity and flexibility in our doctrine.
The basic inquiry was described by Justice Cardozo more than 70 years ago. When confronted with a substantive due process claim, we must ask whether the allegedly unlawful practice violates values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut,
Justice Cardozo's test undeniably requires judges to apply their own reasoned judgment, but that does not mean it involves an exercise in abstract philosophy. In addition to other constraints I will soon discuss, see Part III, infra, historical and empirical data of various kinds ground the analysis. Textual commitments laid down elsewhere in the Constitution, judicial precedents, English common law, legislative and social facts, scientific and professional developments, practices of other civilized societies,
The Court errs both in its interpretation of Palko and in its suggestion that later cases rendered Palko's methodology defunct. Echoing Duncan, the Court advises that Justice Cardozo's test will not be satisfied "`if a civilized system could be imagined that would not accord the particular
Nor, as the Court intimates, see ante, at 3034, did Duncan mark an irreparable break from Palko, swapping out liberty for history. Duncan limited its discussion to "particular procedural safeguard[s]" in the Bill of Rights relating to "criminal processes," 391 U.S., at 149, n. 14, 88 S.Ct. 1444; it did not purport to set a standard for other types of liberty interests. Even with regard to procedural safeguards, Duncan did not jettison the Palko test so much as refine it: The judge is still tasked with evaluating whether a practice "is fundamental... to ordered liberty," within the context of the "Anglo-American" system. Duncan, 391 U.S., at 149-150, n. 14, 88 S.Ct. 1444. Several of our most important recent decisions confirm the proposition that substantive due process analysis— from which, once again, "incorporation" analysis derives—must not be wholly backward looking. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas,
The Court's flight from Palko leaves its analysis, careful and scholarly though it is, much too narrow to provide a satisfying answer to this case. The Court hinges its entire decision on one mode of intellectual history, culling selected pronouncements and enactments from the 18th and 19th centuries to ascertain what Americans thought about firearms. Relying on Duncan and Glucksberg, the plurality suggests that only interests that have proved "fundamental from an American perspective," ante, at 3046, 3050, or "`deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,'" ante, at 3036 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S., at 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258), to the Court's satisfaction, may qualify for incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. To the extent the Court's opinion could be read to imply that the historical pedigree of a right is the exclusive or dispositive determinant of its status under the Due Process Clause, the opinion is seriously mistaken.
A rigid historical test is inappropriate in this case, most basically, because our substantive due process doctrine has never evaluated substantive rights in purely, or even predominantly, historical terms. When the Court applied many of the procedural guarantees in the Bill of Rights to the States in the 1960's, it often asked whether the guarantee in question was "fundamental in the context of the criminal
Yet when the Court has used the Due Process Clause to recognize rights distinct from the trial context—rights relating to the primary conduct of free individuals— Justice Cardozo's test has been our guide. The right to free speech, for instance, has been safeguarded from state infringement not because the States have always honored it, but because it is "essential to free government" and "to the maintenance of democratic institutions"—that is, because the right to free speech is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Thornhill v. Alabama,
More fundamentally, a rigid historical methodology is unfaithful to the Constitution's command. For if it were really the case that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of liberty embraces only those rights "so rooted in our history, tradition, and practice as to require special protection," Glucksberg, 521 U.S., at 721, n. 17, 117 S.Ct. 2258, then the guarantee would serve little function, save to ratify those rights that state actors have already been according the most extensive protection.
No, the liberty safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment is not merely preservative in nature but rather is a "dynamic concept." Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U. Chi. L.Rev. 13, 38 (1972). Its dynamism provides a central means through which the Framers enabled the Constitution to "endure for ages to come," McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 415, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), a central example of how they "wisely spoke in general language and left to succeeding generations the task of applying that language to the unceasingly changing environment in which they would live," Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L.Rev. 693, 694 (1976). "The task of giving concrete meaning to the term `liberty,'" I have elsewhere explained at some length, "was a part of the work assigned to future generations." Stevens, The Third Branch of Liberty, 41 U. Miami L.Rev. 277, 291 (1986).
At this point a difficult question arises. In considering such a majestic term as "liberty" and applying it to present circumstances, how are we to do justice to its urgent call and its open texture—and to the grant of interpretive discretion the
The most basic is that we have eschewed attempts to provide any all-purpose, top-down, totalizing theory of "liberty."
Yet while "the `liberty' specially protected by the Fourteenth Amendment" is "perhaps not capable of being fully clarified," Glucksberg, 521 U.S., at 722, 117 S.Ct. 2258, it is capable of being refined and delimited. We have insisted that only certain types of especially significant personal interests may qualify for especially heightened protection. Ever since "the deviant economic due process cases [were] repudiated," id., at 761, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment), our doctrine has steered away from "laws that touch economic problems, business affairs,
Rather than seek a categorical understanding of the liberty clause, our precedents have thus elucidated a conceptual core. The clause safeguards, most basically, "the ability independently to define one's identity," Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
Another key constraint on substantive due process analysis is respect for the democratic process. If a particular liberty interest is already being given careful consideration in, and subjected to ongoing calibration by, the States, judicial enforcement may not be appropriate. When the Court declined to establish a general right to physician-assisted suicide, for example, it did so in part because "the States [were] currently engaged in serious, thoughtful examinations of physician-assisted suicide and other similar issues," rendering judicial intervention both less necessary and potentially more disruptive. Glucksberg, 521 U.S., at 719, 735, 117 S.Ct. 2258. Conversely, we have long appreciated that more "searching" judicial review may be justified when the rights of "discrete and insular minorities"—groups that may face systematic barriers in the political system—are at stake. United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
Recognizing a new liberty right is a momentous step. It takes that right, to a considerable extent, "outside the arena of public debate and legislative action." Glucksberg, 521 U.S., at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258. Sometimes that momentous step must be taken; some fundamental aspects of personhood, dignity, and the like do not vary from State to State, and demand a baseline level of protection. But sensitivity to the interaction between the intrinsic aspects of liberty and the practical realities of contemporary society provides an important tool for guiding judicial discretion.
This sensitivity is an aspect of a deeper principle: the need to approach our work with humility and caution. Because the relevant constitutional language is so "spacious," Duncan, 391 U.S., at 148, 88 S.Ct. 1444, I have emphasized that "[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we
Several rules of the judicial process help enforce such restraint. In the substantive due process field as in others, the Court has applied both the doctrine of stare decisis —adhering to precedents, respecting reliance interests, prizing stability and order in the law—and the common-law method—taking cases and controversies as they present themselves, proceeding slowly and incrementally, building on what came before. This restrained methodology was evident even in the heyday of "incorporation" during the 1960's. Although it would have been much easier for the Court simply to declare certain Amendments in the Bill of Rights applicable to the States in toto, the Court took care to parse each Amendment into its component guarantees, evaluating them one by one. This piecemeal approach allowed the Court to scrutinize more closely the right at issue in any given dispute, reducing both the risk and the cost of error.
Relatedly, rather than evaluate liberty claims on an abstract plane, the Court has "required in substantive-due-process cases a `careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest." Glucksberg, 521 U.S., at 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (quoting Reno v. Flores,
As this discussion reflects, to acknowledge that the task of construing the liberty clause requires judgment is not to say that it is a license for unbridled judicial lawmaking. To the contrary, only an honest reckoning with our discretion allows for honest argumentation and meaningful accountability.
The question in this case, then, is not whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms (whatever that right's precise contours) applies to the States because the Amendment has been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. It has not been. The question, rather, is whether the particular right asserted by petitioners applies to the States because of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, standing on its own bottom. And to answer that question, we need to determine, first, the nature of the right that has been asserted and, second, whether that right is an aspect of Fourteenth Amendment "liberty." Even accepting the Court's holding in Heller, it remains entirely possible that the right to keep and bear arms identified in that opinion is not judicially enforceable against the States, or that only part of the right is so enforceable.
As noted at the outset, the liberty interest petitioners have asserted is the "right to possess a functional, personal firearm, including a handgun, within the home." Complaint ¶ 34, App. 23. The city of Chicago allows residents to keep functional firearms, so long as they are registered, but it generally prohibits the possession of handguns, sawed-off shotguns, machine guns, and short-barreled rifles. See Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code § 8-20-050
Petitioners' framing of their complaint tracks the Court's ruling in Heller. The majority opinion contained some dicta suggesting the possibility of a more expansive arms-bearing right, one that would travel with the individual to an extent into public places, as "in case of confrontation." 554 U.S., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2797-2798. But the Heller plaintiff sought only dispensation to keep an operable firearm in his home for lawful self-defense, see id., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2788, and n. 2), and the Court's opinion was bookended by reminders that its holding was limited to that one issue, id., at ___, ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2788, 2821-2822; accord, ante, at 3050 (plurality opinion). The distinction between the liberty right these petitioners have asserted and the Second Amendment right identified in Heller is therefore evanescent. Both are rooted to the home. Moreover, even if both rights have the logical potential to extend further, upon "future evaluation," Heller, 554 U.S., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2821, it is incumbent upon us, as federal judges contemplating a novel rule that would bind all 50 States, to proceed cautiously and to decide only what must be decided.
Understood as a plea to keep their preferred type of firearm in the home, petitioners' argument has real force.
Bolstering petitioners' claim, our law has long recognized that the home provides a kind of special sanctuary in modern life. See, e.g., U.S. Const., Amdts. 3, 4; Lawrence, 539 U.S., at 562, 567, 123 S.Ct. 2472; Payton v. New York,
While the individual's interest in firearm possession is thus heightened in the home, the State's corresponding interest in regulation is somewhat weaker. The State generally has a lesser basis for regulating private as compared to public acts, and firearms kept inside the home generally pose a lesser threat to public welfare as compared to firearms taken outside. The historical case for regulation is likewise stronger outside the home, as many States have for many years imposed stricter, and less controversial, restrictions on the carriage of arms than on their domestic possession. See, e.g., id., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2816-2817 (noting that "the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues"); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 478-479 (1871) (observing that "almost, if not every one of the States of this Union have [a prohibition on the carrying of deadly weapons] upon their statute books," and lambasting claims of a right to carry such weapons as "little short of ridiculous"); Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 Colum. L.Rev. 1278, 1321-1336 (2009).
It is significant, as well, that a rule limiting the federal constitutional right to keep and bear arms to the home would be less intrusive on state prerogatives and easier to administer. Having unleashed in Heller a tsunami of legal uncertainty, and thus litigation,
But that is not the case before us. Petitioners have not asked that we establish a constitutional right to individual self-defense; neither their pleadings in the District Court nor their filings in this Court make any such request. Nor do petitioners contend that the city of Chicago— which, recall, allows its residents to keep most rifles and shotguns, and to keep them loaded—has unduly burdened any such right. What petitioners have asked is that
Of course, owning a handgun may be useful for practicing self-defense. But the right to take a certain type of action is analytically distinct from the right to acquire and utilize specific instrumentalities in furtherance of that action. And while some might favor handguns, it is not clear that they are a superior weapon for lawful self-defense, and nothing in petitioners' argument turns on that being the case. The notion that a right of self-defense implies an auxiliary right to own a certain type of firearm presupposes not only controversial judgments about the strength and scope of the (posited) self-defense right, but also controversial assumptions about the likely effects of making that type of firearm more broadly available. It is a very long way from the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment protects a basic individual right of self-defense to the conclusion that a city may not ban handguns.
In short, while the utility of firearms, and handguns in particular, to the defense of hearth and home is certainly relevant to an assessment of petitioners' asserted right, there is no freestanding self-defense claim in this case. The question we must decide is whether the interest in keeping in the home a firearm of one's choosing—a handgun, for petitioners—is one that is "comprised within the term liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment. Whitney, 274 U.S., at 373, 47 S.Ct. 641 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
While I agree with the Court that our substantive due process cases offer a principled basis for holding that petitioners have a constitutional right to possess a usable firearm in the home, I am ultimately persuaded that a better reading of our case law supports the city of Chicago. I would not foreclose the possibility that a particular plaintiff—say, an elderly widow who lives in a dangerous neighborhood and does not have the strength to operate a long gun—may have a cognizable liberty interest in possessing a handgun. But I cannot accept petitioners' broader submission. A number of factors, taken together, lead me to this conclusion.
First, firearms have a fundamentally ambivalent relationship to liberty. Just as they can help homeowners defend their families and property from intruders, they can help thugs and insurrectionists murder innocent victims. The threat that firearms will be misused is far from hypothetical, for gun crime has devastated many of our communities. Amici calculate that approximately one million Americans have been wounded or killed by gunfire in the last decade.
Hence, in evaluating an asserted right to be free from particular gun-control regulations, liberty is on both sides of the equation. Guns may be useful for self-defense, as well as for hunting and sport, but they also have a unique potential to facilitate death and destruction and thereby to destabilize ordered liberty. Your interest in keeping and bearing a certain firearm may diminish my interest in being and feeling safe from armed violence. And while granting you the right to own a handgun might make you safer on any given day— assuming the handgun's marginal contribution to self-defense outweighs its marginal contribution to the risk of accident, suicide, and criminal mischief—it may make you and the community you live in less safe overall, owing to the increased number of handguns in circulation. It is at least reasonable for a democratically elected legislature to take such concerns into account in considering what sorts of regulations would best serve the public welfare.
The practical impact of various gun-control measures may be highly controversial, but this basic insight should not be. The idea that deadly weapons pose a distinctive threat to the social order—and that reasonable restrictions on their usage therefore impose an acceptable burden on one's personal liberty—is as old as the Republic. As THE CHIEF JUSTICE observed just the other day, it is a foundational premise of modern government that the State holds a monopoly on legitimate violence: "A basic step in organizing a civilized society is to take [the] sword out of private hands and turn it over to an organized government, acting on behalf of all the people." Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, ___ U.S. ___, ___,
Limiting the federal constitutional right to keep and bear arms to the home complicates the analysis but does not dislodge this conclusion. Even though the Court has long afforded special solicitude for the privacy of the home, we have never understood that principle to "infring[e] upon" the authority of the States to proscribe certain inherently dangerous items, for "[i]n such cases, compelling reasons may exist for overriding the right of the individual to possess those materials." Stanley, 394 U.S., at 568, n. 11, 89 S.Ct. 1243.
Second, the right to possess a firearm of one's choosing is different in kind from the liberty interests we have recognized under the Due Process Clause. Despite the plethora of substantive due process cases that have been decided in the post-Lochner century, I have found none that holds, states, or even suggests that the term "liberty" encompasses either the common-law right of self-defense or a right to keep and bear arms. I do not doubt for a moment that many Americans feel deeply passionate about firearms, and see them as critical to their way of life as well as to their security. Nevertheless, it does not appear to be the case that the ability to own a handgun, or any particular type of firearm, is critical to leading a life of autonomy, dignity, or political equality: The marketplace offers many tools for self-defense, even if they are imperfect substitutes, and neither petitioners nor their amici make such a contention. Petitioners' claim is not the kind of substantive interest, accordingly, on which a uniform, judicially enforced national standard is presumptively appropriate.
Indeed, in some respects the substantive right at issue may be better viewed as a property right. Petitioners wish to acquire certain types of firearms, or to keep certain firearms they have previously acquired. Interests in the possession of chattels have traditionally been viewed as property interests subject to definition and regulation by the States. Cf. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. ___, ___, ___ S.Ct. ___, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010) (opinion of SCALIA, J.) ("Generally speaking, state law defines property interests"). Under that tradition, Chicago's ordinance is unexceptional.
Similarly, it is undeniable that some may take profound offense at a remark made by the soapbox speaker, the practices of another religion, or a gay couple's choice to have intimate relations. But that offense is moral, psychological, or theological in nature; the actions taken by the rights-bearers do not actually threaten the physical safety of any other person.
Third, the experience of other advanced democracies, including those that share our British heritage, undercuts the notion that an expansive right to keep and bear arms is intrinsic to ordered liberty. Many of these countries place restrictions on the possession, use, and carriage of firearms far more onerous than the restrictions found in this Nation. See Municipal Respondents' Brief 21-23 (discussing laws of England, Canada, Australia, Japan, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, and New Zealand). That the United States is an international outlier in the permissiveness of its approach to guns does not suggest that our laws are bad laws. It does suggest that this Court may not need to assume responsibility for making our laws still more permissive.
Admittedly, these other countries differ from ours in many relevant respects, including their problems with violent crime and the traditional role that firearms have played in their societies. But they are not so different from the United States that we ought to dismiss their experience entirely. Cf. ante, at 3044-3045 (plurality opinion); ante, at 3055-3056 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). The fact that our oldest allies have almost uniformly found it appropriate to regulate firearms extensively
Fourth, the Second Amendment differs in kind from the Amendments that surround it, with the consequence that its inclusion in the Bill of Rights is not merely unhelpful but positively harmful to petitioners' claim. Generally, the inclusion of a liberty interest in the Bill of Rights points toward the conclusion that it is of fundamental significance and ought to be enforceable against the States. But the Second Amendment plays a peculiar role within the Bill, as announced by its peculiar opening clause.
The Second Amendment, in other words, "is a federalism provision," Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow,
The Court is surely correct that Americans' conceptions of the Second Amendment right evolved over time in a more individualistic direction; that Members of the Reconstruction Congress were urgently concerned about the safety of the newly freed slaves; and that some Members believed that, following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Second Amendment would apply to the States. But it is a giant leap from these data points to the conclusion that the Fourteenth
I accept that the evolution in Americans' understanding of the Second Amendment may help shed light on the question whether a right to keep and bear arms is comprised within Fourteenth Amendment "liberty." But the reasons that motivated the Framers to protect the ability of militiamen to keep muskets available for military use when our Nation was in its infancy, or that motivated the Reconstruction Congress to extend full citizenship to the freedmen in the wake of the Civil War, have only a limited bearing on the question that confronts the homeowner in a crime-infested metropolis today. The many episodes of brutal violence against African-Americans that blight our Nation's history, see ante, at 3038-3042 (majority opinion); ante, at 3080-3082, 3086-3088 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), do not suggest that every American must be allowed to own whatever type of firearm he or she desires—just that no group of Americans should be systematically and discriminatorily disarmed and left to the mercy of racial terrorists. And the fact that some Americans may have thought or hoped that the Fourteenth Amendment would nationalize the Second Amendment hardly suffices to justify the conclusion that it did.
Fifth, although it may be true that Americans' interest in firearm possession and state-law recognition of that interest are "deeply rooted" in some important senses, ante, at 3036 (internal quotation marks omitted), it is equally true that the States have a long and unbroken history of regulating firearms. The idea that States may place substantial restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms short of complete disarmament is, in fact, far more entrenched than the notion that the Federal Constitution protects any such right. Federalism is a far "older and more deeply rooted tradition than is a right to carry," or to own, "any particular kind of weapon."
From the early days of the Republic, through the Reconstruction era, to the present day, States and municipalities have placed extensive licensing requirements on firearm acquisition, restricted the public carriage of weapons, and banned altogether the possession of especially dangerous weapons, including handguns. See Heller, 554 U.S., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2848-2850 (BREYER, J., dissenting) (reviewing colonial laws); Cornell & DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American Origins of Gun Control, 73 Fordham L.Rev. 487, 502-516 (2004) (reviewing pre-Civil War laws); Brief for 34 Professional Historians and Legal Historians as Amici Curiae 4-22 (reviewing Reconstruction-era laws); Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 Mich. L.Rev. 683, 711-712, 716-726 (2007) (reviewing 20th-century laws); see generally post, at 3131-3136.
This history of intrusive regulation is not surprising given that the very text of the Second Amendment calls out for regulation,
Finally, even apart from the States' long history of firearms regulation and its location at the core of their police powers, this is a quintessential area in which federalism ought to be allowed to flourish without this Court's meddling. Whether or not we can assert a plausible constitutional basis for intervening, there are powerful reasons why we should not do so.
Across the Nation, States and localities vary significantly in the patterns and problems of gun violence they face, as well as in the traditions and cultures of lawful gun use they claim. Cf. post, at 3128-3129. The city of Chicago, for example, faces a pressing challenge in combating criminal street gangs. Most rural areas do not. The city of Chicago has a high population density, which increases the potential for a gunman to inflict mass terror and casualties. Most rural areas do not.
Given that relevant background conditions diverge so much across jurisdictions, the Court ought to pay particular heed to state and local legislatures' "right to experiment." New State Ice, 285 U.S., at 311, 52 S.Ct. 371 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). So long as the regulatory measures they have chosen are not "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable," we should be allowing them to "try novel social and economic" policies. Ibid. It "is more in keeping ... with our status as a court in a federal system," under these circumstances, "to avoid imposing a single solution ... from the top down." Smith v. Robbins,
It is all the more unwise for this Court to limit experimentation in an area "where the best solution is far from clear." United States v. Lopez,
Nor will the Court's intervention bring any clarity to this enormously complex area of law. Quite to the contrary, today's decision invites an avalanche of litigation that could mire the federal courts in fine-grained determinations about which state and local regulations comport with the Heller right—the precise contours of which are far from pellucid—under a standard of review we have not even established. See post, at 3126-3128. The plurality's "assuranc[e]" that "incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms," ante, at 3047, provides only modest comfort. For it is also an admission of just how many different types of regulations are potentially implicated by today's ruling, and of just how ad hoc the Court's initial attempt to draw distinctions among them was in Heller. The practical significance of the proposition that "the Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States," ante, at 3026 (majority opinion), remains to be worked out by this Court over many, many years.
Furthermore, and critically, the Court's imposition of a national standard is still more unwise because the elected branches have shown themselves to be perfectly capable of safeguarding the interest in keeping and bearing arms. The strength of a liberty claim must be assessed in connection with its status in the democratic process. And in this case, no one disputes "that opponents of [gun] control have considerable political power and do not seem
This is not a case, then, that involves a "special condition" that "may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Carolene Products, 304 U.S., at 153, n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778. Neither petitioners nor those most zealously committed to their views represent a group or a claim that is liable to receive unfair treatment at the hands of the majority. On the contrary, petitioners' views are supported by powerful participants in the legislative process. Petitioners have given us no reason to believe that the interest in keeping and bearing arms entails any special need for judicial lawmaking, or that federal judges are more qualified to craft appropriate rules than the people's elected representatives. Having failed to show why their asserted interest is intrinsic to the concept of ordered liberty or vulnerable to maltreatment in the political arena, they have failed to show why "the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment" should be "held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion" about how to deal with the problem of handgun violence in the city of Chicago. Lochner, 198 U.S., at 76, 25 S.Ct. 539 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
The preceding sections have already addressed many of the points made by Justice SCALIA in his concurrence. But in light of that opinion's fixation on this one, it is appropriate to say a few words about Justice SCALIA's broader claim: that his preferred method of substantive due process analysis, a method "that makes the traditions of our people paramount," ante, at 3050, is both more restrained and more facilitative of democracy than the method I have outlined. Colorful as it is, Justice SCALIA's critique does not have nearly as much force as does his rhetoric. His theory of substantive due process, moreover, comes with its own profound difficulties.
Although Justice SCALIA aspires to an "objective," "neutral" method of substantive due process analysis, ante, at 3055-3056, his actual method is nothing of the sort. Under the "historically focused" approach he advocates, ante, at 3057, numerous threshold questions arise before one ever gets to the history. At what level of generality should one frame the liberty interest in question? See n. 25, supra. What does it mean for a right to be "`deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,'" ante, at 3026-3027 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S., at 721, 117 S.Ct. 2302)? By what standard will that proposition be tested? Which types of sources will count, and how will those sources be
Nor is there any escaping Palko, it seems. To qualify for substantive due process protection, Justice SCALIA has stated, an asserted liberty right must be not only deeply rooted in American tradition, "but it must also be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Lawrence, 539 U.S., at 593, n. 3, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (dissenting opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying the latter, Palko-derived half of that test requires precisely the sort of reasoned judgment—the same multifaceted evaluation of the right's contours and consequences—that Justice SCALIA mocks in his concurrence today.
So does applying the first half. It is hardly a novel insight that history is not an objective science, and that its use can therefore "point in any direction the judges favor," ante, at 3058 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). Yet 21 years after the point was brought to his attention by Justice Brennan, Justice SCALIA remains "oblivious to the fact that [the concept of `tradition'] can be as malleable and elusive as `liberty' itself." Michael H., 491 U.S., at 137, 109 S.Ct. 2333 (dissenting opinion). Even when historical analysis is focused on a discrete proposition, such as the original public meaning of the Second Amendment, the evidence often points in different directions. The historian must choose which pieces to credit and which to discount, and then must try to assemble them into a coherent whole. In Heller, Justice SCALIA preferred to rely on sources created much earlier and later in time than the Second Amendment itself, see, e.g., 554 U.S., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2789-2790 (consulting late 19th-century treatises to ascertain how Americans would have read the Amendment's preamble in 1791); I focused more closely on sources contemporaneous with the Amendment's drafting and ratification.
The malleability and elusiveness of history increase exponentially when we move from a pure question of original meaning, as in Heller, to Justice SCALIA's theory of substantive due process. At least with the former sort of question, the judge can focus on a single legal provision; the temporal scope of the inquiry is (or should be) relatively bounded; and there is substantial agreement on what sorts of authorities merit consideration. With Justice SCALIA's approach to substantive due process, these guideposts all fall away. The judge must canvas the entire landscape of American law as it has evolved through time, and perhaps older laws as well, see, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S., at 596, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (discussing "`ancient roots'" of proscriptions against sodomy (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick,
My point is not to criticize judges' use of history in general or to suggest that it always generates indeterminate answers; I have already emphasized that historical study can discipline as well as enrich substantive due process analysis. My point is simply that Justice SCALIA's defense of his method, which holds out objectivity and restraint as its cardinal—and, it seems, only—virtues, is unsatisfying on its own terms. For a limitless number of subjective judgments may be smuggled into his historical analysis. Worse, they may be buried in the analysis. At least with my approach, the judge's cards are laid on the table for all to see, and to critique. The judge must exercise judgment, to be sure. When answering a constitutional question to which the text provides no clear answer, there is always some amount of discretion; our constitutional system has always depended on judges' filling in the document's vast open spaces.
Justice SCALIA's approach is even less restrained in another sense: It would effect a major break from our case law outside of the "incorporation" area. Justice SCALIA does not seem troubled by the fact that his method is largely inconsistent with the Court's canonical substantive due process decisions, ranging from Meyer,
Which leads me to the final set of points I wish to make: Justice SCALIA's method invites not only bad history, but also bad constitutional law. As I have already explained, in evaluating a claimed liberty interest (or any constitutional claim for that matter), it makes perfect sense to give history significant weight: Justice SCALIA's position is closer to my own than he apparently feels comfortable acknowledging. But it makes little sense to give history dispositive weight in every case. And it makes especially little sense to answer questions like whether the right to bear arms is "fundamental" by focusing only on the past, given that both the practical significance and the public understandings of such a right often change as society changes. What if the evidence had shown that, whereas at one time firearm possession contributed substantially to personal liberty and safety, nowadays it contributes nothing, or even tends to undermine them? Would it still have been reasonable to constitutionalize the right?
As for "the democratic process," ante, at 3057-3058, a method that looks exclusively to history can easily do more harm than good. Just consider this case. The net result of Justice SCALIA's supposedly objective analysis is to vest federal judges— ultimately a majority of the judges on this Court—with unprecedented lawmaking powers in an area in which they have no special qualifications, and in which the give-and-take of the political process has functioned effectively for decades. Why this "intrudes much less upon the democratic process," ante, at 3058, than an approach that would defer to the democratic process on the regulation of firearms is, to say the least, not self-evident. I cannot even tell what, under Justice SCALIA's view, constitutes an "intrusion."
It is worth pondering, furthermore, the vision of democracy that underlies Justice SCALIA's critique. Because very few of us would welcome a system in which majorities or powerful interest groups always get their way. Under our constitutional scheme, I would have thought that a judicial approach to liberty claims such as the one I have outlined—an approach that investigates both the intrinsic nature of the claimed interest and the practical significance of its judicial enforcement, that is transparent in its reasoning and sincere in its effort to incorporate constraints, that is guided by history but not beholden to it, and that is willing to protect some rights even if they have not already received uniform protection from the elected branches—has the capacity to improve, rather than "[im]peril," ante, at 3058, our democracy. It all depends on judges' exercising careful, reasoned judgment. As it always has, and as it always will.
The fact that the right to keep and bear arms appears in the Constitution should not obscure the novelty of the Court's decision to enforce that right against the States. By its terms, the Second Amendment does not apply to the States; read properly, it does not even apply to individuals outside of the militia context. The Second Amendment was adopted to protect the States from federal encroachment. And the Fourteenth Amendment has never been understood by the Court to have "incorporated" the entire Bill of Rights. There was nothing foreordained about today's outcome.
Although the Court's decision in this case might be seen as a mere adjunct to its decision in Heller, the consequences could prove far more destructive—quite literally—to our Nation's communities and to our constitutional structure. Thankfully, the Second Amendment right identified in Heller and its newly minted Fourteenth
I would proceed more cautiously. For the reasons set out at length above, I cannot accept either the methodology the Court employs or the conclusions it draws. Although impressively argued, the majority's decision to overturn more than a century of Supreme Court precedent and to unsettle a much longer tradition of state practice is not, in my judgment, built "upon respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing and preserving American freedoms." Griswold, 381 U.S., at 501, 85 S.Ct. 1678 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Justice BREYER, with whom Justice GINSBURG and Justice SOTOMAYOR join, dissenting.
In my view, Justice STEVENS has demonstrated that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "substantive due process" does not include a general right to keep and bear firearms for purposes of private self-defense. As he argues, the Framers did not write the Second Amendment with this objective in view. See ante, at 3111-3112 (dissenting opinion). Unlike other forms of substantive liberty, the carrying of arms for that purpose often puts others' lives at risk. See ante, at 3107-3109. And the use of arms for private self-defense does not warrant federal constitutional protection from state regulation. See ante, at 3112-3116.
The Court, however, does not expressly rest its opinion upon "substantive due process" concerns. Rather, it directs its attention to this Court's "incorporation" precedents and asks whether the Second Amendment right to private self-defense is "fundamental" so that it applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See ante, at 3031-3036.
I shall therefore separately consider the question of "incorporation." I can find nothing in the Second Amendment's text, history, or underlying rationale that could warrant characterizing it as "fundamental" insofar as it seeks to protect the keeping and bearing of arms for private self-defense purposes. Nor can I find any justification for interpreting the Constitution as transferring ultimate regulatory authority over the private uses of firearms from democratically elected legislatures to courts or from the States to the Federal Government. I therefore conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment does not "incorporate" the Second Amendment's right "to keep and bear Arms." And I consequently dissent.
The Second Amendment says: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." Two years ago, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. ___,
The Court based its conclusions almost exclusively upon its reading of history. But the relevant history in Heller was far from clear: Four dissenting Justices disagreed with the majority's historical analysis. And subsequent scholarly writing reveals why disputed history provides treacherous ground on which to build decisions written by judges who are not expert at history.
Since Heller, historians, scholars, and judges have continued to express the view that the Court's historical account was flawed. See, e.g., Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble: Original Public Meaning and the Political Culture of Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L.Rev. 1295 (2009); Finkelman, It Really Was About a Well Regulated Militia, 59 Syracuse L.Rev. 267 (2008); P. Charles, The Second Amendment: The Intent and Its Interpretation by the States and the Supreme Court (2009); Merkel, The District of Columbia v. Heller and Antonin Scalia's Perverse Sense of Originalism, 13 Lewis & Clark L.Rev. 349 (2009); Kozuskanich, Originalism in a Digital Age: An Inquiry into the Right to Bear Arms, 29 J. Early Republic 585 (2009); Cornell, St. George Tucker's Lecture Notes, the Second Amendment, and Originalist Methodology, 103 Nw. U.L.Rev. 1541 (2009); Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, New Republic, Aug. 27, 2008, pp. 32-35; see also Epstein, A Structural Interpretation of the Second Amendment: Why Heller is (Probably) Wrong on Originalist Grounds, 59 Syracuse L.Rev. 171 (2008).
Consider as an example of these critiques an amici brief filed in this case by historians who specialize in the study of the English Civil Wars. They tell us that Heller misunderstood a key historical point. See Brief for English/Early American Historians as Amici Curiae (hereinafter English Historians' Brief) (filed by 21 professors at leading universities in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia). Heller's conclusion that "individual self-defense" was "the central component" of the Second Amendment's right "to keep and bear Arms" rested upon its view that the Amendment "codified a pre-existing right" that had "nothing whatever to do with service in a militia." 554 U.S., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2797, 2801-2802. That view in turn rested in significant part upon Blackstone having described the right as "`the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defence,'" which reflected the provision in the English Declaration of Right of 1689 that gave the King's Protestant "`subjects'" the right to "`have Arms for their defence suitable to their Conditions, and as allowed by law.'" Id., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2798 (quoting 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 140 (1765) (hereinafter Blackstone) and 1 W. & M., c. 2, § 7, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 441 (1689)). The Framers, said the majority, understood that right "as permitting a citizen to
The historians now tell us, however, that the right to which Blackstone referred had, not nothing, but everything, to do with the militia. As properly understood at the time of the English Civil Wars, the historians claim, the right to bear arms "ensured that Parliament had the power" to arm the citizenry: "to defend the realm" in the case of a foreign enemy, and to "secure the right of `self-preservation,'" or "self-defense," should "the sovereign usurp the English Constitution." English Historians' Brief 3, 8-13, 23-24 (emphasis added). Thus, the Declaration of Right says that private persons can possess guns only "as allowed by law." See id., at 20-24. Moreover, when Blackstone referred to "`the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defence,'" he was referring to the right of the people "to take part in the militia to defend their political liberties," and to the right of Parliament (which represented the people) to raise a militia even when the King sought to deny it that power. Id., at 4, 24-27 (emphasis added) (quoting 1 Blackstone 140). Nor can the historians find any convincing reason to believe that the Framers had something different in mind than what Blackstone himself meant. Compare Heller, supra, at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2798-2799 with English Historians' Brief 28-40. The historians concede that at least one historian takes a different position, see id., at 7, but the Court, they imply, would lose a poll taken among professional historians of this period, say, by a vote of 8 to 1.
If history, and history alone, is what matters, why would the Court not now reconsider Heller in light of these more recently published historical views? See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 923-924,
My aim in referring to this history is to illustrate the reefs and shoals that lie in wait for those nonexpert judges who place virtually determinative weight upon historical considerations. In my own view, the Court should not look to history alone but to other factors as well—above all, in cases where the history is so unclear that the experts themselves strongly disagree. It should, for example, consider the basic values that underlie a constitutional provision and their contemporary significance. And it should examine as well the relevant consequences and practical justifications that might, or might not, warrant removing an important question from the democratic decisionmaking process. See ante, at 3097-3099 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (discussing shortcomings of an exclusively historical approach).
In my view, taking Heller as a given, the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the Second Amendment right to keep
The majority here, like that in Heller, relies almost exclusively upon history to make the necessary showing. Ante, at 3036-3044. But to do so for incorporation purposes is both wrong and dangerous. As Justice STEVENS points out, our society has historically made mistakes— for example, when considering certain 18th- and 19th-century property rights to be fundamental. Ante, at 3098-3099 (dissenting opinion). And in the incorporation context, as elsewhere, history often is unclear about the answers. See Part I, supra; Part III, infra.
Accordingly, this Court, in considering an incorporation question, has never stated that the historical status of a right is the only relevant consideration. Rather, the Court has either explicitly or implicitly made clear in its opinions that the right in question has remained fundamental over time. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon,
I thus think it proper, above all where history provides no clear answer, to look to other factors in considering whether a right is sufficiently "fundamental" to remove it from the political process in every State. I would include among those factors the nature of the right; any contemporary disagreement about whether the right is fundamental; the extent to which incorporation will further other, perhaps more basic, constitutional aims; and the extent to which incorporation will advance or hinder the Constitution's structural aims, including its division of powers among different governmental institutions (and the people as well). Is incorporation needed, for example, to further the Constitution's effort to ensure that the government treats each individual with equal respect? Will it help maintain the democratic form of government that the Constitution foresees? In a word, will incorporation prove consistent, or inconsistent, with the Constitution's efforts to create governmental institutions well suited to the carrying out of its constitutional promises?
Finally, I would take account of the Framers' basic reason for believing the Court ought to have the power of judicial review. Alexander Hamilton feared granting that power to Congress alone, for he feared that Congress, acting as judges, would not overturn as unconstitutional a popular statute that it had recently enacted, as legislators. The Federalist No. 78, p. 405 (G. Carey & J. McClellan eds.
How do these considerations apply here? For one thing, I would apply them only to the private self-defense right directly at issue. After all, the Amendment's militia-related purpose is primarily to protect States from federal regulation, not to protect individuals from militia-related regulation. Heller, 554 U.S., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2801-2802; see also Miller, 307 U.S., at 178, 59 S.Ct. 816. Moreover, the Civil War Amendments, the electoral process, the courts, and numerous other institutions today help to safeguard the States and the people from any serious threat of federal tyranny. How are state militias additionally necessary? It is difficult to see how a right that, as the majority concedes, has "largely faded as a popular concern" could possibly be so fundamental that it would warrant incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment. Ante, at 3037-3038. Hence, the incorporation of the Second Amendment cannot be based on the militia-related aspect of what Heller found to be more extensive Second Amendment rights.
For another thing, as Heller concedes, the private self-defense right that the Court would incorporate has nothing to do with "the reason" the Framers "codified" the right to keep and bear arms "in a written Constitution." 554 U.S., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2801-2802 (emphasis added). Heller immediately adds that the self-defense right was nonetheless "the central component of the right." Ibid. In my view, this is the historical equivalent of a claim that water runs uphill. See Part I, supra. But, taking it as valid, the Framers' basic reasons for including language in the Constitution would nonetheless seem more pertinent (in deciding about the contemporary importance of a right) than the particular scope 17th- or 18th-century listeners would have then assigned to the words they used. And examination of the Framers' motivation tells us they did not think the private armed self-defense right was of paramount importance. See Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1164 (1991) ("[T]o see the [Second] Amendment as primarily concerned with an individual right to hunt, or protect one's home," would be "like viewing the heart of the speech and assembly clauses as the right of persons to meet to play bridge"); see also, e.g., Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 103, 127-128 (2000); Brief for Historians on Early American Legal, Constitutional, and Pennsylvania History as Amici Curiae 22-33.
Further, there is no popular consensus that the private self-defense right described in Heller is fundamental. The plurality suggests that two amici briefs filed in the case show such a consensus, see ante, at 3048-3049, but, of course, numerous amici briefs have been filed opposing incorporation as well. Moreover, every State regulates firearms extensively, and public opinion is sharply divided on the appropriate level of regulation. Much of
Moreover, there is no reason here to believe that incorporation of the private self-defense right will further any other or broader constitutional objective. We are aware of no argument that gun-control regulations target or are passed with the purpose of targeting "discrete and insular minorities." Carolene Products Co., supra, at 153, n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778; see, e.g., ante, at 3115-3116 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Nor will incorporation help to assure equal respect for individuals. Unlike the First Amendment's rights of free speech, free press, assembly, and petition, the private self-defense right does not comprise a necessary part of the democratic process that the Constitution seeks to establish. See, e.g., Whitney v. California,
Finally, incorporation of the right will work a significant disruption in the constitutional allocation of decisionmaking authority, thereby interfering with the Constitution's ability to further its objectives.
First, on any reasonable accounting, the incorporation of the right recognized in Heller would amount to a significant incursion on a traditional and important area of state concern, altering the constitutional relationship between the States and the Federal Government. Private gun regulation is the quintessential exercise of a State's "police power"—i.e., the power to "protec[t] ... the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the State," by enacting "all kinds of restraints and burdens" on both "persons and property." Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 62, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has long recognized that the Constitution grants the States special authority to enact laws pursuant to this power. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
Second, determining the constitutionality of a particular state gun law requires finding answers to complex empirically based questions of a kind that legislatures are better able than courts to make. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,
Government regulation of the right to bear arms normally embodies a judgment that the regulation will help save lives. The determination whether a gun regulation is constitutional would thus almost always require the weighing of the constitutional right to bear arms against the "primary concern of every government—a concern for the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens." United States v. Salerno,
Given the competing interests, courts will have to try to answer empirical questions of a particularly difficult kind. Suppose, for example, that after a gun regulation's adoption the murder rate went up. Without the gun regulation would the murder rate have risen even faster? How is this conclusion affected by the local recession which has left numerous people unemployed? What about budget cuts that led to a downsizing of the police force? How effective was that police force to begin with? And did the regulation simply take guns from those who use them for lawful purposes without affecting their possession by criminals?
Consider too that countless gun regulations of many shapes and sizes are in place in every State and in many local communities. Does the right to possess weapons for self-defense extend outside the home? To the car? To work? What sort of guns are necessary for self-defense? Handguns? Rifles? Semiautomatic weapons? When is a gun semi-automatic? Where are different kinds of weapons likely needed? Does time-of-day matter? Does the presence of a child in the house matter? Does the presence of a convicted felon in the house matter? Do police need special rules permitting patdowns designed to find guns? When do registration requirements become severe to the point that they amount to an unconstitutional ban? Who can possess guns and of what kind?
The difficulty of finding answers to these questions is exceeded only by the importance of doing so. Firearms cause well over 60,000 deaths and injuries in the United States each year. Those who live in urban areas, police officers, women, and children, all may be particularly at risk. And gun regulation may save their lives. Some experts have calculated, for example, that Chicago's handgun ban has saved several hundred lives, perhaps close to 1,000, since it was enacted in 1983. Other experts argue that stringent gun regulations "can help protect police officers operating on the front lines against gun violence," have reduced homicide rates in Washington, D. C., and Baltimore, and have helped to lower New York's crime and homicide rates.
At the same time, the opponents of regulation cast doubt on these studies. And who is right? Finding out may require interpreting studies that are only indirectly related to a particular regulatory statute, say one banning handguns in the home. Suppose studies find more accidents and suicides where there is a handgun in the home than where there is a long gun in the home or no gun at all? To what extent do such studies justify a ban? What if opponents of the ban put forth counter studies?
In answering such questions judges cannot simply refer to judicial homilies, such as Blackstone's 18th-century perception that a man's home is his castle. See 4 Blackstone 223. Nor can the plurality so simply reject, by mere assertion, the fact that "incorporation will require judges to assess the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions." Ante, at 3050. How can the Court assess the strength of the government's regulatory interests without addressing issues of empirical fact? How can the Court determine if a regulation is appropriately tailored without considering its impact? And how can the Court determine if there are less restrictive alternatives without considering what will happen if those alternatives are implemented?
Perhaps the Court could lessen the difficulty of the mission it has created for itself by adopting a jurisprudential approach similar to the many state courts that administer a state constitutional right to bear arms. See infra, at 3130-3131 (describing state approaches). But the Court has not yet done so. Cf. Heller, 544 U.S., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2818-2822 (rejecting an "`interest-balancing' approach" similar to that employed by the States); ante, at 3050 (plurality opinion). Rather, the Court has haphazardly created a few simple rules, such as that it will not touch "prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill," "laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings," or "laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms." Heller, 544 U.S., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2817; Ante, at 3047 (plurality opinion). But why these rules and not others? Does the Court know that these regulations are justified by some special gun-related risk of death? In fact, the Court does not know. It has simply invented rules that sound sensible without being able to explain why or how Chicago's handgun ban is different.
At the same time, there is no institutional need to send judges off on this "mission-almost-impossible." Legislators are able to "amass the stuff of actual experience and cull conclusions from it." United States v. Gainey,
In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
There are 50 state legislatures. The fact that this Court may already have refused to take this wise advice with respect to Congress in Heller is no reason to make matters worse here.
Third, the ability of States to reflect local preferences and conditions—both key virtues of federalism—here has particular importance. The incidence of gun ownership varies substantially as between crowded cities and uncongested rural communities, as well as among the different geographic regions of the country. Thus, approximately 60% of adults who live in the relatively sparsely populated Western States of Alaska, Montana, and Wyoming report that their household keeps a gun, while fewer than 15% of adults in the densely populated Eastern States of Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Massachusetts say the same.
The nature of gun violence also varies as between rural communities and cities. Urban centers face significantly greater levels of firearm crime and homicide, while rural communities have proportionately
It is thus unsurprising that States and local communities have historically differed about the need for gun regulation as well as about its proper level. Nor is it surprising that "primarily, and historically," the law has treated the exercise of police powers, including gun control, as "matter[s] of local concern." Medtronic, 518 U.S., at 475, 116 S.Ct. 2240 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Fourth, although incorporation of any right removes decisions from the democratic process, the incorporation of this particular right does so without strong offsetting justification—as the example of Oak Park's handgun ban helps to show. See Oak Park, Ill., Municipal Code, § 27-2-1 (1995). Oak Park decided to ban handguns in 1983, after a local attorney was shot to death with a handgun that his assailant had smuggled into a courtroom in a blanket. Brief for Oak Park Citizens Committee for Handgun Control as Amicus Curiae 1, 21 (hereinafter Oak Park Brief). A citizens committee spent months gathering information about handguns. Id., at 21. It secured 6,000 signatures from community residents in support of a ban. Id., at 21-22. And the village board enacted a ban into law. Id., at 22.
Subsequently, at the urging of ban opponents the Board held a community referendum on the matter. Ibid. The citizens committee argued strongly in favor of the ban. Id., at 22-23. It pointed out that most guns owned in Oak Park were handguns and that handguns were misused more often than citizens used them in self-defense. Id., at 23. The ban opponents argued just as strongly to the contrary. Ibid. The public decided to keep the ban by a vote of 8,031 to 6,368. Ibid. And since that time, Oak Park now tells us, crime has decreased and the community has seen no accidental handgun deaths. Id., at 2.
Given the empirical and local value-laden nature of the questions that lie at the heart of the issue, why, in a Nation whose Constitution foresees democratic decisionmaking, is it so fundamental a matter as to require taking that power from the people? What is it here that the people did not know? What is it that a judge knows better?
* * *
In sum, the police power, the superiority of legislative decisionmaking, the need for local decisionmaking, the comparative desirability of democratic decisionmaking, the lack of a manageable judicial standard, and the life-threatening harm that may flow from striking down regulations all argue against incorporation. Where the incorporation of other rights has been at issue, some of these problems have arisen. But in this instance all these problems are present, all at the same time, and all are likely to be present in most, perhaps nearly all, of the cases in which the constitutionality of a gun regulation is at issue. At the same time, the important factors that favor incorporation in other instances— e.g., the protection of broader constitutional objectives—are not present here. The upshot is that all factors militate against incorporation—with the possible exception of historical factors.
I must, then, return to history. The plurality, in seeking to justify incorporation, asks whether the interests the Second
As I have made clear, I do not believe history is the only pertinent consideration. Nor would I read history as broadly as the majority does. In particular, since we here are evaluating a more particular right—namely, the right to bear arms for purposes of private self-defense—general historical references to the "right to keep and bear arms" are not always helpful. Depending upon context, early historical sources may mean to refer to a militia-based right—a matter of considerable importance 200 years ago—which has, as the majority points out, "largely faded as a popular concern." Ante, at ___. There is no reason to believe that matters of such little contemporary importance should play a significant role in answering the incorporation question. See Apodaca, 406 U.S., at 410, 92 S.Ct. 1628 (incorporation "inquiry must focus upon the function served" by the right in question in "contemporary society"); Wolf v. Colorado,
That said, I can find much in the historical record that shows that some Americans in some places at certain times thought it important to keep and bear arms for private self-defense. For instance, the reader will see that many States have constitutional provisions protecting gun possession. But, as far as I can tell, those provisions typically do no more than guarantee that a gun regulation will be a reasonable police power regulation. See Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 Mich. L.Rev. 683, 686, 716-717 (2007) (the "courts of every state to consider the question apply a deferential `reasonable regulation' standard") (hereinafter Winkler, Scrutinizing); see also id., at 716-717 (explaining the difference between that standard and ordinary rational-basis review). It is thus altogether unclear whether such provisions would prohibit cities such as Chicago from enacting laws, such as the law before us, banning handguns. See id., at 723. The majority, however, would incorporate a right that is likely inconsistent with Chicago's law; and the majority would almost certainly strike down that law. Cf. Heller, 554 U.S., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2818-2822 (striking down the District of Columbia's handgun ban).
Thus, the specific question before us is not whether there are references to the right to bear arms for self-defense throughout this Nation's history—of course there are—or even whether the Court should incorporate a simple constitutional requirement that firearms regulations not unreasonably burden the right to keep and bear arms, but rather whether there is a consensus that so substantial a private self-defense right as the one described in Heller applies to the States. See, e.g., Glucksberg, supra, at 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (requiring "a careful description" of the right at issue when deciding whether it is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" (internal quotation marks omitted)). On this question, the reader will have to make up his or her own mind about the historical record that I describe in part below. In my view, that
I thus cannot find a historical consensus with respect to whether the right described by Heller is "fundamental" as our incorporation cases use that term. Nor can I find sufficient historical support for the majority's conclusion that that right is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Instead, I find no more than ambiguity and uncertainty that perhaps even expert historians would find difficult to penetrate. And a historical record that is so ambiguous cannot itself provide an adequate basis for incorporating a private right of self-defense and applying it against the States.
The Eighteenth Century
The opinions in Heller collect much of the relevant 18th-century evidence. See 554 U.S., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2790-2805; id., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2824-2838 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); id., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2848-2850 (BREYER, J., dissenting). In respect to the relevant question— the "deeply rooted nature" of a right to keep and bear arms for purposes of private self-defense—that evidence is inconclusive, particularly when augmented as follows:
First, as I have noted earlier in this opinion, and Justice STEVENS argued in dissent, the history discussed in Heller shows that the Second Amendment was enacted primarily for the purpose of protecting militia-related rights. See supra, at 3122; Heller, supra, at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2790-2805. Many of the scholars and historians who have written on the subject apparently agree. See supra, at 3120-3122.
Second, historians now tell us that the right to which Blackstone referred, an important link in the Heller majority's historical argument, concerned the right of Parliament (representing the people) to form a militia to oppose a tyrant (the King) threatening to deprive the people of their traditional liberties (which did not include an unregulated right to possess guns). Thus, 18th-century language referring to a "right to keep and bear arms" does not ipso facto refer to a private right of self-defense—certainly not unambiguously so. See English Historians' Brief 3-27; see also supra, at 3120-3122.
Third, scholarly articles indicate that firearms were heavily regulated at the time of the framing—perhaps more heavily regulated than the Court in Heller believed. For example, one scholar writes that "[h]undreds of individual statutes regulated the possession and use of guns in colonial and early national America." Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep Arms, 25 Law & Hist. Rev. 139, 143 (2007). Among these statutes was a ban on the private firing of weapons in Boston, as well as comprehensive restrictions on similar conduct in Philadelphia and New York. See Acts and Laws of Massachusetts, p. 208 (1746); 5 J. Mitchell, & H. Flanders, Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania From 1682 to 1801, pp.
Fourth, after the Constitution was adopted, several States continued to regulate firearms possession by, for example, adopting rules that would have prevented the carrying of loaded firearms in the city, Heller, 554 U.S., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2848-2850 (BREYER, J., dissenting); see also id., at ___, 128 S.Ct., at 2819-2820. Scholars have thus concluded that the primary Revolutionary era limitation on a State's police power to regulate guns appears to be only that regulations were "aimed at a legitimate public purpose" and "consistent with reason." Cornell, Early American Gun Regulation and the Second Amendment, 25 Law & Hist. Rev. 197, 198 (2007).
The Pre-Civil War Nineteenth Century
I would also augment the majority's account of this period as follows:
First, additional States began to regulate the discharge of firearms in public places. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 17, 1831, § 6, reprinted in 3 Statutes of Ohio and the Northwestern Territory 1740 (S. Chase ed. 1835); Act of Dec. 3, 1825, ch. CCXCII, § 3, 1825 Tenn. Priv. Acts 306.
Second, States began to regulate the possession of concealed weapons, which were both popular and dangerous. See, e.g., C. Cramer, Concealed Weapon Laws of the Early Republic 143-152 (1999) (collecting examples); see also 1837-1838 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 137, pp. 200-201 (banning the wearing, sale, or giving of Bowie knives); 1847 Va. Acts ch. 7, § 8, p. 110, ("Any free person who shall habitually carry about his person, hidden from common observation, any pistol, dirk, bowie knife, or weapon of the like kind, from the use of which the death of any person might probably ensue, shall for every offense be punished by [a] fine not exceed fifty dollars").
State courts repeatedly upheld the validity of such laws, finding that, even when the state constitution granted a right to bear arms, the legislature was permitted to, e.g., "abolish" these small, inexpensive, "most dangerous weapons entirely from use," even in self-defense. Day v. State, 37 Tenn. 496, 500 (1857); see also, e.g., State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399, 400 (1858) (upholding concealed weapon ban because it "prohibited only a particular mode of bearing arms which is found dangerous to the peace of society"); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 489-490 (1850) (upholding concealed weapon ban and describing the law as "absolutely necessary to counteract a vicious state of society, growing out of the habit of carrying concealed weapons"); State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616-617 (1840).
The Post-Civil War Nineteenth Century
It is important to read the majority's account with the following considerations in mind:
First, the Court today properly declines to revisit our interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See ante, at 3030-3031. The Court's case for incorporation must thus rest on the conclusion that the right to bear arms is "fundamental." But the very evidence that it advances in support of the conclusion that Reconstruction-era Americans strongly supported a private self-defense right shows with equal force that Americans wanted African-American citizens to have the same rights to possess guns as did white citizens. Ante, at 3038-3044. Here, for example is what Congress said when it enacted a Fourteenth Amendment predecessor, the Second Freedman's Bureau Act. It wrote that the statute, in order to secure "the constitutional right to
This sounds like an antidiscrimination provision. See Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets the Fourteenth Amendment: Original Public Meaning and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 361, 383-384 (2009) (discussing evidence that the Freedmen's Bureau was focused on discrimination).
Another Fourteenth Amendment predecessor, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, also took aim at discrimination. See § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (citizens of "every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude ... shall have the same right [to engage in various activities] and to full and equal benefit of all laws ... as is enjoyed by white citizens"). And, of course, the Fourteenth Amendment itself insists that all States guarantee their citizens the "equal protection of the laws."
There is thus every reason to believe that the fundamental concern of the Reconstruction Congress was the eradication of discrimination, not the provision of a new substantive right to bear arms free from reasonable state police power regulation. See, e.g., Brief for Municipal Respondents 62-69 (discussing congressional record evidence that Reconstruction Congress was concerned about discrimination). Indeed, why would those who wrote the Fourteenth Amendment have wanted to give such a right to Southerners who had so recently waged war against the North, and who continued to disarm and oppress recently freed African-American citizens? Cf. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, § 6, 14 Stat. 487 (disbanding Southern militias because they were, inter alia, disarming the freedmen).
Second, firearms regulation in the later part of the 19th century was common. The majority is correct that the Freedmen's Bureau points to a right to bear arms, and it stands to reason, as the majority points out, that "[i]t would have been nonsensical for Congress to guarantee the... equal benefit of a ... right that does not exist." Ante, at 3043. But the majority points to no evidence that there existed during this period a fundamental right to bear arms for private self-defense immune to the reasonable exercise of the state police power. See Emberton, The Limits of Incorporation: Violence, Gun Rights, and Gun Regulation in the Reconstruction South, 17 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 615, 621-622 (2006) (noting that history shows that "nineteenth-century Americans" were "not opposed to the idea that the state should be able to control the use of firearms").
To the contrary, in the latter half of the 19th century, a number of state constitutions adopted or amended after the Civil War explicitly recognized the legislature's general ability to limit the right to bear arms. See Tex. Const., Art. I, § 13 (1869) (protecting "the right to keep and bear arms," "under such regulations as the legislature may prescribe"); Idaho Const., Art. I, § 11 (1889) ("The people have the right to bear arms ...; but the Legislature shall regulate the exercise of this right by law"); Utah Const., Art. I, § 6 (1896) (same). And numerous other state constitutional provisions adopted during this period explicitly granted the legislature various types of regulatory power over firearms. See Brief for Thirty-Four Professional Historians et al. as Amici Curiae
Moreover, four States largely banned the possession of all nonmilitary handguns during this period. See 1879 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 186, § 1 (prohibiting citizens from carrying "publicly or privately, any ... belt or pocket pistol, revolver, or any kind of pistol, except the army or navy pistol, usually used in warfare, which shall be carried openly in the hand"); 1876 Wyo. Comp. Laws ch. 52, § 1 (forbidding "concealed or ope[n]" bearing of "any fire arm or other deadly weapon, within the limits of any city, town or village"); Ark. Act of Apr. 1, 1881, ch. 96, § 1 (prohibiting the "wear[ing] or carry[ing]" of "any pistol ... except such pistols as are used in the army or navy," except while traveling or at home); Tex. Act of Apr. 12, 1871, ch. 34 (prohibiting the carrying of pistols unless there are "immediate and pressing" reasonable grounds to fear "immediate and pressing" attack or for militia service). Fifteen States banned the concealed carry of pistols and other deadly weapons. See Legal Historians' Brief 16, n. 14. And individual municipalities enacted stringent gun controls, often in response to local conditions—Dodge City, Kansas, for example, joined many western cattle towns in banning the carrying of pistols and other dangerous weapons in response to violence accompanying western cattle drives. See Brief for Municipal Respondents 30 (citing Dodge City, Kan., Ordinance No. 16, § XI (Sept. 22, 1876)); D. Courtwright, The Cowboy Subculture, in Guns in America: A Reader 96 (J. Dizard et al. eds.1999) (discussing how Western cattle towns required cowboys to "check" their guns upon entering town).
Further, much as they had during the period before the Civil War, state courts routinely upheld such restrictions. See, e.g., English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1871); Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 475 (1874); Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 461 (1876); State v. Workman, 35 W.Va. 367, 373, 14 S.E. 9 (1891). The Tennessee Supreme Court, in upholding a ban on possession of nonmilitary handguns and certain other weapons, summarized the Reconstruction understanding of the states' police power to regulate firearms:
The Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries
Although the majority does not discuss 20th- or 21st-century evidence concerning the Second Amendment at any length, I think that it is essential to consider the recent history of the right to bear arms for private self-defense when considering whether the right is "fundamental." To that end, many States now provide state constitutional protection for an individual's right to keep and bear arms. See Volokh,
First, by the end of the 20th century, in every State and many local communities, highly detailed and complicated regulatory schemes governed (and continue to govern) nearly every aspect of firearm ownership: Who may sell guns and how they must be sold; who may purchase guns and what type of guns may be purchased; how firearms must be stored and where they may be used; and so on. See generally Legal Community Against Violence, Regulating Guns In America (2008), available at http:// www.lcav.org/publications-briefs/regulating_guns. asp (all Internet materials as visited June 24, 2010, and available in Clerk of Court's case file) (detailing various arms regulations in every State).
Of particular relevance here, some municipalities ban handguns, even in States that constitutionally protect the right to bear arms. See Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code, § 8-20-050(c) (2009); Oak Park, Ill., Municipal Code, §§ 27-2-1, 27-1-1 (1995); Toledo, Ohio, Municipal Code, ch. 549.25 (2010). Moreover, at least seven States and Puerto Rico ban assault weapons or semiautomatic weapons. See Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 12280(b) (West Supp.2009); Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann. § 53-202c (2007); Haw.Rev.Stat. § 134-8 (1993); Md.Crim. Law Code Ann. § 4-303(a) (Lexis 2002); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 140, § 131M (West 2006); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-5 (West Supp.2010); N.Y. Penal Law Ann. § 265.02(7) (West Supp.2008); 25 Laws P.R. Ann. § 456m (Supp.2006); see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (federal machinegun ban).
Thirteen municipalities do the same. See Albany, N. Y., City Code § 193-16(A) (2005); Aurora, Ill., Code of Ordinances § 29-49(a) (2009); Buffalo, N. Y., City Code § 180-1(F) (2000); Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code § 8-24-025(a) (2010); Cincinnati, Ohio, Municipal Code § 708-37(a) (2008); Cleveland, Ohio, Codified Ordinances § 628.03(a) (2008); Columbus, Ohio, City Code § 2323.31 (2007); Denver, Colo., Municipal Code § 38-130(e) (2008); Morton Grove, Ill., Village Code § 6-2-3(A); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 10-303.1 (2009); Oak Park, Ill., Village Code § 27-2-1 (2009); Rochester, N. Y., City Code § 47-5(F) (2008); Toledo, Ohio, Municipal Code § 549.23(a). And two States, Maryland and Hawaii, ban assault pistols. See Haw.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 134-8; Md.Crim. Law Code Ann. § 4-303 (Lexis 2002).
Second, as I stated earlier, state courts in States with constitutions that provide gun rights have almost uniformly interpreted those rights as providing protection only against unreasonable regulation of guns. See, e.g., Winkler, Scrutinizing 686 (the "courts of every state to consider" a gun regulation apply the "`reasonable regulation'" approach); State v. McAdams,
When determining reasonableness those courts have normally adopted a highly deferential attitude towards legislative determinations. See Winkler, Scrutinizing 723 (identifying only six cases in the 60 years before the article's publication striking down gun control laws: three that banned "the transportation of any firearms for any purpose whatsoever," a single "permitting law," and two as-applied challenges in "unusual circumstances"). Hence, as evidenced by the breadth of existing regulations, States and local governments maintain substantial flexibility to regulate firearms—much as they seemingly have throughout the Nation's history—
Although one scholar implies that state courts are less willing to permit total gun prohibitions, see Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L.Rev. 1443, 1458 (2009), I am aware of no instances in the past 50 years in which a state court has struck down as unconstitutional a law banning a particular class of firearms, see Winkler, Scrutinizing 723.
Indeed, state courts have specifically upheld as constitutional (under their state constitutions) firearms regulations that have included handgun bans. See Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove,
Third, the plurality correctly points out that only a few state courts, a "paucity" of state courts, have specifically upheld handgun bans. Ante, at 3047. But which state courts have struck them down? The absence of supporting information does not help the majority find support. Cf. United States v. Wells,
* * *
In sum, the Framers did not write the Second Amendment in order to protect a private right of armed self-defense. There has been, and is, no consensus that the right is, or was, "fundamental." No broader constitutional interest or principle supports legal treatment of that right as fundamental. To the contrary, broader constitutional concerns of an institutional nature argue strongly against that treatment.
Moreover, nothing in 18th-, 19th-, 20th-, or 21st-century history shows a consensus that the right to private armed self-defense, as described in Heller, is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history or tradition" or is otherwise "fundamental." Indeed, incorporating the right recognized in Heller may change the law in many of the 50 States. Read in the majority's favor, the historical evidence is at most ambiguous. And, in the absence of any other support for its conclusion, ambiguous history cannot show that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates a private right of self-defense against the States.
With respect, I dissent.
Sources Supporting Data in Part II-B
Please see the following sources to support the paragraph on popular opinion on pages 9-10:
Data on Gun Violence
Please see the following sources to support the sentences concerning gun violence on page 13:
Data on the Effectiveness of Regulation
Please see the following sources to support the sentences concerning the effectiveness of regulation on page 13:
Data on Handguns in the Home
Please see the following sources referenced in the sentences discussing studies concerning handguns in the home on pages 13-14:
Data on Regional Views and Conditions
Please see the following sources referenced in the section on the diversity of regional views and conditions on page 16:
- No Cases Found