JOHNSON v. CITY OF NEW YORK No. 192
15 N.Y.3d 676 (2010)
942 N.E.2d 219
917 N.Y.S.2d 10
TAMMY D. JOHNSON, Individually and as Mother and Natural Guardian of ARJAYE JOHNSON, an Infant, et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Respondents. (And Another Action.)
Court of Appeals of New York.
Decided November 23, 2010.
New York City ( Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, and Susan Paulson of counsel), for respondents. Francis F Caputo
Judges GRAFFEO, READ and SMITH concur with Judge PIGOTT; Judge JONES dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion in which Chief Judge LIPPMAN and Judge CIPARICK concur.
OPINION OF THE COURT
On May 27, 2005 at approximately 6:30 P.M., New York City Police Officers Williams and Loor received a complaint from a
Officer Loor then ran from the south side of 126th Street to the north side, positioning himself behind a tree directly across the street from the suspect. The suspect fired at Officer Loor, who responded in kind. According to the pretrial testimony, Officer Loor did not see any bystanders in the area while he was shooting, and the area near the suspect was clear of pedestrians. Officer Williams—who continued using the trailer for cover—observed the suspect back onto the sidewalk from behind the van and, having a view of the suspect's profile and being concerned for Officer Loor's safety, fired one or two shots at the suspect. She testified that she did not observe any pedestrians in the area when discharging her weapon.
During the melee, three other officers appeared on the scene. Officer Garcia heard a scream from the direction of Lenox Avenue. He walked toward the commotion and observed the suspect shoot at Officers Williams and Loor and then hide behind the van. Officer Garcia took cover in a brownstone well on the north side of the street. He had a clear view of the suspect and fired at him out of concern for Officer Loor, who was taking fire; Officer Garcia did not see any pedestrians or bystanders on the street.
Officers Beddows and Eckert separately responded to the scene. Officer Beddows took cover on the north side of the street behind a cruiser. He observed the suspect firing shots from behind the van. Officer Beddows had a clear view when he fired two shots at the suspect, and he saw no pedestrians on the street other than the suspect.
Officer Eckert positioned his cruiser in front of the van. He observed only the suspect and did not see any other pedestrians on the block. He walked toward the rear of his cruiser and took
Plaintiff Tammy Johnson was playing with her 18-month-old daughter and socializing with neighbors on 126th Street near her residence when she heard gunshots, which sent her neighbors fleeing into the house. Johnson saw two men running toward her, one of whom was carrying a gun. Johnson and her daughter lay on the ground behind a white SUV, which was two vehicles away from the van behind which the suspect was hiding. She looked under the SUV and saw the suspect on the south side of the street lying on the ground shooting at a police officer across the street. An errant bullet struck Johnson's elbow.
Johnson, individually and on behalf of her daughter, commenced this negligence action against the City and police officers alleging, among other things, that the officers negligently discharged their firearms in violation of department guidelines. The City interposed an answer and, upon completion of discovery, moved for summary judgment on the ground that the officers exercised their professional judgment and acted reasonably in returning fire once fired upon.
Johnson opposed the City's motion and cross-moved for summary judgment on liability, claiming that the officers violated New York City Police Department Procedure No. 203-12, entitled "Deadly Physical Force," which sets forth the guidelines for the use of firearms. The relevant guidelines state that
Supreme Court denied Johnson's cross motion insofar as relevant to this appeal, and the City's motion for summary judgment, holding that although the City met its burden of establishing that the officers exercised their professional judgment, there was an issue of fact as to whether the officers violated police guidelines by discharging their weapons.
The Appellate Division, in a 3-2 decision, reversed and dismissed the complaint, holding that Johnson failed to show that the officers violated any of the guidelines. The court pointed to the uncontradicted testimony of the officers that there were no pedestrians in sight as the officers "sought to protect themselves and their fellow officers by returning fire" (
The professional judgment rule insulates a municipality from liability for its employees' performance of their duties "`where the . . . conduct involves the exercise of professional judgment such as electing one among many acceptable methods of carrying out tasks, or making tactical decisions'" (McCormack v City of New York,
The guideline here calls for such judgment, i.e., the police must not discharge their firearms if doing so would "unnecessarily endanger innocent persons." It does not prohibit officers from discharging their weapons when innocent bystanders are present in every instance. Rather, the guideline grants officers the discretion to make a judgment call as to when, and under what circumstances, it is necessary to discharge their weapons.
The officers clearly had probable cause to fire their weapons at the suspect: they were in pursuit of an armed individual who opened fire on them on a public street, endangering the lives of the officers and the public. Johnson asserts, however, that she met her burden of raising a question of fact that the officers violated the guideline because they did not survey the area to see if bystanders were present before firing at the suspect. However, on this record, it is uncontroverted that all of the officers who fired at the suspect did so when they had a clear view of him, and all testified that they did not see any bystanders in the area while firing, such that it cannot be said that the officers failed to exercise discretion in discharging their weapons. Nor is there any evidence that Johnson and her daughter were in the line of fire during the melee such that a question of fact was presented as to whether officers' discharge of their firearms violated the guideline (cf. Lubecki v City of New York,
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.
JONES, J. (dissenting).
Because there is an issue of fact as to whether the police officers violated a New York City Police Department guideline that prohibits unnecessarily endangering innocent persons by failing to ascertain the presence of bystanders before firing their weapons, I respectfully dissent and would reverse the order of the Appellate Division.
Generally, municipalities are immunized from liability for the exercise of discretion by their agencies or officials. When official acts, including those of police officers (see Rodriguez v City of New York,
However, this broad protection is neither absolute, nor automatically afforded, as the municipality must exercise discretion in compliance with its own procedures (see Haddock v City of New York,
New York City Police Department Procedure No. 203-12, entitled "Deadly Physical Force," as relevant here, commands that "b. Police officers shall not discharge their weapons when doing so will unnecessarily endanger innocent persons."
Here, there is an issue of fact as to whether the police officers violated this elemental requirement. Record evidence establishes the presence of bystanders in the immediate area of the shooting. For example, photographic evidence indicates plaintiffs were in close proximity to the suspect, who was positioned approximately two car lengths away. A crime scene sketch, created by the Police Department Crime Scene Unit, showing the relative positions of all the individuals involved in the incident indicates that when Officer Garcia fired his weapon, he was
Further, when questioned about the incident, Officer Garcia answered that he never affirmatively looked for pedestrians before firing his weapon. Officer Beddows similarly testified that he did not determine whether pedestrians were present before firing his weapon. In fact, he stated that he did not look for bystanders until "after pretty much everything was done." Given the close proximity of plaintiffs to the suspect, the admitted failure of some officers to look for bystanders before firing their weapons creates a triable issue as to whether the police violated departmental guidelines prohibiting actions that unnecessarily endanger innocent persons.
While I acknowledge the difficulties faced by police officers in the performance of their duties, I find it troubling that some of the officers in this incident failed to observe the surrounding area prior to firing their weapons. Our governmental immunity precedent is premised on the inherent requirement that reasoned judgment be used in exercising discretion. And where, as here, there is evidence that police officers failed to look for innocent persons before firing their weapons, it does not seem possible to conclude as a matter of law that the necessary judgment was exercised and, concomitantly, that there was no violation of the guideline against unnecessarily endangering innocent persons. As this Court has previously stated, immunity will not be provided where "[t]here is no indication that . . . the City made any effort to comply with its own personnel procedures" (Haddock, 75 NY2d at 485).
The majority relies on Rodriguez and Lubecki to conclude that there is no issue of fact as to whether the officers violated guidelines because plaintiffs were not in the line of police fire. However, the applicable guideline does not merely prohibit police from discharging their weapons when there is a civilian directly in the path of police fire. Rodriguez and Lubecki dealt with facts indicating clear violations of police guidelines because of certain injury to innocent persons. In Rodriguez, an officer fired through a crowd at a suspect, and in Lubecki, officers fired at a suspect holding an innocent person hostage. While these cases present classic scenarios of endangerment, they should not be understood to be the exclusive examples of violations of
Order affirmed, with costs.
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