BLOSSOM v. BLOSSOM No. 2010-IA-00882-SCT.
66 So.3d 124 (2011)
Kelly Finn BLOSSOM v. Michael BLOSSOM.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
July 21, 2011.
J. Edward Rainer, Gary Lee Williams, Brandon, attorneys for appellant.
Christopher Paul Palmer, Michael A. Boland, Frank D. Edens, Craig Lawson Slay, Brandon, attorneys for appellee.
PIERCE, Justice, for the Court:
¶ 1. This matter is an interlocutory appeal by Kelly Blossom ("Kelly") regarding the issuance of a protective order by the Rankin County Chancery Court denying her attempt to take the deposition of two witnesses in her pending divorce case. One of the witnesses was a minor victim in a criminal case ("C.B.") in which Kelly eventually pleaded guilty to having committed sexual battery. The other potential deponent, a minor named R.W., was identified by Kelly as having knowledge about "the rape" in the criminal case. At the time the trial court issued the protective order, Kelly was being prosecuted for sexual battery in the Rankin County Circuit Court and was represented by the same counsel for both the criminal prosecution and the divorce proceeding.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
¶ 2. On September 25, 2009, Michael Blossom ("Michael") filed a complaint and obtained a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction against Kelly, enjoining her from having any contact with their children. Michael's complaint for the temporary restraining order was based on the fact that Kelly previously had been arrested and charged with ten counts of sexual battery against a minor, C.B., in the city of Flowood, Mississippi.
¶ 3. On December 8, 2009, Kelly filed her Answer and Defenses to the complaint for the temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction. Included in her Answer
¶ 4. In her complaint for divorce, Kelly alleged that she was entitled to a divorce from Michael on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and sought custody of their minor children and possession of all marital property. On February 10, 2010, Michael filed his responses to Kelly's First Set of Interrogatories, and, within the responses, he denied that Kelly was entitled to a divorce. He did not assert any grounds for divorce against her.
¶ 5. On April 21, 2010, Kelly issued deposition subpoenas for C.B. and R.W., both of whom were to be deposed on May 5, 2010. At the time, C.B. was the alleged victim in the sexual-battery charges pending against Kelly in Rankin County Circuit Court.
¶ 6. On April 26, 2010, Kelly responded to Michael's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents, identifying numerous witnesses whom she intended to call at trial who had relevant knowledge in the matter. In her response to Michael's interrogatories, Kelly did not mention C.B., but she included R.W. as an intended witness.
¶ 7. On May 4, 2010, Michael filed a Motion for a Protective Order to prevent the depositions of C.B. and R.W. The district attorney's office sought to intervene with a Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena with prejudice, requesting
The chancellor barred the State of Mississippi from proceeding on its motion, stating that Kelly's counsel was "entitled to more notice." On May 10, 2010, after giving consideration to the pleadings and the arguments of the parties' counsel, the trial court entered an order prohibiting the depositions of C.B. and R.W.
¶ 8. Kelly appeals the chancellor's decision prohibiting her from deposing C.B. and R.W. and this Court granted interlocutory appeal pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 5.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 9. When reviewing matters relating to discovery, this Court has used an abuse-of-discretion standard. "In regard to matters relating to discovery, the chancellor has considerable discretion. This Court will not disturb discovery orders unless there has been an abuse of discretion." Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Miss. Div. of Medicaid,
¶ 10. This Court has a history of applying strict standards for interlocutory appeals as they relate to discovery matters. In fact, "as a general rule, this Court has declared that it `is not about to become involved in the wholesale granting of interlocutory appeals of civil discovery disputes. Pre-trial discovery is governed by flexible rules well within the administrative capacity of our trial courts.'" Haynes v. Anderson,
¶ 11. Both parties stipulate that the issue of this appeal is whether the chancellor in the lower court erred by entering a protective order, enjoining and preventing Kelly from taking the deposition of both C.B. and R.W. To properly address these issues, this Court must examine the proper rules and the reasoning used by the chancellor when he granted the protective orders. Rule 26(d) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure sets out the guidelines and requirements of a protective order.
¶ 12. After reviewing the record herein, this Court finds that the chancellor erred by granting the protective orders without meeting the requirements set out in Rule 26(d). The fact that a witness is an "alleged minor victim of a crime"
¶ 13. We reverse the decision of the chancellor and remand this matter to the
WALLER, C.J., CARLSON AND DICKINSON, P.JJ., RANDOLPH, KITCHENS, CHANDLER AND KING, JJ., CONCUR. LAMAR, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
LAMAR, Justice, dissenting:
¶ 15. Because the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in entering the protective orders, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 16. As an initial matter, I find this case inappropriate for interlocutory review. Although the majority correctly notes that this Court has stated that it is "not about to become involved in the wholesale granting of interlocutory appeals of discovery disputes," it fails to explain why it is doing so in this case. (Maj. Op. ¶ 10). As this Court stated in American Electric v. Singarayar,
¶ 17. I also disagree with the majority's cursory finding that the chancellor erred in granting the protective orders. The standard of review in discovery matters is abuse of discretion. Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Miss. Div. of Medicaid,
¶ 18. A party may obtain discovery "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the issues raised by the claims or defenses of any party." Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). But a trial judge may enter a protective order "upon motion by a party ... and for good cause shown ... to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense...." Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(d) (emphasis added).
¶ 19. Here, Michael Blossom filed a motion for a protective order to prevent Kelly Blossom from deposing C.B. and R.W. Michael argued that Kelly was seeking to "use the divorce case to conduct discovery for the criminal cases which would otherwise be unavailable to her within the criminal cases themselves" and that C.B. and R.W. "clearly [had] absolutely no relevance to the parties' pending divorce case...." The chancellor agreed and entered the protective orders, finding that any information C.B. possessed was "beyond the scope of discovery" in the divorce proceeding, and that any knowledge R.W. had was "not relevant to [the] divorce proceeding."
¶ 20. I find no abuse of the chancellor's "considerable" discretion in this case. A chancellor may issue a protective order "for good cause shown." Here, C.B. was the minor victim of a crime committed by Kelly, the person seeking the deposition. And R.W. had information—according to Kelly—only about "the rape" in the criminal case. I believe the chancellor was within his discretion to find that C.B. and R.W. had no information relevant to the divorce action.
¶ 21. As discussed above, I find this case inappropriate for interlocutory review. But because this Court has decided to address the issues on the merits, I would affirm the chancellor's ruling.
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