On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 6, 2016 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
YOUNG, C.J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the order denying leave to appeal. I would grant leave to appeal because I believe that this Court's peremptory order in People v. Johnson was poorly reasoned and inconsistent with the text of MCL 750.520a(r), the statute defining sexual penetration.
The prosecution in this case sought to amend the information to charge defendant with one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct pursuant to MCL 750.520b(1)(c). The defendant had pushed a 14-year-old girl's head down onto his
MCL 750.520a(r) defines "sexual penetration" to include "sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person's body...." The statute unambiguously defines "fellatio" as a type of "sexual penetration." The term "fellatio" means "oral stimulation of the penis."
However, under Johnson, proof of "fellatio" constituting "sexual penetration" under MCL 750.520b requires proof of "intrusion."
I continue to believe that Johnson is wrong and should be overruled. At the very least, this issue should be given this Court's full attention and resolved by a reasoned opinion, rather than a peremptory order.