WATKINS v. FANNIN No. 2008-CA-000170-MR.
278 S.W.3d 637 (2009)
RONALD WATKINS, Appellant, v. Sgt. FANNIN, Appellees.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
February 27, 2009.
Ronald Watkins, Sandy Hook, KY, pro se.
Angela E. Cordery, Office of Legal Services, Frankfort, KY, for Appellee, Justice and Public Safety Cabinet.
Before ACREE and VANMETER, JUDGES; HENRY, Senior Judge.
OPINION AND ORDER
Ronald Watkins appeals, pro se, from an order of the Elliott Circuit Court dismissing his petition for declaration of rights after he alleged that prison authorities violated his due process rights during a disciplinary hearing. Because Watkins failed to name an indispensable party, we dismiss this appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Watkins, who is serving time in Little Sandy Correctional Complex (LSCC), was charged with violating a prison regulation after deliberately bumping a corrections officer with his shoulder as they were passing each other in opposite directions. In accordance with Department of Corrections (Department) regulations, LSCC personnel investigated the charge and conducted an adjustment hearing to assess the charge. The adjustment officer, Sgt. Marlo Fannin, determined that Watkins was guilty of the charged offense and proposed penalizing him by the loss of two years' non-restorable good time, plus 180 days in disciplinary segregation. Sgt. Fannin reported her conclusions to LSCC's warden, Gary Beckstrom. Watkins filed an appeal with Warden Beckstrom, in writing, detailing his claim that the hearing violated his due process rights. After considering the appeal, Warden Beckstrom concurred with Sgt. Fannin's conclusions and signed the report, thereby forfeiting Watkins' good-time credit.
Watkins petitioned the Elliott Circuit Court for a declaration of rights, claiming he had been denied due process. He named Sgt. Fannin and Warden Beckstrom as respondents. An attorney with the Office of Legal Services of the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet (Cabinet) filed a response to Watkins' petition.
Watkins' brief urges reversal on grounds that the circuit court: (1) failed to consider the reliability of the evidence against him; (2) incorrectly determined that Watkins failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; and (3) did not consider his claim that he was denied the ability to present witnesses. These arguments lack merit. Ultimately, however, we cannot address any of them.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION; NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
"A notice of appeal, when filed, transfers jurisdiction of the case from the circuit court to the appellate court. It
When a circuit court renders judgment in favor of multiple parties, each of those parties becomes a potential appellee. The appellant is not required to name them all, but he is required to name each party that is "necessary" to adequate and proper appellate review and disposition. Our Supreme Court said, "a person is a necessary party if the person would be a necessary party for further proceedings in the circuit court if the judgment were reversed." Kesler v. Shehan,
The circuit court rendered judgment in favor of Sgt. Fannin and Warden Beckstrom. Watkins could have named both as appellees but he did not. The caption of Watkins' notice of appeal identifies "Sgt. Fannin, et. al" as appellee. The body of the notice identifies the appellee as "Sgt Fannin, ex., al." When Watkins filed his brief, he again identified "Sgt. Fannin, et. al" as the appellee. Warden Beckstrom was not named as a party to the appeal.
Therefore, thirty days after the circuit court judgment was entered, the judgment became final and no longer appealable as to Warden Beckstrom. The question we must answer is whether the warden is a necessary and indispensable party to this appeal. If we answer the question in the affirmative, consideration of the merits of the appeal would be inappropriate because we would lack jurisdiction. Dismissal of the appeal would be the only appropriate action. Id.; Slone v. Casey,
Having examined the statutes, regulations, and the properly adopted policies of the Department of Corrections, as well as the relief Watkins seeks, we conclude that Warden Beckstrom is a necessary and indispensable party to this appeal. In his absence, this Court is without jurisdiction to address the merits, and the case must be dismissed.
AUTHORITY TO GRANT AND FORFEIT "GOOD-TIME" CREDIT; MAINTENANCE OF PRISON DISCIPLINE
The Kentucky Legislature delegated to the Department the discretionary authority to award "good-time" credit to reduce a prisoner's sentence. Pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 197.045(1), a prisoner "may receive a credit on his sentence. . . to be determined by the department from the conduct of the prisoner." KRS 197.045(1)(emphasis supplied). Conversely, "[t]he department may forfeit any good time previously earned by the prisoner or deny the prisoner the right to earn good time in any amount if during the
The Legislature also authorized the promulgation of "administrative regulations for the government and discipline of the penitentiary . . . and for the government of the prisoners in their deportment and conduct[.]" KRS 197.020(1)(a). Presumably recognizing that prisoner discipline is best conducted at the individual prisons, the Legislature also granted the Secretary of the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, which oversees the Department, authority to "delegate to any person appointed the power and authority as he or she deems reasonable and proper for the effective administration of the cabinet." KRS 196.035.
The bulk of the power and authority in the area of prisoner discipline has been properly delegated to the wardens of the various penal institutions of Kentucky. Among the many Kentucky Corrections Policies and Procedures (KCPP) developed and adopted as law to govern prison administration is KCPP 15.6, entitled "Adjustment Procedures and Programs," made law by its incorporation by reference in 501 Kentucky Administrative Regulations (KAR) 6:020.
Pursuant to Section II of KCPP 15.6, every "alleged violation of [LSCC] rules and regulations shall be fairly processed." Section II(C)(1)(a) requires a prison employee with personal knowledge of an alleged violation to prepare a disciplinary report of the incident. The report is submitted to a shift supervisor for review. KCPP 15.6 Section II(C)(3). The shift supervisor reviews the report for compliance with the reporting policy and signs it. KCPP 15.6 Section II(C)(4)(a). A supervisor not involved in the incident then begins an investigation of the allegations in the disciplinary report. KCPP 15.6 Section II(C)(4)(b).
The disciplinary report is presented to an adjustment officer; copies of the report and all documentary evidence, including written statements, are simultaneously given to the prisoner. KCPP 15.6 Section II(C)(4)(b)(3)(a)-(c).
Section II(D) requires the adjustment officer to conduct a hearing after which she prepares a written record of the proceedings, including a statement of the discipline to be imposed. A copy is provided to the prisoner.
The disciplinary report is then "routed to the Warden or his designee for his signature" for "administrative . . . review[.]" KCPP 15.6 Section II(E) and (F)(6). However, the prisoner also has the right to appeal the disciplinary report to the warden who will then undertake an "appellate review" of the prisoner's case. KCPP 15.6 Section II(F)(1) and (6). The warden has the authority to:
KCPP 15.6 Section II(F)(5); see also KCPP 15.6 Section II(F)(6)(prohibiting the warden from increasing the discipline).
There is no right to appeal the warden's decision.
To summarize, the Legislature authorized the Secretary of the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, in overseeing the Department of Corrections, to regulate, to reward, and to punish prisoner conduct. The Secretary, without ceding or relinquishing that authority, properly delegated much of it to the wardens who, under properly adopted policies, have final say in the forfeiture of good-time credit. The roles of the prison employee who reports the incident, the supervisor who reviews the report, the supervisor who investigates the report, and the adjustment officer who completes the report, are merely preliminary to the wardens' exercise of final authority delegated to him by the Secretary.
WATKINS' PETITION AND APPEAL
Watkins' petition to the Elliott Circuit Court sought an order to "restor[e] the lost good-time (two years non-restorable) and void/expunge the conviction from the Petitioner's files[.]"
However, other than Watkins, the only party before this Court is the adjustment officer, Sgt. Fannin. Sgt. Fannin never had the authority to forfeit or restore Watkins' good-time credit. In fact, without the signature of Warden Beckstrom, Sgt. Fannin's efforts (as well as that of the
LACK OF JURISDICTION
This Court is without jurisdiction to grant Watkins any relief because he failed to name anyone other than "Sgt. Fannin, et al" as a party to the appeal in either the caption or the body of his notice of appeal. Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 73.03(1) requires a notice of appeal to "specify by name all appellants and all appellees" and specifically notes that "et al." is not a "proper designation of parties[.]" While pro se litigants are sometimes held to less stringent standards than lawyers in drafting formal pleadings, see Haines v. Kerner,
Finally, we note as irrelevant the fact that the Cabinet, which defended this appeal, has not raised this issue; an appellate court may not acquire jurisdiction through waiver. Wilson v. Russell,
This appeal is hereby dismissed for failure to name an indispensible party.
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