STIPUATION AND ORDER TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDE TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant CHARLES NEELY by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 15, 2017.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until July 20, 2017, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between June 15, 2017 and July 20, 2017, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has provided initial discovery of over 4000 pages.
b. Counsel for defendant needs additional time to complete the review of discovery, to conduct defense investigation, and to discuss potential resolution with defendant.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 15, 2017 to July 20, 2017, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (7) (A), B (iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.