REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CHARLES B. GOODWIN, Magistrate Judge.
Petitioner Danny R. Campbell, a state prisoner appearing pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. No. 1). United States District Judge David L. Russell has referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636. Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts ("Section 2254 Rules"), the undersigned has examined the Petition and recommends dismissal.
I. Screening Requirement and Jurisdiction
The Court is required to review habeas petitions promptly and to dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." Section 2254 R. 4. Likewise, courts are obligated to examine their jurisdiction sua sponte and dismiss any action where subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506-07 (2006); Berryhill v. Evans, 466 F.3d 934, 938 (10th Cir. 2006).
II. Second or Successive Petitions Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
Section 2244(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code limits the circumstances in which a petitioner may proceed with a second or successive habeas corpus action under § 2254:
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)-(3)(A). "A district court does not have jurisdiction to address the merits of a second or successive . . . 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claim until [the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals] has granted the required authorization." In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 2008); see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3); Section 2254 R. 9.
1. Petitioner's Petition Is "Second or Successive" Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)
In January 1979, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. Pet. at 1;
Petitioner has previously challenged his 1979 state-court conviction through several habeas proceedings in this Court. In Campbell v. Cowley [hereinafter Campbell II], Petitioner's § 2254 petition was dismissed as successive and as an abuse of the writ. See Campbell II, No. CIV-92-2413-T (W.D. Okla.) (R. & R., May 24, 1993 (Doc. No. 22); J., June 10, 1993 (Doc. No. 24)). In that 1992 habeas action, the Court identified Petitioner's first federal habeas corpus challenge to the conviction to have been filed in 1988 and then denied. See Campbell II, R. & R. at 2-3 (citing Campbell v. Cowley, No. CIV-88-1407-T (W.D. Okla.) [hereinafter Campbell I]).
In May 2016, Petitioner filed two more habeas actions in this Court. In Campbell III, Petitioner's § 2254 petition was dismissed as an untimely and unauthorized successive habeas petition. See Campbell III, 2016 WL 4078598, at *4. In Campbell v. Bear, No. CIV-16-530-R (W.D. Okla.) [hereinafter Campbell IV], Petitioner's pleading was likewise dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to the extent Petitioner was challenging his state-court conviction through an unauthorized second or successive habeas petition. See Campbell IV (R. & R., May 31, 2016 (Doc. No. 6); Order, June 24, 2016 (Doc. No. 8)).
In the current action, Petitioner again seeks to challenge his 1979 state-court conviction and sentence.
More significantly, however, because Petitioner's previous habeas actions challenged the same state-court conviction and were either denied on the merits or dismissed as second/successive, the current Petition is "second or successive" for purposes of § 2244(b). 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)-(2); see In re Rains, 659 F.3d 1274, 1275 (10th Cir. 2011); Campbell II, R. & R. at 2-3; id., J. at 1; Campbell III, 2016 WL 4077250, at *1; Campbell IV, Order at 1-2. In the instant matter, there is no indication that Petitioner has received an order from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing this Court to consider this pleading, which is at least his fifth § 2254 Petition challenging his January 1979 state-court judgment and sentence in Oklahoma County District Court Case Number CF-1978-2706. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); Pet. at 3.
To any extent Petitioner's present habeas claims were raised in any prior § 2254 petition, these claims must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (prescribing that a previously presented claim presented in a second or successive § 2254 application "shall be dismissed"); see, e.g., Hall v. Falk, 535 F. App'x 762, 763 (10th Cir. 2013); Allen v. Massie, 236 F.3d 1243, 1244-45 (10th Cir. 2001).
With respect to any new claims now raised by Petitioner that "challeng[e] the same conviction" as did any of Petitioner's prior habeas petitions, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the claims. In re Rains, 659 F.3d at 1275; see also Hall, 535 F. App'x at 763; In re Cline, 531 F.3d at 1251.
In re Cline, 531 F.3d at 1252. "Where there is no risk that a meritorious successive claim will be lost absent a § 1631 transfer, a district court does not abuse its discretion if it concludes it is not in the interest of justice to transfer the matter to [the appellate] court for authorization." Id.
2. Transfer of the Instant Petition Is Not in the Interest of Justice
a. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)
In this case, it would not further the interest of justice to transfer the matter to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals because Petitioner cannot satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) to obtain authorization to proceed with a successive habeas petition. By statute, a new habeas claim presented in a second or successive habeas petition
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B).
Petitioner's conclusory allegations in the Petition cannot reasonably be said to rely upon a new rule of constitutional law or a factual predicate alleged to not have been discoverable previously. See Pet. at 1-21; 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A), (B)(i). Nor has Petitioner presented underlying facts for his claims sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found him guilty of his first-degree murder offense. See Pet. at 1-21; 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).
b. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)
Moreover, the "interest of justice" does not support transfer of this petition because the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) for filing a habeas action "expired many years prior to the date on which Petitioner filed the instant Petition." Campbell III, 2016 WL 4078598, at *3; accord Campbell IV, R. & R. at 6; see Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 217 (2002) ("Because [the petitioner's] conviction became final before AEDPA took effect, the federal limitations period began running on AEDPA's effective date, April 24, 1996, giving [the petitioner] one year from that date (in the absence of tolling) to file a federal habeas petition."). This action, initiated February 27, 2017, is therefore untimely absent application of statutory or equitable tolling or an exception to the one-year time limit.
First, there is no basis for statutory tolling alleged in the Petition or reflected in the relevant public filings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Pet. at 13; State v. Campbell, No. CF-1978-2706 (Okla. Cnty. Dist. Ct.); Campbell v. State, No. F-79-428 (Okla. Crim. App.); Campbell v. State, No. PC-1988-165 (Okla. Crim. App.); Campbell II, No. CIV-92-2413-T (W.D. Okla.); Campbell III, No. CIV-16-526-R (W.D. Okla.); Campbell IV, No. CIV-16-530-R (W.D. Okla.); see also Clark v. Oklahoma, 468 F.3d 711, 714 (10th Cir. 2006). Nor is Petitioner entitled to statutory tolling for the period that any of his other habeas petitions were pending in this Court or in the Tenth Circuit. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001); Brown v. Poppel, 98 F. App'x 785, 788 (10th Cir. 2004).
Next, the AEDPA filing deadline may be equitably tolled in "extraordinary circumstances." Clark, 468 F.3d at 714 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also York v. Galetka, 314 F.3d 522, 527-28 (10th Cir. 2003). To be entitled to equitable tolling, Petitioner must "show both extraordinary circumstances preventing timeliness and diligent pursuit of his claim." See Clark, 468 F.3d at 714; accord Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010); see also Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000). Petition's nonsensical allegations cannot reasonably be construed as presenting extraordinary circumstances that prevented his timely pursuit of federal habeas corpus relief. See Pet. at 1-2, 13-21. Merely filing a prior federal habeas petition does not entitle Petitioner to equitable tolling. See Duncan, 533 U.S. at 181-82; Brown, 98 F. App'x at 788. Petitioner's presumed lack of knowledge of the law and lack of legal assistance generally are insufficient as well. See Marsh, 223 F.3d at 1220; Johnson v. Jones, 502 F. App'x 807, 810 (10th Cir. 2012). The lack of "extraordinary circumstances preventing timeliness" and lack of "diligent pursuit" of Petitioner's federal claims are clear on the face of the Petition, and Petitioner has not shown that equitable tolling is warranted. See Clark, 468 F.3d at 714; Brown, 98 F. App'x at 788.
Finally, "a credible showing of actual innocence" "may allow a prisoner to pursue his constitutional claims" as to his conviction, under an exception to procedural bars and statutes of limitations addressed by the Supreme Court in McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1928, 1931-32 (2013). Successful actual-innocence claims are rare due to the strong evidentiary requirements for such claims. See id. at 1928, 1931, 1936; House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). "[P]risoners asserting innocence as a gateway to defaulted claims must establish that, in light of new evidence, `it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" House, 547 U.S. at 536-37 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). In the Petition, Petitioner "provide[s] no new evidence that was not presented at his trial" and "has not shown that in light of new evidence a reasonable juror would not have found him guilty of the murder offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Campbell III, 2016 WL 4078598, at *3; see Pet. at 1-2, 13-21; Pet. Ex. 1. Petitioner's claims therefore do not invoke the actual-innocence equitable exception. See McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928.
Because all claims of the Petition were: (i) either "presented in a prior application," 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1); or (ii) do not meet the criteria for the Court's consideration under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2); and (iii) would be subject to dismissal as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), "there is no risk that a meritorious successive claim will be lost" absent a transfer to the appellate court. In re Cline, 531 F.3d at 1252. The Petition should be dismissed rather than transferred to the Tenth Circuit. See id.; Campbell III, 2016 WL 4078598, at *3-4; Campbell IV, Order at 1.
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. No. 1) be dismissed in its entirety. Further, Petitioner's application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) should be denied as moot. See Campbell IV, R. & R. at 7.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
Petitioner is advised of his right to file an objection to the Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by April 25, 2017, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. Petitioner is further advised that failure to timely object to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues contained herein. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the present case. The Court Clerk is directed to serve copies of the Petition and this Report and Recommendation on Respondent and the Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma through electronic mail sent to firstname.lastname@example.org.