MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ANN D. MONTGOMERY, District Judge.
This matter is before the undersigned United States District Judge for a ruling on Defendant Malcolm Roy Evans' ("Evans") Motion to Terminate AG Custody [Docket No. 128] and Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 129]. The Government has filed a Response [Docket No. 133]. For the reasons set forth below, the Motions are denied.
On June 18, 2015, after a four-day trial, a jury found Evans guilty of offenses stemming from armed bank robbery and carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), 2113(d), 2119(1), and 2113(e).
On February 2, 2017, Evans was transported to the Metropolitan Detention Center in Los Angles, California for the evaluation. In a March 3, 2017 letter, the Warden of the Metropolitan Detention Center requested a 15-day extension to complete the examination. That request was granted.
Evans now argues that he should be released from the Attorney General's custody and transported back to Minnesota to receive a competency evaluation from a psychologist or psychiatrist of his choice. Evans also argues that his due process rights have been violated by the length of time between his trial and sentencing. Evans requests that the charges against him be dismissed.
A. Motion to Terminate Custody
Evans first argues that the Attorney General has failed to arrange for a timely competency evaluation, and he should therefore be permitted to make arrangements to have the evaluation performed by a psychologist of his choosing. This argument has no merit. Evans, who was committed to the custody of the Attorney General for a 30 day period, arrived at the Metropolitan Detention Center on February 2, 2017. In a March 3, 2017 letter, the Warden of that facility requested a 15-day extension to complete the evaluation. Under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1), the Attorney General is permitted to maintain custody of a defendant for a "reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months." The time Evans has been in the custody of the Attorney General is reasonable.
B. Motion to Dismiss
Evans next argues that the delay between verdict and sentencing has violated his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(b)(1). Evans argues that because of this delay, he has been prejudiced by being confined in a county jail setting that is more restrictive than a federal prison, which has impaired his ability to assist in his legal defense and has adversely impacted his mental state.
The Supreme Court has held that an "inordinate delay in sentencing" implicates the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The delay between verdict and sentencing, and any resulting prejudice to Evans, have not violated his due process rights. Some of the delay can be attributed to Evans himself, as the presentence investigation report was delayed because of Evans' deteriorating relationship with his trial attorney, a relationship that ultimately frayed beyond repair and required substitution of counsel.
The prejudice to Evans is not "substantial and demonstrable."
Based upon the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein,