OPINION AND ORDER
DONETTA W. AMBROSE, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging disability due to physical and mental impairments. Plaintiff's application was denied initially, and upon hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). The Appeals Council denied his request for review. Before the Court are the parties' cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion will be denied, and Defendant's granted.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decisions on disability claims is provided by statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) 6 and 1383(c)(3) 7. Section 405(g) permits a district court to review the transcripts and records upon which a determination of the Commissioner is based, and the court will review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. §706. When reviewing a decision, the district court's role is limited to determining whether the record contains substantial evidence to support an ALJ's findings of fact.
Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate" to support a conclusion.
A district court cannot conduct a
II. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly disregarded the opinion of treating and examining medical providers. In particular, he points to the ALJ's treatment of his treating therapist and supervising psychiatrist of over a year and a half; and to the ALJ's treatment of the opinion of Dr. Uran, an agency examiner. Further, he argues that the residual functional capacity ("RFC") assessment was not supported by substantial evidence; and that the ALJ improperly dealt with vocational expert ("VE") testimony and Plaintiff's subjective complaints.
A. Dr. Uran and Ms. Loper
Dr. Uran opined that Plaintiff had marked limitations interacting appropriately with supervisors, co-workers, and the public, and responding appropriately to work pressures and changes in routine. The space left for supporting medical/clinical findings was left blank. In support of her finding of marked limitations on carrying out, understanding, and remembering detailed instructions, she listed mood instability, poor insight, anxiety, delusions, paranoia, "attention," and "learning." These functional limitations are not specifically addressed in the attached narrative, in which Dr. Uran assigned him a GAF of 45, and noted scattered responses and over-productive speech, but appropriate social judgment. The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Uran's opinion, on grounds that Dr. Uran appeared to have accepted Plaintiff's subjective complaints in full; he also noted that Plaintiff was not medicated at the time of the exam, but had reported good results with medication.
As regards the opinion of Ms. Loper, which was co-signed by supervising psychiatrist Dr. Hanlin, the ALJ gave the opinion little weight. Ms. Loper opined that Plaintiff had poor to no ability to maintain attention for two hours, attend work regularly, perform at a consistent pace, and complete a normal workday. As support for these conclusions, she noted missed appointments, medication noncompliance, irritability with family, non-compliance with OSA, and inability to stay on topic during session.
The ALJ noted that Ms. Loper is not an acceptable medical source, and that the opinion was internally inconsistent with her note that Plaintiff responded well to medication, as well as with Plaintiff's GAF of 70, noted as current and highest past score. He further noted that Plaintiff testified that Dr. Hanlin never examined or treated him. This approach to a supervising psychiatrist is acceptable.
B. Residual Functional Capacity
Plaintiff further argues that the RFC lacks substantial evidence, as there is no evidence indicating that Plaintiff can perform the mental or physical requirements listed therein. The ALJ found an RFC of light work, along with the following limitations:
. . . claimant is limited to occasional climbing (ramps and stairs only) balancing, stooping, crouching, crawling, and kneeling; limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks that re not performed in a fast-paced production environment and involving only simple, work-related decisions and, in general, relatively few work place changes; and no more than occasional supervision or occasional interaction with coworkers."
Plaintiff specifically argues that record evidence, including reports from Dr. Uran and PBS Mental Health Associates, indicate that Plaintiff is unable to deal with elements such as social functioning, work pressures and changes, or attendance. He further contends that the ALJ failed to include limitations relating to Plaintiff's neck, mid-back, shoulder and arm; seizures, syncopal episodes, states of confusion, memory impairments, and limited intellectual functioning. He also contends that his need for a cane and inability to stand, walk, sit, and lift would preclude light work. Again, applicable standards do not permit me to re-weigh the evidence. The issue is not whether evidence exists to support Plaintiff's position, but instead whether the ALJ's decision is properly supported. Here, I find no error in the ALJ's RFC.
C. Remaining Arguments
Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ relied on an incomplete hypothetical question, and erred in evaluating Plaintiff's subjective complaints. With respect to the VE, Plaintiff's argument is cursory and undeveloped, and will be rejected. Regarding the ALJ's treatment of his subjective complaints, the ALJ's conclusions are entitled to great deference and should not be discarded lightly.
In sum, Plaintiff's Motion will be denied, and Defendant's granted. An appropriate Order follows.
AND NOW, this 10th day of February, 2017, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Plaintiff's Motion is denied, and Defendant's granted.