STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR CONTINUANCE OF STATUS CONFERENCE
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Jason Hitt, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Omar Williams, Kristy Kellogg, hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for Status Conference on February 9, 2017.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the Status Conference to February 23, 2017, at 9:30 a.m. and to exclude time between February 9, 2017, and February 23, 2017, under Local Code T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. A continuance is requested because defense counsel was recently appointed and needs additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and discuss a potential resolution.
b. Counsel for defendants believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The Government does not object to the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of February 9, 2017, to February 23, 2017, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
2. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
The Court, having received, read, and considered the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing therefrom, adopts the stipulation of the parties in its entirety as its order. IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED this 7th day of February, 2017.