MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JORGE L. ALONSO, District Judge.
Before the Court is defendant Balmer Lawrie Van Leer Ltd.'s ("BLVL") motion to dismiss the first amended complaint and crossclaim  pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). For the reasons set forth below, BLVL's motion is granted.
In this products liability case, plaintiffs Griffith Laboratories and Innova ("Griffith") allege as follows. In early 2013, defendant Kancor Ingredients Limited ("Kancor") supplied Griffith with an ingredient (Oleoresin Paprika or "OR Paprika") for use in liquid pepperoni seasoning that plaintiffs sell to pepperoni manufacturers. (Am. Compl. ¶ 15.) Kancor delivered two specific OR Paprika batches to Griffith in plastic containers manufactured by BLVL. (Id. ¶ 16.) Those two OR Paprika batches were used to make two seasoning lots that then ended up in five different liquid pepperoni seasoning lots. (Id. ¶ 17.) From there, the five liquid seasoning lots were sent to two of plaintiffs' customers and used to flavor those customers' meat products that were later used on an unnamed pizza franchisor's pizzas. (Id. ¶ 18.) In February 2013, two of Griffith's customers informed Griffith that small pieces of plastic had been found in their liquid pepperoni seasoning lots. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.) Accordingly, Griffith screened its remaining inventory of OR Paprika and found more plastic pieces. (Id. ¶ 21.) Griffith had those plastic pieces tested and confirmed that they were polypropylene copolymer, of which they believe the BLVL containers, used to ship the OR Paprika, were made. (Id. ¶ 22.) In mid-2013, after plaintiffs visited Kancor and BLVL's manufacturing facilities and observed similar pieces of plastic lying on and near the filling line, plaintiffs paid their two customers over $900,000 to settle the claims made against them over the plastic contamination. (Id. ¶¶ 23-26.) Griffith now seeks contribution from Kancor and BLVL under the Illinois Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act, for the claims paid and profits lost as a result of the plastic contamination. (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.)
In its crossclaim against BLVL, Kancor alleges that if the OR Paprika delivered to Griffith contained plastic particles, that contamination was caused by defects in the containers Kancor received from BLVL. (Crossclm. ¶ 5.) Kancor seeks indemnification for all losses, costs, and damages caused by BLVL's allegedly defective containers. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.)
"A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) tests whether a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant." In re First Farmers Fin. Litig., No. 14-CV-7581, 2017 WL 85442, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2017). If a defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction. uBID, Inc., v. Go Daddy Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 423-24 (7th Cir. 2010). The Court takes "the plaintiff's asserted facts as true and resolve[s] any factual disputes in its favor." Id. If, however, the plaintiff does not refute facts contained in the defendant's affidavit, the Court will accept those facts as true. GCIU-Emp'r Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp., 565 F.3d 1018, 1020 n.1 (7th Cir. 2009).
In support of its motion to dismiss, BLVL asserts that the Court does not have general personal jurisdiction over it because it is headquartered and incorporated in India. (Def.'s Mem. at 1.) BLVL also argues it is not subject to specific personal jurisdiction because BLVL did not purposely avail itself of the Illinois market, the claims against it do not arise out of its contacts with Illinois, and exercising jurisdiction over it would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. (Id. at 2.)
BLVL relies on its location and headquarters and also asserts that the Court should not exercise general jurisdiction over it based on Greif Inc. (a BLVL corporate "grandparent") and American Flange's (a BLVL customer) contacts with Illinois. (Def.'s Mem. at 7-8.) BLVL argues that it has no operations in Illinois and that its sale of steel closures to American Flange in Illinois does not trigger personal jurisdiction here. (Id. at 8-10.) Griffith disagrees, arguing that 1.92% of BLVL's annual sales are made to American Flange and constitute continuous and systematic sales to Illinois sufficient to justify its filing suit here. (Griffith Resp. at 2-3.) Kancor concurs and asserts that in the first quarter of 2016, BLVL shipped more than $300,000 of products to Illinois. (Kancor Resp. at 2.) Additionally, Griffith asserts that BLVL promotes its products in the United States through industry websites. (Griffith Resp. at 2.)
"General jurisdiction is all-purpose; it exists only when the party's affiliations with the State in which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive as to render it essentially at home in the forum State." Kipp v. Ski Enter. Corp. of Wis., Inc., 783 F.3d 695, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In two recent Supreme Court decisions, the Court "made clear that only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction there." Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 760 (2014); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (general jurisdiction may be asserted over a foreign corporation when its continuous and systematic affiliations cause it to be at home in the forum State.) "[T]he inquiry under Goodyear is not whether a foreign corporation's in-forum contacts can be said to be in some sense `continuous and systematic,' it is whether that corporation's `affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum State.'" Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).
BLVL is an Indian company headquartered in Mumbai. (Def.'s Mem. Ex. 1, Silva Decl. ¶ 4.)
BLVL contends that the Court does not have specific jurisdiction over it because BLVL does not market or sell, directly or through a third-party distributor, plastic containers in Illinois, or anywhere else in the United States. (Def.'s Mem. at 11-12.) BLVL argues that its plastic containers made their way to Illinois through Kancor's unilateral acts. (Id. at 12.) Moreover, BLVL asserts that Griffith and Kancor's claims against it arise out of BLVL's contacts in India, not Illinois. (Id. at 13.) The transaction between Kancor and BLVL for the plastic containers took place exclusively in India. (Id. at 5.) BLVL did not request or direct Kancor to use the plastic containers in Illinois, and after BLVL shipped the containers to Kancor in India, it had no control over them. (Id. at 5, 12.) Finally, BLVL argues that it would be unreasonable as a matter of law for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over it. (Id. at 14-15.) Griffith counters that BLVL's activities satisfy all of Illinois's Long-Arm Statute requirements sufficient to support a finding of specific personal jurisdiction. (Griffith's Resp. at 9.) Specifically, Griffith asserts that BLVL transacts business in Illinois through American Flange (Tri-Sure), has sufficient minimum contacts in Illinois, and placed the plastic containers into the stream of commerce knowing that they would end up in the United States, including Illinois. (Id. at 9-11.) BLVL argues that it is not subject to specific jurisdiction under the constitutional test and therefore the Court does not need to consider Illinois' Long-Arm Statute. (Def.'s Reply at 9.) Further, BLVL asserts that a stream-of-commerce theory does not apply because Kancor is BLVL's customer, not its distributor, and BLVL did not engage in any efforts to serve Illinois markets. (Id. at 10-12.) BLVL contends that even if it had knowledge that its product would be distributed in Illinois, that alone is not a sufficient basis to confer jurisdiction in Illinois. (Id. at 11.) BLVL also argues that its sales of a different product in Illinois cannot support the exercise of specific jurisdiction. (Id. at 13.) Finally, BLVL reiterates that the exercise of jurisdiction over it would be inconsistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. (Id. at 14-15.)
"Specific personal jurisdiction is appropriate where (1) the defendant has purposely directed his activities at the forum state or purposely availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in that state, and (2) the alleged injury arises out of the defendant's fourm-related activities." N. Grain Mktg., LLC, v. Greving, 743 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 2014).
BLVL's containers made their way to Illinois through Kancor's unilateral acts, and BLVL does not market or sell plastic containers in Illinois. Neither Griffith nor Kancor has submitted evidence that BLVL knew that Kancor would use (or continue to use) its containers in Illinois.
Even if jurisdiction did exist, requiring BLVL to defend a lawsuit in Illinois would be unreasonable. BLVL is an Indian company primarily doing business there, and this dispute, at least as it relates to BLVL, is about indemnifying Kancor. Kancor is also based in India, and because the transaction between BLVL and Kancor took place there, Indian law, not Illinois law, would likely govern indemnification. Griffith can proceed in Illinois against Kancor, so any interest the State of Illinois has in adjudicating injuries that occurred here will not be subverted by dismissing BLVL. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) ("Considering the international context, the heavy burden on the alien defendant, and the slightest interests of the plaintiff and the forum State, the exercise of personal jurisdiction . . . in this instance would be unreasonable and unfair."). Because BLVL is not at home in Illinois, has not purposely availed itself of Illinois, the injury does not arise out of its Illinois-based activities, and exercising jurisdiction here would offend traditional notions of fair play, it is dismissed as a defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction.
For the aforementioned reasons, defendant BLVL's motion to dismiss is granted.