ROY B. DALTON, Jr., District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on the following:
Upon consideration, the Court finds that the motion is due to be denied.
On June 23, 2015, Lashunda Redd ("
As an initial matter, Defendant improperly relies on 18 U.S.C. 3742(e) to support her motion. Section 3742(e) does not grant the Court authority to reduce a defendant's sentence. Section 3742(e) simply sets forth a basis for a court of appeals to review a sentence imposed by a district court. Therefore, Section 3742(e) fails to provide a basis for this Court to reduce Defendant's sentence.
Defendant's reliance on Pepper is also misplaced. In Pepper, the Supreme Court held that "when a defendant's sentence has been set aside on appeal and his case remanded for resentencing, a district court may consider evidence of a defendant's rehabilitation since his prior sentencing and that such evidence may, in appropriate cases, support a downward variance from the advisory Guidelines range." Pepper, 562 U.S. at 491. Thus, "while rehabilitation may be a ground the court can consider if it is in the midst of sentencing or resentencing, rehabilitation is not a justification for the court to resentence the defendant in the first place." United States v. Edmondson, 799 F.Supp.2d 1297, 1299 (M.D. Ala. 2011). Because Defendant has already been sentenced and has not appealed her sentence, Pepper is inapplicable here.
Indeed, the Court may only modify Defendant's term of imprisonment: (1) upon motion by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons under limited circumstances; (2) where "expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure"; or (3) if a sentencing range has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. See 18 U.S.C. 3582(c). Defendant raises no arguments that implicate any of these three exceptions.
Accordingly, it is hereby