Attorney(s) appearing for the Case
Juan Arquimidez Villanueva, Defendant, represented by Dina Lee Santos , Law Offices of Dina L. Santos.
Jose Cruz Rodriguez-Rodriguez, Defendant, represented by Clemente Jimenez , Law Office Of Clemente M. Jimenez.
Richard Lopez, Defendant, represented by Kyle Rodger Knapp , Kyle R. Knapp, Attorney At Law.
USA, Plaintiff, represented by Jason Hitt , United States Attorney's Office.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TO CONTINUE CASE TO MARCH 23, 2017
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and Defendant Juan Villanueva, represented by Attorney Dina Santos; Defendant Jose Cruz Rodriguez-Rodriguez represented by Attorney Clemente Jimenez; Defendant Richard Lopez, represented by Attorney Kyle Knapp, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 9, 2017.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until March 23, 2017, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between February 9, 2017, and March 23, 2017, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to review the discovery, continue to conduct investigation, and to otherwise prepare for trial. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
b) The government does not object to the continuance.
c) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
d) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 9, 2017, to March 23, 2017, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.