ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Robert Rubino is a California state prisoner incarcerated at a correctional facility in San Diego, California. Mr. Rubino filed a lawsuit pro se in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against California
A California jury convicted Mr. Rubino in October 2006 of sixteen counts of lewd acts upon a minor and two counts of displaying harmful matter to a minor with the intent to seduce the minor. The San Diego Superior Court sentenced Mr. Rubino on February 22, 2007, to an aggregate prison sentence of 73 years to life. See Rubino v. Allison, No. 11cv665 WQH WVG, 2012 WL 760709, at *1 (S.D.Cal. Mar. 6, 2012); Mot. to Dismiss at 2. Mr. Rubino has filed multiple habeas petitions in state and federal courts in California without success. He is now barred under the successive habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), from pursuing habeas relief in federal court without first obtaining permission from the Ninth Circuit.
In his Amended Complaint, Mr. Rubino invokes the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 702, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983-85, and he purports to bring a class action.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim challenges the adequacy of a complaint on its face. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint must be sufficient "to give a defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is "plausible on its face." Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A court must treat the complaint's factual allegations as true, "even if doubtful in fact." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But a court need not accept as true legal conclusions set forth in a complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated by reference, and public matters about which the court may take judicial notice. Abhe & Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao, 508 F.3d 1052, 1059 (D.C.Cir.2007).
The transferring court construed Mr. Rubino's claims as brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) — the authority for bringing personal-capacity lawsuits against federal officials for constitutional violations. But Mr. Rubino contends that the United States and Attorney General Lynch "are sued in their political and official capacities for enacting and applying AEDPA's and the PLRA's unconstitutional as applied Statutes and Rules to deny either 42 U.S.C. 1983, or habeas corpus review as required by the First Amendment and Article 1, Section 9, Clause 2 of the U.S. Const." Am. Compl. at 16. In addition, Mr. Rubino does not seek a Bivens remedy, which "is [money] damages or nothing." Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979); accord Simpkins v. D.C. Gov't, 108 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C.Cir.1997) ("Bivens actions are for damages."). Consequently, the transferred Bivens claim will be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
Mr. Rubino's claim against Lynch in her official capacity is generally "another way of pleading an action against [the United States]." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (citing Monell v. N.Y. City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). Mr. Rubino's official-capacity claim rests on an erroneous premise. Congress (not the Attorney General) enacts laws such as the AEDPA and PLRA, and the federal courts (not the Attorney General) generally "apply the law as it reads." Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F.R.D. 5, 9 (D.D.C. 2001). Furthermore, it is "well-settled that a prisoner seeking relief from his conviction or sentence may not bring  an action" for injunctive and declaratory relief, Williams v. Hill, 74 F.3d 1339, 1340 (D.C.Cir.1996) (per curiam) (citations omitted); such is the exclusive province of habeas corpus, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973).
Mr. Rubino insists that he "is not seeking relief or release from his state court convictions or sentences," Opp'n at 1 [Dkt. 82], but "he does not claim an injury apart from the fact of his conviction[s]." Williams, 74 F.3d at 1340. Mr. Rubino claims in his opposition that he is being denied "meaningful court access." Opp'n at 7. He cites the favorable termination requirement established in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129
Finally, to the extent that Mr. Rubino is seeking "relief to halt California Federal Courts' abuse of the United States Constitution and the American Criminal Justice system," based on their application of the AEDPA and PLRA to him, Opp'n at 15, this Court is without jurisdiction to grant or deny such relief. See Panko v. Rodak, 606 F.2d 168, 171 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081, 100 S.Ct. 1034, 62 L.Ed.2d 765 (1980) ("It seems axiomatic that a lower court may not order the judges or officers of a higher court to take an action."); United States v. Choi, 818 F.Supp.2d 79, 85 (D.D.C.2011) (district courts "generally lack appellate jurisdiction over other judicial bodies, and cannot exercise appellate mandamus over other courts") (citing Lewis v. Green, 629 F.Supp. 546, 553 (D.D.C.1986)).
The Court concludes that Mr. Rubino has failed to state a Bivens claim against Attorney General Lynch and a claim for equitable relief against the United States. Consequently, Defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint will be granted.
Date: September 1, 2016.