Jose Armando Ramos appeals following his conviction for illegal reentry. He argues that his prior conviction for aggravated assault in violation of Texas Penal Code § 22.02 was improperly characterized as a crime of violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). He also argues that the entry of judgment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) was erroneous because Texas aggravated assault is not an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), which defines aggravated felony by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 16. Ramos failed to object to these determinations in the district court; therefore, we review for plain error. See United States v. Henao-Melo, 591 F.3d 798, 801 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).
In United States v. Guillen-Alvarez, 489 F.3d 197, 199-01 (5th Cir. 2007), we held that a conviction for aggravated assault in violation of Texas Penal Code § 22.02 qualifies as the enumerated offense of aggravated assault, and, thus, a crime of violence for purposes of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). Guillen-Alvarez remains valid after Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016). United States v. Shepherd, 848 F.3d 425, 427-28 (5th Cir. 2017). We are bound by our own precedent unless and until that precedent is altered by a decision of the Supreme Court or this court sitting en banc. See United States v. Setser, 607 F.3d 128, 131 (5th Cir. 2010).
We have also rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of § 16(b) based on Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). See United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670, 672-79 (5th Cir.) (en banc), petition for cert. filed (Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 16-6259). The grant of certiorari in Lynch v. Dimaya, 137 S.Ct. 31 (2016), does not alter our holding in Gonzalez-Longoria. See Setser, 607 F.3d at 131. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.