A jury convicted Chris Eugene Cosner of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) and brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The district court sentenced Cosner as a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 to a total of 360 months of imprisonment. Cosner now appeals, contending that his bank robbery conviction is not a "crime of violence" for the purposes of serving as a predicate offense for his § 924(c)(1) conviction or for application of the career-offender guideline. He also asserts that the district court improperly participated in plea negotiations and that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. We affirm.
First, as Cosner concedes, his challenges to the characterization of his federal bank robbery conviction of a "crime of violence" are foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. Brewer, which held that federal bank robbery is categorically a "crime of violence" as defined by § 4B1.2(a)(1) for the purpose of the career-offender guideline. See 848 F.3d 711, 714-16 (5th Cir. 2017). Because § 4B1.2(a)(1) defines "crime of violence" "in exactly the same manner as § 924(c)(3)(A)," see United States v. Jones, 854 F.3d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 2017), Brewer necessarily dictates that federal bank robbery is also categorically a "crime of violence" for the purposes of his § 924(c)(1) conviction, see 848 F.3d at 714-16.
Second, Cosner fails to establish either that the district court impermissibly participated in plea discussions or, if it did, that such participation had any effect on the fairness and impartiality of his trial and sentencing. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1), (h); United States v. Crowell, 60 F.3d 199, 205 (5th Cir. 1995).
Third, we are unpersuaded that this is a "rare case" in which the record is sufficiently developed to allow this court to consider Cosner's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the first instance on direct appeal. See United States v. Isgar, 739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, we dismiss those claims without prejudice to collateral review. Id.