MENDOZA-PABLO v. HOLDERNo. 07-73592.
667 F.3d 1308 (2012)
Juan Ubaldo MENDOZA-PABLO, Petitioner,
Eric H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
Eric H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted July 21, 2011.
Filed February 7, 2012.
Robert L. Lewis, Law Office of Robert L. Lewis, Oakland, California, for the petitioner. Gregory G. Katsas, Daniel E. Goldman, and Yamileth G. Handuber, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for the respondent.
Before: A. WALLACE TASHIMA and JOHNNIE B. RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and JED S. RAKOFF, Senior District Judge.
Opinion by Judge RAKOFF; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge RAWLINSON.
RAKOFF, Senior District Judge:
Petitioner Juan Ubaldo Mendoza-Pablo petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT") on the ground, inter alia, that Mendoza-Pablo had not been the victim of past persecution because he was never "personally challenged or confronted by any potential persecutor." We grant the petition.
The pertinent facts are as follows.
Id. at 150.
During this conflict, the Guatemalan government, "regarding the entire civilian population of many villages as members of guerrilla groups," sought to "physically eliminat[e]" all the people residing in those
Very shortly thereafter, Mendoza-Pablo was born, several weeks premature. Food was scarce in the mountains and Mendoza-Pablo's mother, unable to breast feed, sought to nourish him with tea made from wild herbs. When he was roughly three months old, Mendoza-Pablo's family decided that, in light of the foregoing events, remaining in Guatemala posed a danger to their lives. Accordingly, the family traveled to Mexico, where, however, they did not have lawful status, as a result of which Mendoza-Pablo was unable to attend school and had difficulty obtaining employment. In addition, Mendoza-Pablo was often sick and frequently had nightmares.
In due course, the U.S. Government sought Mendoza-Pablo's removal, and on May 19, 2003, Mendoza-Pablo appeared before an IJ without counsel, and was granted a continuance of removal proceedings to obtain legal representation. On October 16, 2003, he filed with the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") an application for asylum, with-holding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). After the IJ granted two additional continuances—to allow for attorney preparation, for the resolution of a pending Freedom of Information Act request, and for Mendoza-Pablo to retain new counsel—on July 7, 2004, Mendoza-Pablo appeared before the IJ and renewed his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. On March 20, 2006, four days before the scheduled merits hearing on those applications, counsel for Mendoza-Pablo filed a motion to continue the proceedings so as to "allow time for a psychological evaluation" of Mendoza-Pablo, which had not yet been completed because of "scheduling and monetary restraints." The IJ denied the request, ruling that "no good cause ha[d] been established" for a continuance.
On March 24, 2006, after a merits hearing, the IJ denied Mendoza-Pablo's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The IJ found Mendoza-Pablo credible in all respects, but held that the substance of his testimony was insufficient to meet his burden of establishing past persecution. Specifically, the IJ held that Mendoza-Pablo had not been persecuted because he had never personally "witnessed any atrocities" and he was never "personally challenged or confronted" by the Guatemalan military forces
Mendoza-Pablo appealed the IJ's decision to the BIA, which, by Order dated August 9, 2007, affirmed the IJ's decision. Specifically, the BIA held that Mendoza-Pablo's "second hand exposure" to the civil war in Guatemala was insufficient to establish past persecution because he did not personally endure or witness the atrocities perpetrated by the Guatemalan government against his family and ancestral village. Further, the BIA agreed that Mendoza-Pablo's testimony as to any emotional harm he suffered as a result of his childhood experiences was insufficient to constitute past persecution without "expert or objective evidence" that he presently suffers from a psychological disorder stemming from those experiences.
Because the BIA conducted an independent review of the IJ's findings, we review the BIA's decision and not that of the IJ. Zheng v. Ashcroft,
The Attorney General may, in his discretion, grant asylum to applicants determined to be refugees within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1). An applicant qualifies as a refugee when he "is unable or unwilling to return to his home country because of a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
Persecution is defined as "the infliction of suffering or harm . . . in a way regarded as offensive." Li v. Ashcroft,
This case requires us to determine whether Mendoza-Pablo's early deprivations growing directly out of the unquestionable persecution of his mother and, more generally, his and his parents's fear of further persecution growing directly out of the Guatemalan government's across-the-board persecution of Mayans, constitutes persecution under the INA. Mendoza-Pablo was born in the mountains several weeks premature, very shortly after his pregnant mother fled from Guatemalan government forces that had attacked her ancestral village, burned the village to the ground, and massacred its inhabitants, including several of Mendoza-Pablo's close relatives. Despite his mother's best efforts, Mendoza-Pablo was severely malnourished throughout the first few months of his life, because his mother was too malnourished to breastfeed. Faced with the very real threat of further persecution, the family, just months after the village was massacred, fled the country. Although Mendoza-Pablo's family succeeded in escaping to Mexico, their unlawful status there directly led to further deprivations suffered by Mendoza-Pablo, including lack of schooling and difficulty finding employment.
The BIA concluded that the foregoing does not to constitute "persecution" because Mendoza-Pablo's experiences, in its view, constituted "second hand exposure" to the violence perpetrated against the inhabitants of Todos Santos. As an initial matter, it is clear from our case law that an infant can be the victim of persecution, even though he has no present recollection of the events that constituted his persecution. See Benyamin v. Holder,
Id. at 1045-46. Accordingly, the harms suffered by Mendoza-Pablo's family members "must be considered" in assessing whether the events of his childhood rise to the level of past persecution.
Moreover, as we have consistently recognized, being forced to flee from one's home in the face of an immediate threat of severe physical violence or death is squarely encompassed within the rubric of persecution, as long as the persecutors' actions are motivated by the victim's race or some other protected consideration. See Knezevic, 367 F.3d at 1211; see also Khup v. Ashcroft,
Here, Mendoza-Pablo's pregnant mother, like the petitioners in Knezevic, fled from her home village as a result of her (eminently-reasonable) belief that her life—as well the life of the child in her womb—was in severe and immediate danger because Guatemalan military forces had specifically targeted the village's inhabitants on the basis of their racial and ethnic background. The tragic seriousness of the danger was confirmed when several of Mendoza-Pablo's relatives were locked inside of their homes and burned alive by Guatemalan government soldiers.
The persecution of Mendoza-Pablo's pregnant mother directly informs everything that happened to him in the weeks and months thereafter. Prematurely born to his distraught and persecuted mother, Mendoza-Pablo suffered intensely during his first three months of life because of severe malnourishment occasioned by his mother's flight to the mountains. While the precise long-term effect of these circumstances on Mendoza-Pablo's physical and mental development may well be impossible to determine,
Accordingly, on the particular facts of this case, we conclude that where a pregnant mother is persecuted in a manner that materially impedes her ability to provide for the basic needs of her child, where that child's family has undisputedly suffered severe persecution, and where the newborn child suffers serious deprivations directly attributable not only to those facts, but also to the material ongoing threat of continued persecution of the child and the child's family, that child may be said to have suffered persecution and therefore be eligible for asylum under the INA. See Jorge-Tzoc, 435 F.3d at 150 (concluding that the petitioner suffered persecution where he "was a child [of seven] at the time of the massacres . . . and thus necessarily dependant on both his family and his community" to an extent that an adult is not).
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the BIA's ruling that Mendoza-Pablo did not suffer past persecution because his exposure to persecution was "second hand" reflects an incorrect view of the applicable law, which permits the BIA to take account of the indirect effects of persecution as well as the direct effects, at least where, as here, the connection between the two is so immediate and strong. We therefore remand Mendoza-Pablo's petition to the BIA for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Opinion.
RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, and dissenting in part:
I agree in principle that an infant may be subjected to persecution. However, I do not agree that the facts of this case compel a conclusion that Petitioner Juan Ubaldo Mendoza-Pablo was subjected to persecution as an infant. I respectfully dissent.
Mendoza-Pablo was informed by his mother that he was born several weeks premature, and was malnourished because of the family's forced retreat into the mountains, where food was scarce. When Mendoza-Pablo was approximately three months old, Mendoza-Pablo's family fled to Mexico. In Mexico, Mendoza-Pablo was unable to attend school and experienced difficulty in finding employment.
When asked why he was seeking asylum, Mendoza-Pablo responded, "I'm applying for asylum because I don't have papers or anything . . . I don't have where to live[sic]. I don't have anywhere to go. . . ."
Mendoza-Pablo never articulated a concrete reason to support his asserted fear of being killed. When the subject was raised for the final time during the hearing, the best explanation he could muster was:
The Immigration Judge (IJ) credited Mendoza-Pablo's testimony, but held that the testimony was not sufficient to meet Mendoza-Pablo's burden of establishing either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. The IJ based his finding on the following observations:
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's denial of relief. The BIA noted that Mendoza-Pablo had absolutely no recollection of the events that formed the basis for his claim of persecution. The BIA explicitly upheld the IJ's determination that Mendoza-Pablo failed to establish that he was the victim of past persecution. The BIA acknowledged that Mendoza-Pablo's persecution claim was predicated primarily on "alleged emotional harm . . ." Nevertheless, the BIA agreed with the IJ that the lack of objective evidence or expert testimony in support of the claimed harm rendered Mendoza-Pablo's claim without merit.
The BIA also agreed with the IJ that Mendoza-Pablo's "second-hand exposure to war" where he "never witnessed any atrocities or was ever personally challenged or confronted," was insufficient to establish past persecution.
Finally, the BIA affirmed the IJ's ruling that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that Mendoza-Pablo had an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution. The persecution of Mendoza-Pablo's parents was too remote to establish an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution, and Mendoza-Pablo's claims regarding how he would be injured if he returned to Guatemala were entirely speculative.
It is important to keep in mind that our review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is extremely limited. In order for us to reach a different conclusion, the record must compel a different result. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias,
"Persecution is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive. . . ." Gormley v. Ashcroft,
The cases cited by the majority are easily distinguished. Benyamin v. Holder,
The cases cited by the majority stand for the unremarkable proposition that age is a factor to be considered in determining whether persecution has occurred. See Hernandez-Ortiz v. Gonzales,
The best the majority can do is speculate regarding the likelihood that the "deprivations" experienced by Mendoza-Pablo "would have some deleterious and long-lasting effects. . . ." Majority Opinion, p. 1315. The majority cites Brucaj v. Ashcroft,
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