BLOCKOWICZ v. WILLIAMS No. 10-1167.
630 F.3d 563 (2010)
David BLOCKOWICZ, Mary Blockowicz, and Lisa Blockowicz, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Joseph David WILLIAMS and Michelle Ramey, Defendants, and Ed Magedson and Xcentric Ventures, LLC, Third Party Respondents-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Decided December 27, 2010.
Maria Crimi Speth (argued), Attorney, Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., Phoenix, AZ, for Third Party Respondents-Appellees.
Before CUDAHY, FLAUM, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.
FLAUM, Circuit Judge.
David, Mary, and Lisa Blockowicz received an injunction ordering Joseph David Williams and Michelle Ramey to remove defamatory comments they posted about the Blockowiczs on www. ripoffreport.com ("ROR"), among other websites. Williams and Ramey never responded to the injunction, prompting the Blockowiczs to contact the websites on which the statements were posted to secure compliance with the injunction. Every website complied, except for ROR. The Blockowiczs asked the district court that issued the injunction to enforce it against Xcentric Ventures, LLC, ("Xcentric") the host of ROR, and Ed Magedson, the website's manager, pursuant to Rule 65(d)(2)(C). The district court declined, and the Blockowiczs appeal the district court's decision. They argue that Xcentric and Magedson fit within Rule 65(d)(2)(C), and thus should be bound by the injunction, because they had "actual notice" of the injunction, and they were "in active concert or participation" with the defendants in violating the injunction by failing to remove the defamatory statements. We affirm: Xcentric and Magedson were not "in active concert or participation" with the defendants pursuant to Rule 65(d)(2)(C).
The Blockowiczs filed a civil suit against Williams and Ramey ("the defendants") on
ROR is a website on which users post comments about bad business practices. It is operated by Xcentric and managed by Magedson. In order to post on ROR, users must enter into a contractual relationship with Xcentric by signing Xcentric's Terms of Service. The Terms of Service have a number of relevant provisions. First, they prohibit users from posting defamatory information:
Next, the Terms of Service state that users "will defend, indemnify, and hold harmless Xcentric ... for any losses, costs, liabilities and expenses (including reasonable attorneys' fees) relating to or arising out of your use of ROR, including, but not limited to, any breach by you of the terms of this Agreement."
Third, they state: "By posting information on ROR, you understand and agree that the material will not be removed even at your request. You shall remain solely responsible for the content of your postings on ROR."
Fourth, the Terms of Service provide that when users post information on ROR, they "automatically grant ... to Xcentric an irrevocable, perpetual, fully-paid, worldwide exclusive license to use, copy, perform, display and distribute such information and content...."
ROR also provides information to parties considering suing the website:
The Blockowiczs eventually filed a "Motion for Third Party Enforcement of Injunction," asking the district court to compel Xcentric to remove the defamatory postings by enforcing the injunction against Xcentric and Magedson pursuant
A. Personal Jurisdiction Defense Is Waived
Xcentric and Magedson argue that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. But even when a valid personal jurisdiction defense exists, the defense is waived if the objecting party fails to timely raise it, FED.R.CIV.P. 12(h)(1); Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
In its initial response to the Blockowiczs' motion to enforce the injunction against Xcentric and Magedson, Xcentric wrote that it "contests that the [district court] has personal jurisdiction over it and does not waive any arguments it has pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2)." Even if this footnote adequately raised their defense, Xcentric and Magedson waived it by participating in the district court proceedings, which included both briefing and oral arguments addressing the merits of the Blockowiczs' claim. See Meyer, 10 F.3d at 1296-97 ("The defendants did raise the defense in their answer, and therefore the waiver provided for by Rule 12(h) did not occur. However, the privileged defenses referred to in Rule 12(h)(1) may be waived by formal submission in a cause, or by submission through conduct." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); ECHO, Inc. v. Whitson Co., Inc.,
B. Xcentric and Magedson Are Not Bound By The Injunction Pursuant To Rule 65(d)
As a preliminary issue, we note that the Blockowiczs' motion asked the district court to enforce the injunction against third parties Xcentric and Magedson. At the core of their case below and on appeal, the Blockowiczs argue that Xcentric and Magedson assisted the defendants in violating the injunction. Accordingly, we view this case as one for contempt, the usual context for enforcing injunctions against third parties who assist enjoined parties in violating an injunction. See Regal Knitwear Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
We review a district court's adjudication of civil contempt for abuse of discretion. Badger Meter, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp.,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2) provides that an injunction binds "the following who receive actual notice of it by personal service or otherwise: (A) the parties; (B) the parties' officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (C) other persons who are in active concert or participation with anyone described in Rule 65(d)(2)(A) or (B)." "The purpose of the rule is to ensure `that defendants may not nullify a decree by carrying out prohibited acts through aiders and abettors, although they were not parties to the original proceeding.'" U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.2d at 332 (quoting Regal Knitwear Co., 324 U.S. at 14, 65 S.Ct. 478). Consistent with this purpose, we have explained that a person is in "active concert or participation" with an enjoined party, and thus bound by the injunction, if "he aids or abets an enjoined party in violating [the] injunction," or if he is in privity with an enjoined party. Nat'l Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of the U.S. of Am. Under the Hereditary Guardianship, Inc. v. Nat'l Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of the U.S. of Am., Inc.,
Xcentric concedes that it received actual notice of the injunction. Further, in seeking to enforce the injunction pursuant to Rule 65(d)(2)(C), the Blockowiczs argue solely that Xcentric and Magedson aided and abetted the defendants; they do not assert a privity-related argument. Thus, the only issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in concluding that third parties Xcentric and Magedson did not aid or abet the defendants in violating the injunction, and thus that Xcentric and Magedson are not bound by the injunction pursuant to Rule 65(d)(2)(C).
The Blockowiczs argue that Xcentric's contract with the defendants, the Terms of Service, amounts to an act that aids and abets the defendants' publication of the comments at issue. The fact that the contract was signed before the injunction was
The Blockowiczs' arguments are unavailing. Actions that aid and abet in violating the injunction must occur after the injunction is imposed for the purposes of Rule 65(d)(2)(C), and certainly after the wrongdoing that led to the injunction occurred. This requirement is apparent from Rule 65(d)(2)'s text, which requires that nonparties have "actual notice" of the injunction. A non-party who engages in conduct before an injunction is imposed cannot have "actual notice" of the injunction at the time of their relevant conduct. Not to mention, permitting Xcentric's and Magedson's pre-injunction conduct to bind them to the injunction would be inconsistent with the purpose of Rule 65(d)(2)(C), which is to prevent defendants from rendering injunctions void by carrying out prohibited acts through third parties who were not parties to the original proceeding. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.2d at 332. The defendants agreed to the Terms of Service before the injunction was imposed and before they even posted the statements at issue. The Blockowiczs' attempt to rely on the Terms of Service is unavailing.
Further, the Blockowiczs presented no evidence that Xcentric or Magedson took any action to aid or abet the defendants in violating the injunction after it was issued, either by enforcing the Terms of Service or in any other way. The district court explained that the Blockowiczs failed to present any evidence that either Xcentric or Magedson had any contact with the defendants after the injunction was issued, or that they worked in concert with the defendants to violate the injunction. To the contrary, the record indicates that Xcentric and Magedson have simply done nothing relevant to this dispute since the defendants agreed to the Terms of Service, which occurred before the injunction was issued. Further, the fact that Xcentric is technologically capable of removing the postings does not render its failure to do so aiding and abetting. Xcentric's and Magedson's mere inactivity is simply inadequate to render them aiders and abettors in violating the injunction. See FED. R.CIV.P. 65(d)(2); Regal Knitwear Co., 324 U.S. at 13, 65 S.Ct. 478 ("The courts ... may not grant ... an injunction so broad as to make punishable the conduct of persons who act independently and whose rights have not been adjudged according to law."); E.A. Renfroe & Co., Inc. v. Moran, 338 Fed.Appx. 836, 840 (11th Cir. 2009) ("The law is clear that a court may not enforce an injunction against a nonparty `who act[s] independently' of the enjoined party." (quoting Regal Knitwear Co., 324 U.S. at 13, 65 S.Ct. 478)); Microsystems Software, Inc. v. Scandinavia Online AB,
The Blockowiczs' argument that the Terms of Service are illusory because Xcentric has refused to remove the defendants' defamatory statements is similarly unavailing. The Terms of Service allow Xcentric to recover from users for any loss related to their use of ROR, including any breach of the Terms of Service. Xcentric very well may sue users if and when the
The Blockowiczs also argue that Xcentric and Magedson are aiding and abetting the defendants by selectively enforcing provisions in the Terms of Service: They are enforcing the provision stating that ROR will not take down a posting, but not the provision that prohibits posting defamatory content. As explained above, however, Xcentric's and Magedson's failure to take down the statements does not indicate that they have taken any action since the injunction was issued. In other words, Xcentric's and Magedson's failure to respond to the injunction does not demonstrate that they enforced any provision of their Terms of Service. The record indicates nothing more than that Xcentric and Magedson have ignored the injunction.
Finally, the Blockowiczs argue that this case is analogous Reliance Insurance Company v. Mast Construction Company,
But Reliance and similar cases are distinct from this case. In those cases, the bank's act of transferring funds occurs after the injunction is imposed, unlike here, where Xcentric's only act, entering into a contract with the defendants, occurred long before the injunction was issued. Since the injunction was issued, Xcentric has simply done nothing, and it has certainly not actively assisted the defendants in violating the injunction.
Lastly, the Blockowiczs assert that even if Xcentric did not aid and abet the defendants under Rule 65(d)(2)(C), the district court should have invoked its inherent authority to bind Xcentric and Magedson to the injunction, or otherwise secure the removal of the defendants' statements from ROR. See G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corp.,
With sympathy for the Blockowiczs, we conclude that Rule 65(d)(2)(C) is not the appropriate mechanism for achieving the removal of the defendants' posts. Xcentric and Magedson have simply failed to act in any way relevant to this dispute since agreeing to the Terms of Service with the defendants, which they did before the injunction was issued and before the statements at issue were even posted. Rule
C. Illinois' Statute Of Limitations For Defamation Claims Poses No Bar
Both on appeal and before the district court, the parties dispute whether Illinois' statute of limitations precludes the Blockowiczs from pursuing their defamation claims. But the statute of limitations defense belongs to the defendants, who have never asserted it and who are not parties to this appeal. See FED.R.CIV.P. 8(c)(1) ("In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense...." (emphasis added)). As a general principle, affirmative defenses, like claims, are personal. A person can no more assert someone else's affirmative defense than he can someone else's cause of action. Although there are exceptions to this general principle— subrogation, for example—Xcentric and Magedson cite no authority indicating that any exception applies under the circumstances of this case, and we find none. Xcentric and Magedson cannot assert the defendants' statute of limitations defense.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.
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