ROGERS, C. J.
This case raises the question of whether a party's actions during the pendency of her appeal have resulted in that appeal becoming moot. The plaintiff, Ruth Gladstein, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's dismissal of her action due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction; Gladstein v. Goldfield, 163 Conn.App. 579, 587, 137 A.3d 60 (2016); which followed the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's motion to substitute the trustee of her bankruptcy estate as the correct party plaintiff. The plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly refused to consider her claim that the trial court had applied an improper standard when denying her motion to substitute, concluding instead that she had induced the error of which she complained. Because the bankruptcy trustee, at the plaintiff's behest, has abandoned the underlying action and the plaintiff no longer is seeking to substitute the trustee as party plaintiff, we conclude that our resolution of this claim would afford the plaintiff no practical relief. Accordingly, we dismiss the plaintiff's appeal as moot.
The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to the appeal.
In her 2008 bankruptcy court filings, the plaintiff did not disclose her interest in her mother's trust or her potential legal claims against the defendants. Pursuant to federal bankruptcy law, the plaintiff was required to do so. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a) (1) (debtor must disclose "all legal or equitable interests . . . in property as of the commencement of the case"); 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a) (7) (duty to disclose is continuous so as to include any interest acquired after commencement of case). Moreover, her claims against the defendants were part of the bankruptcy estate and belonged to the bankruptcy trustee and not to her individually.
In response, the plaintiff conceded that she lacked standing and filed a motion to substitute the bankruptcy trustee as the proper plaintiff pursuant to General Statutes § 52-109,
While the plaintiff's appeal to the Appellate Court remained pending, she requested that the bankruptcy trustee abandon the underlying cause of action. On August 7, 2014, the bankruptcy court granted the trustee's motion to abandon the action, nunc pro tunc. As a result of this ruling, the plaintiff's claims against the defendants now belong to her, alone, to pursue.
In her initial brief to the Appellate Court, filed thereafter, the plaintiff contended that the August 7, 2014 order of the bankruptcy court merited a reversal of the trial court's October 30, 2013 judgment dismissing her action to allow further proceedings to be prosecuted in her own name. The defendants moved to strike the plaintiff's brief, arguing that it relied on material outside of the trial court record and pertaining to events that postdated the judgment. After the Appellate Court granted the defendants' motion to strike, the plaintiff filed a substitute brief in which she argued instead that the trial court had applied an improper standard in deciding her motion to substitute.
On March 8, 2016, the Appellate Court decided the plaintiff's appeal. As previously indicated, that court declined to review the plaintiff's claim on its merits, reasoning instead that the plaintiff had induced the action of the trial court that she was challenging on appeal and, therefore, had waived the right to review. Gladstein v. Goldfield, supra, 163 Conn.App. 585-86.
In her briefs to this court and at oral argument, the plaintiff alluded to the posttrial proceedings in the bankruptcy court and indicated that, in the event she prevailed and the case were remanded to the trial court, she intended to move that her motion to substitute be declared moot. Following oral argument, this court, sua sponte, ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the following issue: "`Is this appeal moot, in light of the representation of plaintiff's counsel that the plaintiff no longer is seeking the substitution of the bankruptcy trustee as party plaintiff?'" The plaintiff, in her supplemental brief, contends that the appeal is not moot because a live controversy continues between the parties in regard to her claims of the defendants' wrongdoing in connection with her mother's trust, and this court can provide practical relief in the manner of an unrestricted remand. The defendants, for their part, do not challenge this contention. We disagree with the parties and conclude that this appeal is moot.
Mootness presents a legal question and implicates this court's subject matter jurisdiction, a threshold matter to resolve. Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 323 Conn. 668, 677, 150 A.3d 666 (2016). This court has a duty to dismiss cases over which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, which cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties. Bender v. Bender, 292 Conn. 696, 704 n.5, 975 A.2d 636 (2009); see also Lyon v. Jones, 291 Conn. 384, 392, 968 A.2d 416 (2009) (appropriate to consider mootness even when not raised by parties). We may address a mootness issue if there is either evidence in the record suggesting mootness or an acknowledgment in a party's brief, or at oral argument, as to the existence of facts supporting mootness. Private Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Torres, 278 Conn. 291, 299, 898 A.2d 768 (2006); Phaneuf v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 166 Conn. 449, 451, 352 A.2d 291 (1974).
"A claim of mootness implicates the well established rule that [a]n actual controversy must exist not only at the time [an] appeal is taken, but also throughout the pendency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Ragaglia, 261 Conn. 219, 225, 802 A.2d 778 (2002). "[T]he requirement of an actual controversy . . . is premised upon the notion that courts are called upon to determine existing controversies, and thus may not be used as a vehicle to obtain advisory judicial opinions on points of law." State v. McElveen, 261 Conn. 198, 204-205, 802 A.2d 74 (2002). "[I]t is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Burton, 282 Conn. 1, 14, 917 A.2d 966 (2007). In short, "where the question presented is purely academic, we must refuse to entertain the appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The only questions presented by this appeal are whether the Appellate Court improperly declined to consider the merits of the plaintiff's claim that the trial court had utilized the wrong standard in deciding her motion to substitute and, if so, whether the trial court in fact did use an improper standard. If we were to decide both of these questions in the plaintiff's favor, the proper remedy would be to remand the case for a new hearing on the plaintiff's motion to substitute, utilizing the proper standard.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.