Nos. D054803, D056061

BRIARWOOD CAPITAL, LLC, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LENNAR HOMES OF CALIFORNIA, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division One.
Filed December 1, 2010.



Plaintiff and appellant Briarwood Capital, LLC (Briarwood) appeals from a judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants and respondents Lennar Homes of California, Inc., Lennar Corporation, Quadrant San Diego, LLC and Rancho Santa Fe Lakes Partners, LLC (collectively Lennar) and postjudgment orders awarding Lennar over $300,000 in costs as the prevailing party in the action. Briarwood had sued Lennar for imposition of a constructive trust or damages as a result of an alleged breach of an oral agreement between Briarwood and Lennar to acquire and develop property in Rancho Santa Fe. Following the deposition of Briarwood's principal Nicolas Marsch, Lennar successfully moved for judgment on the pleadings on grounds Marsch's deposition testimony conclusively negated an essential element of each of Briarwood's four causes of action.

On appeal, Briarwood contends the trial court erred by granting judgment on the pleadings in part based on excerpts of Marsch's deposition testimony, which it maintains were subject to interpretation and thus not the proper subject of judicial notice. It further contends other properly judicially noticeable evidence demonstrates the existence of the parties' oral agreement. Briarwood contends the court compounded its errors by applying incorrect legal standards, ignoring certain extrinsic evidence while considering other such evidence, and denying Briarwood leave to amend its complaint. In a separate appeal, Briarwood challenges the costs award in Lennar's favor on grounds it must fall with reversal of the judgment.

We agree the court erred by taking judicial notice of the truth of Marsch's deposition testimony and resolving the factual question of the existence of an oral joint venture or development agreement between Briarwood and Lennar. Because Lennar concedes Briarwood's complaint otherwise states causes of action, we reverse the judgment and the postjudgment costs orders.


We take the background facts from Briarwood's complaint. Briarwood is a company primarily engaged in the business of real estate development, including master-planned communities. In 1997, HCC Investors, LLC (HCC) was formed for the purpose of holding title to and developing real property in Rancho Santa Fe that eventually became a master-planned development known as "The Bridges." Briarwood, through its assignor and predecessor-in-interest Marsch, and Lennar, through wholly owned alter ego subsidiaries and other affiliates, jointly developed The Bridges, which ultimately enjoyed tremendous market success. The HCC limited liability company agreement (HCC agreement) contained a provision by which Marsch and Lennar agreed that "any real estate purchase . . . development, management, . . . sale or resale opportunity adjacent, or related to the Project shall be considered a Company opportunity, and neither Marsch or Lennar [sic] shall pursue such opportunity without first presenting it to the Company." The provision further states: "This is not meant to preclude (i) separate home building activities in the Project undertaken by Marsch or Lennar on the Property or adjacent property or (ii) either party engaging in non-Project related real estate acquisition and development alone or with others in the Rancho Santa Fe area."

At some point before 1998, Briarwood and Marsch began to actively pursue the acquisition of over 540 acres of property in Rancho Santa Fe known as the McCrink Ranch to develop into another high-end, master-planned residential community. Marsh met repeatedly with members of the McCrink family and other consultants for this purpose. In or about 1998, Briarwood advised certain Lennar executives of the McCrink Ranch opportunity and invited Lennar to join it in its pursuit. Lennar agreed to pursue the McCrink Ranch development opportunity jointly with Briarwood in order to create another community similar to The Bridges. Briarwood and Lennar confirmed the agreement by representing to the McCrink family in a joint communication that they intended to "closely align" the McCrink Ranch with The Bridges, including by presenting McCrink Ranch homes at their current sales facilities at The Bridges. Later, because Lennar did not want a particular HCC member to own any interest, Briarwood and Lennar agreed that the McCrink Ranch opportunity would be pursued jointly but through a vehicle other than HCC.

By 2005, the McCrink family had succeeded in obtaining virtually all of the key governmental entitlements necessary to develop a master-planned community. In December 2005, Lennar's regional vice president sent Marsch an email stating: "Nick, you have been great to deal with on this transaction and I have appreciated every amount of support you have provided Lennar. I do want to resolve the transactional side of our deal quickly, so that I can set it as a precedent of the Lennar deal with an equity partner. . . . I need you to tell me what your compensation expectations are on McCrink. . . . Please provide it to me by tomorrow at noon if at all possible. That way I can make the most of my sit down with Emil[e Haddad] and Jeff tomorrow. . . . I too look forward to completing this agreement and focusing on the successful development of McCrink."

However, in the months leading up to February 2006, Lennar manipulated the negotiations with the McCrink family so that the legal right to acquire the McCrink Ranch property was documented in the name of a Lennar affiliate; secretly negotiated with another person to enter into agreement to acquire the McCrink Ranch property via an entity that excluded Briarwood; formed Rancho Santa Fe Lakes Partners, LLC for the express purpose of acquiring McCrink Ranch; joined with Quadrant San Diego Partners, LLC to squeeze out Briarwood and usurp the McCrink Ranch property; and misled Briarwood about its intent to exclude it from the McCrink Ranch opportunity. Rather than construct the style of home exhibited in The Bridges, Lennar intended to build lower-priced, lower-quality houses and wholesale large portions of the McCrink Ranch property to merchant builders.

In November 2006, Briarwood sued Lennar for declaratory relief (first and second causes of action), breach of fiduciary duty/imposition of a constructive trust (third cause of action) and breach of contract (fourth cause of action). In its first cause of action, it sought a judicial determination of the alter ego status of Lennar Homes of California, Inc. and Lennar Corporation. In the second cause of action, it sought a judicial declaration that those defendants, along with Quadrant San Diego, LLC and Rancho Santa Fe Lakes Partners, LLC, held the McCrink Ranch property as constructive trustees for Briarwood's benefit. In its third cause of action, Briarwood alleged in part that by their actions, words and conduct, Briarwood, Lennar Corporation and Lennar Homes of California, Inc. entered into a joint venture or partnership to acquire the McCrink Ranch property and jointly pursue the development of the McCrink Ranch master-planned community. In the fourth cause of action, it alleged Lennar Homes of California, Inc. and Lennar Corporation breached their contractual duties to Briarwood.

The parties engaged in discovery and the matter proceeded to trial, which was eventually set for October 16, 2008. In responses to requests for admission, Briarwood admitted it did not have a formal written agreement to jointly pursue the McCrink Ranch development opportunity, but that Marsch and Jonathan Jaffe, Lennar's then chief operating officer, expressly agreed to jointly pursue the opportunity, an agreement that was assertedly evidenced by writings and emails between the parties. Briarwood admitted that Lennar's fiduciary duty to Briarwood with regard to the McCrink Ranch real estate development "derive[d] from their agreement to jointly pursue that valuable opportunity, not from the language of the HCC operating agreement."

On October 8, 2008, Marsch underwent his deposition as Briarwood's person most knowledgeable relating to the agreement between Briarwood and Lennar to jointly acquire and develop the McCrink Ranch. Marsch was asked about and described his discussions in 2004 and 2005 with representatives of the McCrink family, project manager Tom Harbrecht, and others concerning the project, and proposals made on HCC letterhead to the McCrink family in January 2005 for the property's possible acquisition. He testified that while the McCrink family was considering those HCC proposals, another developer, Davidson Homes (Davidson), who had seen their proposals, approached the family asking for an exclusive right to negotiate and offered to "sweeten every term." Marsch, who believed there was little risk of Davidson taking the deal, suggested to Harbrecht an arrangement to give Davidson some rights so that HCC would acquire the land, create the community and finish some sites, then sell them on some basis to Davidson. Marsch testified that he and Harbrecht discussed the approach, by which HCC would enter into an agreement with the McCrinks and then enter into a parallel and negotiated agreement with Davidson.

Lennar's counsel then asked about HCC's involvement:

"[Defense counsel:] . . . [D]id you specifically discuss that it would be — that HCC would be a central figure in this transaction when you were talking to Mr. Harbrecht about including Mr. Davidson in some kind of overall deal? "[Marsch:] I think the term we were using was Lennar and Marsch as opposed to HCC, because in January some issues were raised with regard to the use of HCC that weren't as yet resolved." "[Defense counsel:] And you understood that because of issues such as the interest of LNR1 in HCC, that HCC could not and would not be the actual acquisition and ownership vehicle, correct? "[Marsch:] Not exactly. I understood that it was preferable for Lennar to substitute a similar but not the same entity. "[Defense counsel:] And they told you that in a meeting with Jon Jaffe and Emile Haddad, correct? "[Marsch:] That's correct. "[Defense counsel:] And, in fact, they told you that before the offers were made by HCC to the McCrinks in January 2005, correct? "[Marsch:] That's right."

In response to further questioning, Marsch testified that when starting discussions with Harbrecht, he and Harbrecht had discussed the fact that Marsch was "part of the deal." Counsel asked whether Marsch told Harbrecht that he, Marsch, would be a partner in the acquiring entity:

"[Marsch:] I don't recall a discussion along those lines, in other words, sort of what I would call the placeholder discussion. [¶] But as far as both me and Jon Jaffe telling him that HCC, the owner of The Bridges, was the — at least the participants or the entity, depending how it came out, was proposing to buy the McCrink Ranch and develop it, but the answer is absolutely." [¶] . . . [¶] "[Defense counsel:] . . . Now I'm asking you that when you talked to Mr. Harbrecht and used words like `we' or `Lennar and Marsch' or `Lennar and me' or any combination of those kinds of expression, did you describe to Mr. Harbrecht that you would be an equity owner in any resulting venture or transaction? "[Marsch:] I don't remember a specific discussion like that because it would have been unnecessary. [¶] . . . [¶] "[Defense counsel:] [¶] . . . [¶] Did you have conversations with him in which you told Mr. Harbrecht that in any structure, any venture, any deal that might materialize, I have a 50-percent interest? Did you tell him that? "[Marsch:] I don't recall any such discussion. "[Defense counsel:] Okay. Did you tell him that you had any specific percentage ownership interest? "[Marsch:] I don't recall any such discussion. "[Defense counsel:] Did you tell him that you had a partnership with Lennar? "[Marsch:] Of course. "[Defense counsel:] You told that to Mr. Harbrecht? "[Marsch:] Let me back up. You used the term `partnership,' but I mean technically it's an LLC, which is not a partnership. "[Defense counsel:] Okay. Well, you're talking about the LLC to which you just said of course, you meant HCC, right? "[Marsch:] Yes. "[Defense counsel:] Okay. When I asked you the question, I meant did you — independent of and other than HCC, did you tell Mr. Harbrecht that you had entered into a partnership with Lennar regarding acquisition of McCrink? "[Marsch:] No. "[Defense counsel:] Did you tell him that you had entered into a joint venture regarding acquisition of McCrink? . . . "[Marsch:] Do you mean other than HCC? "[Defense counsel:] Other than HCC. "[Marsch:] No. "[Defense counsel:] Why not? "[Marsch:] We hadn't — we already had HCC. HCC was, at minimum, a placeholder and maybe it might have ended up being the acquirer. "[Defense counsel:] Did you enter into a partnership or joint venture with Lennar separate from HCC? "[Marsch:] When? "[Defense counsel:] Any time. "[Marsch:] Well, we have one called Lennar Bridges, which is a different LLC. "[Defense counsel:] Other than HCC and other than Lennar Bridges, both of which deal with what is generically known as The Bridges development, correct? "[Marsch:] That's right. "[Defense counsel:] Okay. Not referring to that. Did you enter into, at any point in time, a partnership or joint venture with Lennar with respect to McCrink? "[Marsch:] Not separate from HCC. "[Defense counsel:] Okay. Did you enter into any contract or agreement with Lennar with respect to McCrink? "[Marsch:] Again, we're nuancing here, but we had HCC, HCC was the placeholder so I did enter into that, but all the way back in 1997. "[Defense counsel:] 1997. Okay. And we do want to finish the deposition, okay, so don't take me back to 1997. [¶] Okay. Stay with me. Other than the — your HCC agreement and your Lennar Bridges agreement, which had to do with Bridges — put that aside, okay — did you enter into any type of contract with Lennar with respect to McCrink? "[Marsch:] If you've excluded the other two, then the answer is no. "[Defense counsel:] Okay. So with respect to McCrink, the only agreement that you entered into is HCC, correct? "[Marsch:] Historically. "[Defense counsel:] I don't know what you mean by `historically.' "[Marsch:] I meant — actually should have said at any point in time. "[Defense counsel:] Okay. So let me reput the question, then, to you. [¶] At any point in time the only agreement that you have entered into with Lennar regarding McCrink is the HCC agreement, correct? "[Marsch:] Correct. "[Defense counsel:] Now, when you referred to the HCC agreement in answering my last question, did you mean an agreement that is in writing? "[Marsch:] Yes. "[Defense counsel:] Okay. And that's the 1997 formation agreement with its associated operating agreement, correct? "[Marsch:] Yes."2 (Italics added.)

The day after Marsch's deposition concluded, Lennar moved for judgment on the pleadings on grounds elements of each of Briarwood's causes of action were conclusively negated by Marsch's deposition statement that "the only agreement that [Briarwood] entered into with Lennar regarding McCrink is the HCC Agreement." It argued, "Because there is no independent partnership agreement, there can be no breach of that agreement; nor can there be a breach of fiduciary duty arising from the agreement." Lennar characterized Marsch's deposition testimony as conceding that Briarwood never entered into a separate partnership agreement with Lennar concerning the McCrink Ranch, and that the only rights and obligations of the parties stemmed from the 1997 HCC agreement. It asserted that as a result, Briarwood lacked standing to bring the claims in its complaint because the testimony revealed the acquisition of McCrink Ranch was a corporate opportunity of HCC.

In opposition, Briarwood argued Lennar took Marsch's testimony out of context; that in it, Marsch only established that the HCC agreement was the only written partnership agreement between the parties and thus the testimony did not contradict Briarwood's allegations of an oral agreement. It argued the deposition was extrinsic matter that was not properly considered on Lennar's motion and further, the matters at issue in Marsch's deposition transcript were reasonably disputable and in fact disputed as evidenced by other portions of Marsch's deposition — preventing the court from converting Lennar's motion into an evidentiary hearing as to the testimony's meaning. Briarwood also argued the testimony gave rise to a dispute as to whether the opportunity to acquire and develop McCrink Ranch was a corporate opportunity of HCC. Briarwood sought leave to amend its original complaint in the event the court granted Lennar's motion.

The court granted judgment on the pleadings. It ruled the complaint's allegations as to an oral agreement pertaining to McCrink were contradicted by Marsch's deposition statement that "`the only agreement that [plaintiff] ha[s] entered into with Lennar regarding McCrink is the HCC agreement.'" The court observed Briarwood "disputes this judicially noticed `fact' by contending that Mr. Marsch was actually testifying that the HCC agreement was the only written agreement" but it ruled, "Unlike the `dispute' raised in Joslin [v. H.A.S. Insurance Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369 (Joslin)], this explanation by plaintiff is `inherently incredible' and is `necessarily inconsistent with the deposition testimony.'"

Briarwood moved for reconsideration and a new trial. In support of the request for reconsideration, Marsch explained in an accompanying declaration that when he heard and answered counsel's question about the only agreement with Lennar regarding McCrink Ranch being the HCC agreement, he understood "[he] was only being questioned about the HCC operating and formation agreements." He averred: "I did not mean by my responses to the above-referenced questions that there were no oral agreements created between Lennar and Briarwood as it related to McCrink." He stated his response stemmed from the earlier question as to whether he had ever entered into a partnership or joint venture with Lennar regarding McCrink Ranch, and further explained: "[B]ut for the fact that I had entered into the HCC agreement with Lennar [which contemplated acquisition of additional adjacent or related properties], I would not have brought this deal to Lennar in the first place. Thus, in response to the questions put to me at the Briarwood [person most knowledgeable] deposition, I was only referring to written, not oral, agreements."

The court denied both motions. It entered judgment in Lennar's favor, and Briarwood appealed from that judgment. Thereafter, following a contested hearing on the matter, the court awarded Lennar $301,152.50 in costs. Briarwood then appealed from the postjudgment orders (1) granting in part and denying in part Briarwood's motion to tax and awarding those costs and (2) correcting a mathematical error in the court's prior costs order. We consolidated the appeals on our own motion.


I. Standard of Review/Principles of Judicial Notice

We apply the same rules governing review of an order sustaining a general demurrer. (Smiley v. Citibank (1995) 11 Cal.4th 138, 146.) A judgment on the pleadings should be granted only where, under the facts alleged or properly subject to judicial notice, the plaintiff's complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Saltarelli & Steponovich v. Douglas (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1, 5; Wedemeyer v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1302.) On appeal, we accept as true the complaint's properly pleaded factual allegations, however improbable they may be, and give them a liberal construction. (Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160, 166 (Angelucci); Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515-516, held to be dicta on other grounds in Golden Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Assn. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1013, 1028-1029; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 605.)

In addition to the complaint's allegations and exhibits, we consider matters that must or may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Angelucci, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 166; Hoffman v. Smithwoods RV Park, LLC (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 390, 400.) If such judicially noticeable facts render an otherwise facially valid complaint defective, judgment on the pleadings is proper. (See Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.) This rule discourages plaintiffs from filing sham pleadings: "Under the doctrine of truthful pleading, the courts `will not close their eyes to situations where a complaint contains allegations of fact inconsistent with attached documents, or allegations contrary to facts that are judicially noticed.' [Citation.] `False allegations of fact, inconsistent with annexed documentary exhibits [citation] or contrary to facts judicially noticed [citation], may be disregarded. . . .'" (Hoffman, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 400; accord, C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1102 [allegations contrary to the law or to a fact of which judicial notice may be taken will be treated as a nullity].)

Notwithstanding these rules, on appeal of a judgment on the pleadings, the plaintiff's ability to prove the allegations or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court. (Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 490, 496; Williams v. Southern California Gas Co. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 591, 600 ["We are unaware . . . of any authority that would permit a trial court to decide on a general demurrer that a complaint is false in whole or in part . . . . [A] court ruling on a general demurrer is not empowered to `ascertain whether the facts stated [in the complaint] are true or untrue'"]; see Silguero v. Creteguard, Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 60, 64.) Indeed, "`[t]he hearing on the [motion for judgment on the pleadings] may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing through the guise of having the court take judicial notice of documents whose truthfulness or proper interpretation are disputable.'" (Silguero, at p. 64, quoting Joslin, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 374 and citing generally Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1568-1570; accord, Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113; Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216 [judgment on the pleadings does not depend upon questions of witness credibility or evidentiary conflicts, but must be denied where there are material factual issues that require evidentiary resolution]; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co., supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 605;3 Ramsden v. Western Union (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 873, 879 ["A demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts"].) Rather, "`judicial notice of matters upon demurrer will be dispositive only in those instances where there is not or cannot be a factual dispute concerning that which is sought to be judicially noticed.'" (Joslin, at p. 375, quoting Cruz v. County of Los Angeles (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1131, 1134; accord, Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of University of California (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 364-365; Fremont Indemnity Co., at p. 113; Sosinsky, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1569, n. 9.) Stated another way, "in order for judicial notice to support a motion for judgment on the pleadings by negating an express allegation of the pleading, the notice must be of something that cannot reasonably be controverted." (Columbia Casualty Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 457, 468 (Columbia Casualty).)

A court granting judgment on the pleadings resolves a "mixed question of law and fact that is predominantly one of law" and its order is therefore subject to de novo review. (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 515; see Angelucci, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 166.) Accordingly, "`we are not bound by the determination of the trial court, but are required to render our independent judgment on whether a cause of action has been stated.'" (Mendoza v. Rast Produce Co., Inc. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1401; see Smiley v. Citibank, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 146.)

II. Judicial Notice of Deposition Statements

We turn our analysis to the propriety of taking judicial notice of deposition testimony in connection with a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Judicial notice is a substitute for formal proof. (Sosinsky v. Grant, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1564.) Its consequence is to establish a fact as indisputably true, eliminating the need for further proof. (Ibid; see Post v. Prati (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 626, 633; Mozzetti v. City of Brisbane (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 565, 578 [purpose of judicial notice is to expedite production and introduction of otherwise admissible evidence].) Hence, as we have summarized above, the general rule dictates that a matter is subject to judicial notice only if it is reasonably beyond dispute. (Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont General Corp., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 113; Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882 (Lockley) [matter being judicially noticed must "not [be] reasonably subject to dispute"]; Post v. Prati, at p. 633 ["`The fundamental theory of judicial notice is that the matter that is judicially noticed is one of law or fact that cannot reasonably be disputed'"]; see Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (4th ed. 2009) Judicial Notice, § 49.5, p. 1145.) Only these kinds of incontrovertible matters may render a complaint's allegations defective on the theory that the pleader should not be allowed to bypass a demurrer by suppressing such matters that are inconsistent with factual allegations contained in a complaint. (See City of Chula Vista v. County of San Diego (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1713, 1719; Dwan v. Dixon (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 260, 265.)

"The appropriate setting for resolving facts reasonably subject to dispute is the adversary hearing. It is therefore improper for courts to take judicial notice of any facts that are not the product of an adversary hearing which involved the question of their existence or nonexistence." (Lockley, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 882.)

Application of these rules largely compels courts to decline judicial notice of a pleader's deposition statements to defeat material allegations of the complaint. (See Silguero v. Creteguard, Inc., supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 64 [court rejected request for judicial notice of plaintiff's deposition testimony for the first time on appeal, holding plaintiff's ability to prove the allegations or other possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court: "One of the dangers of winning on demurrer is that you are stuck, on appeal, with your opponent's version of the facts"]; Joslin, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 375-376; Cruz v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 173 Cal.App.3d at p. 1134 [declining to judicially notice deposition transcript of an employee concerning her practices of preparing and mailing a rejection notice on behalf of Los Angeles County].)

In Joslin, our colleagues in the Fourth District, Division Two squarely addressed whether a court may properly take judicial notice of a plaintiff's deposition testimony and rely on its truth in sustaining a demurrer. (Joslin, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 374.) There, the defendant insurer successfully demurred on statute of limitations grounds on the theory the plaintiff — who had alleged the insurer wrongfully refused her claim for repairs under a vehicle service contract — knew its identity when the original complaint was filed. (Id. at pp. 372-373.) It relied in part on portions of the plaintiff's deposition, in which she admitted contacting an employee of the defendant after her car broke down in an attempt to obtain payment. (Ibid.)

Addressing whether the trial court could properly judicially notice that testimony on demurrer, the appellate court rejected the notion — assertedly suggested in Garcia v. Sterling (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 174 — that a court can never accept the truth of statements in a deposition. (Joslin, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 375, fn. 1.) Instead, it applied an approach permitting the trial court to accept the truth of the facts within the plaintiff's deposition "only to the extent they were not or could not be disputed." (Id. at p. 375.) Doing so, it concluded the testimony was not properly subject to judicial notice. It reasoned that even though the plaintiff admitted having received a brochure identifying defendant when she purchased the car and also speaking with the defendant's employee on the phone, she disputed (in opposing points and authorities) her knowledge of the man's status as an employee: "After carefully examining the deposition testimony in question, we conclude that it does not undisputably establish plaintiff's knowledge, when the complaint was filed, of their having dealt with an employee of H.A.S. The explanation given by plaintiffs in their papers opposing the demurrer — in which they said they learned only at the deposition of the employment status of the `man in San Jose' — is not inherently incredible and is not necessarily inconsistent with the deposition testimony. Otherwise stated, if the version set forth in plaintiffs' opposition papers were presented by appropriate testimony and the deposition testimony were offered in impeachment, the question of when plaintiffs acquired the knowledge in question could not be determined as a matter of law. As the knowledge was not established beyond dispute by the deposition evidence, the court could not consider it established for purposes of ruling on the demurrer." (Id. at pp. 375-376, italics added.)

This court applied the same principle in Columbia Casualty, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d 457, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings based not on deposition testimony, but insurance policies incorporated by reference in the operative cross-complaint as well as a concession by the cross-complainant, Columbia, appearing in its opposing points and authorities concerning the existence of a hold-harmless agreement. (Columbia Casualty, at pp. 462, 466.) We observed that judicial notice or evidentiary admissions and concessions are treated differently in motions challenging the pleadings versus summary judgment, explaining that in the latter, an evidentiary admission or concession by a party can place the burden on that party to present facts in rebuttal, but "in order for judicial notice to support a motion for judgment on the pleadings by negating an express allegation of the pleading, the notice must be of something that cannot reasonably be controverted. [Citation.] The same is true of evidentiary admissions or concessions." (Id. at p. 468.) This contrasting treatment, we explained, was "rooted in the demand of due process that a party must be given `notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.'" (Ibid.) Thus, a notice of motion for judgment on the pleadings is "notice to be prepared to argue the legal sufficiency of allegations; it is not notice to come forward with factual support for what is alleged even if the motion is a `speaking' one." (Id. at p. 469.)5

Applying these principles, and noting there was no opportunity on judgment on the pleadings to present parol evidence on the apparent meaning of the policies, we held "a judgment on the pleadings granted in reliance on the terminology of an incorporated complex contract to negate an express allegation of its meaning is highly suspect" and such a motion could be granted "only if the instrument incorporated by reference conclusively negates the express allegation in the pleading . . . ." (Columbia Casualty, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 470.) We found that possibility unlikely "except in the extraordinary case" because of the "inevitable prospect that parol evidence may lead to an interpretation of the contract consistent with the pleading's express allegation." (Ibid.) We held the moving cross-defendant's showing was deficient for purposes of judgment on the pleadings: its construction of the agreement was not the only meaning to which the policy was susceptible, parol evidence was admissible to interpret it, and it had the burden to establish conclusively an interpretation of the policy that negated the construction expressly alleged in the second amended cross-complaint. (Id. at p. 471.)

We further held certain court files and Columbia's concession were not properly considered on the motion; the court files constituted both hearsay and contained content that was reasonably subject to dispute, and the concession with its related hold-harmless agreement were "evidentiary admissions, not judicial admissions in pleadings, and hence are not conclusive on Columbia." (Columbia Casualty, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 474.) The lack of conclusivity of the evidentiary admissions sufficed to defeat the motion. (Ibid.)

III. Marsch's Deposition Testimony is Not A Proper Subject of Judicial Notice

This case does not concern the propriety of judicial notice of a document6 or a concession in points and authorities like Columbia Casualty, but of statements contained within Marsch's deposition as in Joslin. Importantly, Marsch's deposition statements are not incontrovertible judicial admissions, but are instead evidentiary admissions that are not necessarily conclusive on Briarwood. Deposition answers "are simply evidence. . . . [to be] considered and weighed in conjunction with other evidence. They do not constitute incontrovertible judicial admissions as do, for example, concessions in a pleading [citations], or answers to requests for admissions, which are specially designed to pare down disputed issues in a lawsuit." (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1522; accord, Columbia Casualty, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 474.) Evidentiary concessions differ from concessions made in pleadings such as a complaint, which constitute judicial admissions. (See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1248-1249; Foxborough v. Van Atta (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 217, 222, fn. 3.)

However, under Joslin, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d 369, the truth of Marsch's deposition testimony can be the subject of judicial notice if the facts stated therein establish "beyond dispute" (id. at p. 376) that Briarwood and Lennar did not enter into any oral agreement concerning McCrink Ranch, i.e., that such facts were either not disputed by Marsch or cannot be disputed. (Id. at p. 375.) Briarwood contends the court erred by taking judicial notice of Marsch's deposition testimony because, considered in context with the colloquy leading up to the admission as well as Briarwood's discovery responses, it is subject to an interpretation that is consistent with the complaint's allegations (and discovery responses) that the parties orally agreed to jointly pursue the McCrink Ranch opportunity. Briarwood points out that by the time Marsch gave his testimony, he had already explained that he and Lennar had agreed to use HCC as a temporary "placeholder" to acquire McCrink Ranch until they could formalize their agreement for another entity to hold and develop the property. It maintains that in the entire context of the deposition, it was not inherently incredible for Marsch to later clarify that he understood the call of the questions to concern only written agreements. Briarwood argues based on Joslin the court should have allowed Lennar to use Marsch's testimony to impeach him at trial and permit it to make a credibility decision.

Lennar, on the other hand, characterizes Marsch's testimony as "disavowing" any claim by Briarwood based on an oral agreement and "repeatedly testif[ying] there was no oral McCrink agreement . . . ." It argues Marsch's testimony cannot be disputed, and it proceeds to analyze it line by line, stating Marsch's references to "any contract or agreement" or "any type of contract" must include all written or oral agreements. It claims Marsch's assertion that he believed he was being asked about written agreements is "impossible." 7

Our thorough review of Marsch's deposition compels us to agree with Briarwood. The issue Lennar asserts was negated by Marsch's deposition testimony is the existence of a joint agreement between Briarwood and Lennar to acquire and develop the McCrink Ranch. Ultimately, whether or not the parties had formed a binding agreement with regard to McCrink Ranch depends on mutual consent, which is a factual question where the evidence is conflicting or admits of more than one inference. (Fair v. Bakhtiari (2006) 40 Cal.4th 189, 202 ["`Where the existence of a contract is at issue and the evidence is conflicting or admits of more than one inference, it is for the trier of fact to determine whether the contract actually existed'"]; accord, Bustamante v. Intuit, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 199, 208.)

This matter presents a factual issue that cannot be resolved by motion for judgment on the pleadings even in view of Marsch's deposition statements. Marsch did not directly concede there was no oral agreement between him and Lennar principals pertaining to McCrink Ranch. His testimony does not "undisputably establish" (Joslin, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 375) that Briarwood and Lennar principals never entered into an oral understanding pertaining to their joint acquisition and development of McCrink Ranch. Rather, Marsch's testimony was that he and Lennar executives represented to McCrink's project manager that they were proposing to acquire and develop McCrink Ranch (Lennar and Marsch "would be [the] central figure[s]" in this [McCrink Ranch] transaction . . . .") and possibly would do so via their existing limited liability company. This testimony implies some sort of understanding between Lennar and Marsch. But Marsch's deposition answers were obviously guided and limited by the deposition examiner's questions, which only tangentially pertained to the communications or discussions between Marsch and Lennar leading up to the McCrink Ranch proposals, and the substance of those discussions. The deposition examiner was initially focused on Marsch's talks with McCrink's project manager Harbrecht and Harbrecht's understanding of the role HCC would be playing in the acquisition or purchase of McCrink Ranch. It is reasonable to conclude, in the context of the questioning, that Marsch had the general topic of written agreements in mind, and his answers can be reasonably interpreted as focusing on written agreements. Hence, Marsch testified there was never any partnership or joint venture "separate from HCC" and that when he was referring to the "only agreement that [he] had entered into with Lennar regarding McCrink" he meant "an agreement that is in writing." His post-deposition explanation, in our view, is neither inherently incredible nor necessarily inconsistent with his deposition testimony as we have recounted it above.

In short, Marsch's answers are not clear and unequivocal concessions or admissions that contradict Briarwood's pleading and claims of the existence of an oral agreement; indeed at no time did the deposition examiner specifically ask Marsch whether he and Lennar entered into an oral agreement. Because Marsch did in fact dispute the trial court's interpretation of his deposition answers, and the testimony is reasonably subject to dispute, it is not properly judicially noticed in this context. (Joslin, 184 Cal.App.3d at pp. 374-375.)

Lennar emphasizes that the trial court found no ambiguity in Marsch's testimony and that Marsch's later explanations were inconsistent with his deposition testimony. But as stated, on review of a judgment on the pleadings, we are not bound by the trial court's determinations. (Smiley v. Citibank, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 146; Mendoza v. Rast Produce Co., Inc., supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1401.) Lennar also advances an argument based on Joslin and Columbia Casualty in which it suggests Marsch "accepted he had made a concession" as the plaintiff did in Columbia Casualty. It argues that under those circumstances, Columbia Casualty holds judgment on the pleadings is proper without need to decide whether the conceded fact "cannot reasonably be controverted." But Marsch did not make a concession in points and authorities like the plaintiff in Columbia Casualty. Further, he never accepted that he made any such concession, and even if he had, as in Columbia Casualty, it would not bind him on judgment on the pleadings. (Columbia Casualty, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 474.) Under the circumstances, the court erred by granting judgment on the pleadings.

IV. Postjudgment Costs Orders

Reversal of the judgment compels reversal of the award of costs to Lennar based on the judgment, and thus moots Briarwood's appeal from the postjudgment costs orders awarding Lennar $301,152.50. (Allen v. Smith (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1284, disapproved on another ground by San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 315; accord, Gillian v. City of San Marino (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1053; see Muething v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 275, 286; Evans v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1378, 1388.)


The judgment and postjudgment orders are reversed. Briarwood shall recover its costs on appeal.


HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.



1. Comments by counsel at oral argument indicate that LNR was the HCC member that, according to Briarwood's allegations, Lennar did not want to own an interest in the McCrink Ranch deal.
2. The questioning continued with Marsch explaining the relationship between McCrink Ranch and the HCC operating and formation agreements: "[Marsch:] Well, in sequence, if one were to read the formation agreement, there's a concept embedded in that agreement with regards to the potential acquisition of adjacent or related properties. And that concept rolls forward into the operating agreement, as well, although I think both documents still remain operative. [¶] And then as we went forward in time from the signature of these agreements, in fact, there were three or four projects that were specifically discussed with Lennar — and, actually, by `Lennar,' I mean Jon Jaffe — and McCrink was certainly on that list, and there were others. [¶] And we, in fact, did acquire an additional project which eventually it was called Santa Fe Creek, but it was in — developed under the name Lennar Bridges for some reason. [¶] We looked at others. And then at some point in time I presented the McCrink Ranch as a distinct possibility for acquisition to [Jaffe] for our HCC operating company. And at that point he chose to go ahead and pursue it with me, and the rest is history." (Italics added.)
3. In Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co., supra, 123 Cal.App.3d 593, the court held that a plaintiff's affidavits, answers to interrogatories, responses to requests for admissions, "and the like" may be considered in determining whether facts exist that are inconsistent with a complaint's allegations. (Id. at p. 604.) It explained that a demurrer hearing "may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing through the guise of having the court take judicial notice of affidavits, declarations, depositions, and other such material which was filed on behalf of the adverse party and which purports to contradict the allegations and contentions of the plaintiff." (Id. at pp. 604-605.) The last sentence plainly refers to testimony and other evidence from defense witnesses. (Ibid. ["Applying the foregoing principles . . . the trial court in passing upon [defendant's] demurrer . . . could not properly consider the testimony of the defense witnesses tending to refute [plaintiff's] claims"].)
4. In Garcia v. Sterling, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d 17, the Court of Appeal criticized Del E. Webb, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d 593 and other cases to the extent they allowed a court to take judicial notice of the truth of a pleading party's sworn deposition testimony when determining the truth or falsity of matters asserted in pleadings (in Garcia, a verified answer, portions of which the plaintiff moved to strike): "Although the existence of statements contained in a deposition transcript filed as part of the court record can be judicially noticed, their truth is not subject to judicial notice. Consequently, the court could not conclude that any part of the defendant's answer was false based upon his allegedly conflicting deposition testimony." (Garcia v. Sterling, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 22.) Addressing the plaintiffs' cited authorities, the Garcia court stated, "We view these cases as prime examples of the widespread misunderstanding of the scope of judicial notice of court records. A mistaken notion exists that taking judicial notice of court records means noticing `". . .the existence of facts asserted in [all the documents in] a court file . . . a court cannot take judicial notice of hearsay allegations as being true, just because they are part of a court record or file. . . .'" (Id. at p. 22.)
5. We recognized that there were "some few cases where whatever evidence is produced in support of the pleading, the pleader's cause is inevitably destined to fail. The terms of a writing incorporated by reference which rebut an allegation of the pleading may conceivably be so clear and simple that parol evidence will be inadmissible to refute them. Judicial notice may conclusively defeat the pleading as where it establishes res judicata or collateral estoppel. The pleader's own concession may have this same conclusive effect. [¶] In these limited situations, the court, in ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, properly looks beyond the pleadings. But it does so only because the party whose pleading is attacked will as a matter of law, or law's equivalent of judicial notice of a fact not reasonably subject to contradiction, fail in the litigation. Where the significant issue is one of fact and not of law this process is inappropriate." (Columbia Casualty, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 469, italics added.) This court's statement as to res judicata and collateral estoppel was criticized in Sosinsky v. Grant, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1569.)
6. The general rule is that the truthfulness and interpretation of a document's contents are disputable. (C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1104, citing StorMedia Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 449, 457, fn. 9 ["When judicial notice is taken of a document, however, the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable"] & Middlebrook-Anderson Co. v. Southwest Sav. Loan Assn. (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1038 [involving the meaning of a construction loan agreement filed with answers to interrogatories].)
7. At oral argument, Lennar shifted its focus to claim that Marsch's deposition conclusively demonstrated Briarwood's lack of standing because his testimony shows the matter should have been brought as a derivative lawsuit. For the same reasons explained below we conclude Marsch's deposition testimony, as we have recounted it above, is not subject to judicial notice to defeat Briarwood's standing because it does not conclusively establish that McCrink was a corporate opportunity of HCC.


1000 Characters Remaining reserves the right to edit or remove comments but is under no obligation to do so, or to explain individual moderation decisions.

User Comments

Listed below are the cases that are cited in this Featured Case. Click the citation to see the full text of the cited case. Citations are also linked in the body of the Featured Case.

Cited Cases

  • No Cases Found

Listed below are those cases in which this Featured Case is cited. Click on the case name to see the full text of the citing case.

Citing Cases