IN RE HYMAN Docket No. 05-7026-bk.
502 F.3d 61 (2007)
In re Andrew A. HYMAN, Debtor, G. Hallett Denton, As Executor of the Estate of George W. Denton, Appellant, v. Andrew A. Hyman, Debtor-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Decided: September 6, 2007.
Kenneth L. Stein (Norman A. Senior & Jeffery H. Sheetz, of counsel), Greenfield Stein & Senior, LLP, New York, NY, for Appellant G. Hallett Denton.
Anthony L. Tersigni, Meyers Tersigni Feldman & Gray, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Richard N. Gray, Meyers Tersigni Feldman & Gray, New York, NY; M. Stuart Goldberg, White Plains, NY, on the brief), for Appellee Andrew A. Hyman.
Before: CALABRESI and B.D. PARKER, Circuit Judges, and LYNCH, District Judge.
B.D. PARKER, JR., Circuit Judge:
Appellant G. Hallett Denton ("Denton"), the executor of the estate of George W. Denton, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Conner, J.). The district court affirmed an order of the Bankruptcy Court (Hardin, J.) that collateral estoppel did not relieve Denton from proving that a debt owed the estate by Appellee Andrew Hyman ("Hyman") was not dischargeable under § 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. That section of the Code precludes discharge of a debt resulting from a debtor's "defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). During prior litigation, the Westchester County, New York Surrogate's Court ruled that Hyman, in dealings with the Denton estate, breached his fiduciary duties and misappropriated assets. Both the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court ruled that collateral estoppel did not attach to this finding because the issue of whether Hyman committed a "defalcation" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code had not actually been decided by the Surrogate. We agree and we affirm, although on somewhat different grounds.
In 1984 Hyman and George W. Denton ("G.W.Denton") began working for an insurance agency in Westchester County, New York owned by Henry Deppe. The agency represented the Guardian Life Insurance Company of America and, among other activities, marketed Guardian life insurance products through pension plans. These plans were designed and administered through a separate company, National Pension Services, Inc., also owned by Deppe, which channeled business to his insurance agency.
In 1987, G.W. Denton and Hyman took over the business from Deppe and formed their own insurance agency, the Denton-Hyman Agency ("Denton-Hyman"), as well as their own pension administration company, also called National Pension Service, Inc. ("NPS"), and a third company, National Pension Actuaries ("NPA"), which generated business for the agency but was not profitable. Each owned fifty percent, and served as director and executive officer, of the three companies. Guardian designated G.W. Denton and Hyman to succeed Deppe as Guardian's agent for Westchester County under an agreement which provided that, if either left the business, their agency relationship with Guardian would terminate. In starting these businesses, G.W. Denton and Hyman incurred substantial debts — exceeding $1.6 million — which they guaranteed jointly and severally. As was the case with Deppe's agency, NPS generated business for Denton-Hyman, but operated at a loss.
In 1989, thirteen months after starting these businesses, G.W. Denton died unexpectedly and Hyman succeeded him as president and sole director of the three corporations. At that point, the agency relationship between Guardian and Denton-Hyman automatically terminated and, in accordance with Guardian's regulations, both the Denton estate and Denton-Hyman were ineligible to become shareholders in the new general agency. Denton-Hyman, however, still owed $1.6 million in start-up debt for which Denton's estate
In addition to running the agency and paying down the debt, Hyman also engaged in lengthy negotiations with G. Hallett Denton, the executor of G.W. Denton's estate, for the purchase of the estate's fifty percent interest in Denton-Hyman, NPS and NPA. These negotiations were protracted and difficult, and seem to have foundered over the issue of how much of the income Hyman generated belonged to him and how much needed to be shared with the estate. At the end of the day, no agreement was reached.
At this point, Denton sued Hyman in Surrogate's Court. Denton asserted a derivative claim on behalf of Denton-Hyman, seeking to recover "profits earned by Hyman and the Hyman Agency in exploiting assets of [the jointly-owned] corporations" and "damages suffered as a result of the diversion of corporate assets." Hyman asserted a number of affirmative defenses including ratification and estoppel. After a nine-day trial, the Surrogate's Court entered judgment in favor of the estate and against Hyman and the Hyman Agency for $2,734,832, "representing the net profits obtained by [them] as a result of Hyman's breach of fiduciary duty, as an officer, director and 50% shareholder of Denton-Hyman, NPS, and NPA and their misappropriation of the assets and goodwill of said Corporations." In so ruling, the Surrogate's Court found that Hyman had breached his fiduciary duty by "co-opting the Denton-Hyman, NPS and NPA enterprise for the benefit of the Hyman Agency and for his own personal enrichment," using furniture and fixtures of the corporations without compensation, and using "Denton-Hyman overrides to subsidize NPS and NPA and to satisfy the Hyman Agency debt to the Guardian."
Although the Surrogate's conclusions were undoubtedly damaging to Hyman, they were not accompanied by in-depth analysis of a number of issues relevant to this appeal. The Surrogate, for example, made no findings concerning Hyman's state of mind: In using jointly owned assets and income generated by his own efforts both to liquidate debt of the estate and to operate the business that was generating the income, was Hyman breaching a fiduciary obligation by being sloppy or venal or was he stealing? In addition, the Surrogate's decision gave little prominence to the substantial monetary benefits Hyman conferred on the estate. Nor did it specifically address Hyman's argument that the estate's representatives acquiesced in, and consented to, Hyman's conduct over a lengthy period.
In February 2003, Hyman filed for protection under the bankruptcy laws. Denton, as executor of G.W. Denton's estate, then filed a claim based on the Surrogate's Court's judgment, to declare that judgment non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code as a debt arising from "defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity." Denton contended that the
The Bankruptcy Court found the Surrogate's Court's judgment valid and enforceable and allowed Denton's claim based on the judgment. However, the court rejected Denton's contention that collateral estoppel precluded further litigation over the dischargeability of the debt. The Bankruptcy Court ruled that under § 523(a)(4) "defalcation" was narrower than the concept of "misappropriation" under state law, with defalcation requiring "some portion of misconduct." The court then concluded that the Surrogate's Court's findings failed to satisfy the more restrictive definition. In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized Denton's failure to identify any specific conduct of Hyman's that amounted to a defalcation or that could be characterized as wrongful, illegal or morally reprehensible, "other than the fact that the parties did not reach agreement on a buy out."
Because Denton had voluntarily dismissed alternative claims for relief, and had agreed to abide by the Bankruptcy Court's resolution of the collateral estoppel issue rather than retry the claim, the Bankruptcy Court issued a final judgment in favor of Hyman, and Denton appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed. Judge Conner ruled that defalcation requires some element of wrongful intent, so as to be more than a "mere negligent" or innocent act, and held that because the Surrogate's Court made no finding as to Hyman's intent, it necessarily failed to decide the issue of defalcation. The district court found that Hyman's immediate offer to buy out the estate's interest, the three-year-long negotiation over the purchase price, and the pay down of the $1.6 million in debt did not demonstrate the level of misconduct necessary to trigger the application of § 523(a)(4). Specifically, Judge Conner concluded that "Debtor's conduct throughout was fully consistent with a good faith effort to preserve the business for the mutual benefit of AHA and the Estate." This appeal followed.
Our review of a district court's order in its capacity as an appellate bankruptcy court is plenary. In re DeTrano,
To determine whether collateral estoppel applies to the Surrogate's Court's judgment, we look to New York law. See Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons,
On this appeal, these principles must be analyzed jointly with others that have special significance in the bankruptcy context. The basic policy animating the Bankruptcy Code is to afford the "honest but unfortunate" debtor a fresh start. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1105, 1107, 166 L.Ed.2d 956 (2007); Grogan v. Garner,
The first critical question is whether a "defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity" under § 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code is identical to the factual and legal determinations necessarily decided in the prior Surrogate's Court action. Denton argues that the issue of whether a defalcation occurred was necessarily decided by the Surrogate's Court's findings that Hyman breached his fiduciary duty and misappropriated assets. Hyman contends that in view of the pervasive confusion in the federal courts over what constitutes "defalcation" under § 523(a)(4), and also in view of the harsh consequences that attach and the requirement that doubts in a close case such as this should be resolved in his favor, he should not be denied the opportunity to prove at a trial in Bankruptcy Court that he did not violate § 523(a)(4).
While the Code generally allows for the discharge of debts, significant exceptions exist. DeTrano, 326 F.3d at 322. Among them is § 523(a)(4) excepting from discharge any debt "for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). As previously noted, this exception, like most, must be narrowly construed. Kawaauhau v. Geiger,
There has been much debate among the Circuits over whether a "defalcation" under § 523(a)(4) includes all misappropriations or failures to account or only those that evince some wrongful conduct.
In Herbst, 93 F.2d at 511-12, Judge Learned Hand wrestled with this problem without resolving it. He wrote:
Denton relies on In re Hammond,
The Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold that an innocent mistake can constitute a defalcation. In re Uwimana,
The majority of the Circuits addressing this issue, however, require some level of
In light of this persistent confusion, we now align ourselves with the First Circuit, see Baylis, 313 F.3d at 20, in holding that defalcation under § 523(a)(4) requires a showing of conscious misbehavior or extreme recklessness — a showing akin to the showing required for scienter in the securities law context. See Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co.,
By requiring the courts to make appropriate findings of conscious misbehavior or recklessness in the course of dischargeability litigation, the standard we adopt today insures that the harsh sanction of non-dischargeability
In finding that Hyman breached his fiduciary duty by "misappropriating and co-opting assets of the jointly-owned companies for his personal benefit," the Surrogate's Court made no express findings with regard to Hyman's state of mind. We assume that the Surrogate concluded that under New York law such findings were not necessary, since misappropriation and breach of fiduciary duties apparently do not, under New York law, consistently require proof of a culpable mental state. See Strough v. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 N.Y.S. 110, 112 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1888), modified on other grounds and aff'd, 119 N.Y. 212, 23 N.E. 552 (1890) (holding defendant liable for "illegal, though innocent in intent, misappropriation"); Matter of Happy Time Fashions,
Having clarified the standard under § 523(a)(4) and given the unique circumstances of this case, we decline to mechanically apply collateral estoppel. See Jeffreys, 1 N.Y.3d at 41,
The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.
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