ROSE v. STEPHENS No. 00-6542.
291 F.3d 917 (2002)
Gary W. ROSE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert F. STEPHENS, individually and in his official capacity as Secretary of the Justice Cabinet, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Decided and Filed June 3, 2002.
Sheryl G. Snyder (argued and briefed), David L. Hoskins (briefed), Frost, Brown & Todd, Louisville, KY, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before NORRIS, SILER, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.
ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Gary W. Rose appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendant Robert F. Stephens in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Plaintiff argues that his termination from the position of Commissioner of the Kentucky State Police violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Kentucky Whistleblower Act, K.R.S. Chapter 61. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendant.
Plaintiff was appointed to the position of Commissioner of the Kentucky State Police in 1995 and was employed in this position until August 1999 when he was terminated by defendant, the Secretary of Kentucky's Justice Cabinet. Plaintiff's termination resulted from a dispute between himself and defendant over his refusal to withdraw a memorandum which he had submitted to defendant and the governor of Kentucky announcing his decision to eliminate Pat Simpson's position as deputy police commissioner. Simpson was promoted to the position of deputy commissioner by plaintiff at the request of the governor in 1997.
The memorandum contains a lengthy description of disruptive and inefficient actions taken by Simpson and announces plaintiff's decision to abolish the position of deputy commissioner and reassign Simpson to a lower ranking position as a result of his conduct. The memorandum includes allegations that Simpson interfered with hiring and disciplinary decisions; that he authorized unnecessary and wasteful equipment purchases; that he requested unnecessary transfers of personnel; and that he spread rumors that the governor intended to fire plaintiff and another officer.
In his deposition plaintiff acknowledged that he wrote the memorandum in his official capacity as commissioner, and that he included the detailed allegations against Simpson primarily as background information to support his decision to eliminate Simpson's position. Furthermore, plaintiff stated that the "operative paragraph" of the memorandum was on page three where he stated his intention to eliminate Simpson's position.
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, the Justice Cabinet, and the Commonwealth of Kentucky alleging that his discharge violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985, as well as provisions of the Kentucky Whistleblower Act. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiff's § 1985 claims, finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim under that statute. The court also dismissed most of plaintiff's § 1983 claims against defendants in their official capacities because those claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Finally, the court refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
Defendant moved for summary judgment on plaintiff's remaining claims, arguing that the memorandum was not protected speech under the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for defendant, finding that the memorandum was not entitled to First Amendment protection because it did not address a matter of public concern. Plaintiff appeals both the court's grant of summary judgment with respect to his § 1983 claims and the court's refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claim.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. See United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. SST Fitness Corp.,
A. Analytical Framework of the First Amendment Claim
In Connick v. Myers,
The district court found that the memorandum in this case did not relate to a matter of public concern, and, therefore, did not reach the second step of this analysis. The court based its determination on three factors: (1) the memorandum did not allege any illegal activity; (2) plaintiff never attempted to make the allegations public; and (3) most of the allegations concerned decisions made prior to the time when the conflict between plaintiff and Simpson arose. We do not express an opinion on whether the district court correctly determined that the memorandum did not address a matter of public concern, because, as explained below, in the situation presented by this case the Pickering balance favors the government as a matter of law.
In Connick the Court fashioned a framework for protecting the principle that the government "cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression," 461 U.S. at 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, while still permitting the government some leeway when it acts in its role as an employer to operate an efficient workplace. In a separate line of cases dealing with the First Amendment rights of public employees, the Court also has recognized that the
The Court has not addressed the question of whether the Elrod/Branti exception applies to the situation where a policymaking or confidential employee is discharged on the basis of actual speech rather than political affiliation.
Three distinct approaches have emerged among the federal courts of appeal that have addressed the question of how to deal with situations where both the Connick and Elrod/Branti lines of cases potentially apply. The first approach, which has been adopted by the Second Circuit, limits the application of the Elrod/Branti exception to employment decisions that are based solely on political affiliation. See Lewis v. Cowen,
The second approach, which is taken by the First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, applies the exception in situations where the employee's speech relates to either his political affiliation or substantive policy
The final approach, taken by the Ninth Circuit, applies the exception in all situations where the employee is at the policymaking level. See Fazio v. City and County of San Francisco,
We adopt an approach similar to that of the First, Seventh and Tenth Circuits, and hold that where an employee is in a policymaking or confidential position and is terminated for speech related to his political or policy views, the Pickering balance favors the government as a matter of law. This rule flows logically from the Supreme Court's recognition in the political patronage cases that the government has a legitimate interest in securing employees who will loyally implement its policies. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
In addition, this rule is consistent with the balance struck by the Court in Pickering between the government's interest as an employer in an effective and efficient workplace and the individual employee's right to speak as a citizen on matters of public concern. The Court recognized in Pickering that dismissal of an employee in a position which requires loyalty or confidentiality would implicate "significantly different considerations" than those present in the discharge of a lower-level public employee. 391 U.S. at 570 n. 3, 88 S.Ct. 1731. Specifically, the Court stated that:
Id. In other words, the government's interest in appointing politically loyal employees to certain positions converges with its interest in operating an efficient workplace when dealing with policymaking employees because loyalty by those employees is an essential requirement for the efficient functioning of the workplace.
When such an employee speaks in a manner that undermines the trust and confidence that are central to his position, the balance definitively tips in the government's favor because an overt act of disloyalty necessarily causes significant disruption in the working relationship between a confidential employee and his superiors. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570 n. 3, 88 S.Ct. 1731. The additional restriction that this presumption applies only to cases where the employee speaks on political or policy issues ensures that the content of the employee's speech directly implicates the loyalty requirements of the position and thus will adversely affect a central aspect of the working relationship in all cases.
In short, the rule we adopt today simply recognizes the fact that it is insubordination for an employee whose position requires loyalty to speak on job-related issues in a manner contrary to the position of his employer, and, as the Supreme Court has recognized, "employees may always be discharged for good cause, such as insubordination...." Elrod, 427 U.S. at 366, 96 S.Ct. 2673. In this situation an individualized balancing of interests is unnecessary.
B. Application of the Elrod/Branti Exception
Having determined that the Elrod/Branti exception applies to the discharge of a policymaking or confidential employee on the basis of speech, the remaining questions we address are whether plaintiff occupied a policymaking or confidential position and whether the memorandum at issue addressed matters related to politics or policy.
The Supreme Court in Branti set out the standard for determining to what positions the exception applies:
445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287. This circuit has outlined four general categories of positions that satisfy this standard:
McCloud v. Testa,
Kentucky law provides that the police commissioner is a member of the governor's cabinet and "the head and chief executive officer of the department." K.R.S. §§ 15A.020, 16.070. The commissioner is invested with the discretionary authority to, among other things, establish local police headquarters, K.R.S. § 16.070(4), appoint and promote officers, K.R.S. § 16.050, and adopt and repeal rules governing the conduct of officers and the operation of the department, K.R.S. § 16.080. The cabinet-level designation and broad range of discretionary authority granted under Kentucky law to the police commissioner demonstrate that plaintiff unquestionably occupied a category one position.
The final step in our analysis is determining whether the memorandum addressed political or policy-related issues. This inquiry is also easily satisfied in this case. As plaintiff himself acknowledged in his deposition, the "operative paragraph" of the memorandum was the announcement that he intended to eliminate the position of deputy police commissioner and
In light of the foregoing analysis, we hold that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for defendant with respect to plaintiff's § 1983 claims because plaintiff's speech was not protected under the First Amendment.
C. State Law Claim
The final issue in this case is whether the district court erred in refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim under the Kentucky Whistleblower Act, K.R.S. Chapter 61. The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over this claim because the language of the act only waived Kentucky's sovereign immunity for claims brought in state court, thus retaining the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. Plaintiff argues that the language of the act does not specifically preclude actions in federal court and, therefore, should be read as permitting them. We agree with the district court that the language of the act does not waive the state's immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment.
The statute at issue provides that employees alleging violations of the act may bring a civil action for injunctive or punitive damages. K.R.S. § 61.103(2). The statute specifies that:
K.R.S. § 61.103(2). "[I]n order for a state statute or constitutional provision to constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must specify the State's intention to subject itself to suit in federal court." Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,
For the reasons stated above, the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendant is
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