In this consolidated appeal, the plaintiff, James O'Halloran, appeals from the judgments of the trial courts dismissing related actions
The following facts are necessary for our resolution of the plaintiffs claims. The plaintiff is a physician licensed in this state and an active member of the medical staff at the defendant Charlotte Hungerford Hospital (hospital). On January 12, 1999, the individual defendants
The plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss O'Halloran I for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Our standard of review of a ruling on a motion to dismiss is well established. "In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.... A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.... Because the exhaustion [of administrative remedies] doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction, [the court] must decide as a threshold matter whether that doctrine
In our review of the plaintiffs claim, we must evaluate the allegations in the complaint. "The interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court.... In addition, [t]he allegations of the complaint must be given such reasonable construction as will give effect to [it] in conformity with the general theory which it was intended to follow, and do substantial justice between the parties.... Jacques All Trades Corp. v. Brown, 33 Conn.App. 294, 302, 635 A.2d 839 (1993). It is axiomatic that the parties are bound by their pleadings.... Geren v. Board of Education, 36 Conn.App. 282, 289, 650 A.2d 616 (1994), cert. denied, 232 Conn. 907, 653 A.2d 194 (1995).... Kunst v. Vitale, 42 Conn.App. 528, 532, 680 A.2d 339 (1996)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Baldwin v. Jablecki, 52 Conn.App. 379, 381-82, 726 A.2d 1164 (1999).
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly dismissed O'Halloran I on the ground that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. More specifically, the plaintiff claims that he was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies because he was seeking remedies unavailable to him via the administrative process. We agree.
Pursuant to our standard of review, we take as true the following facts alleged in the complaint in O'Halloran I. Hyllen-Davey v. Plan & Zoning Commission, supra, 57 Conn.App. 592. The plaintiff is a physician licensed in this state, he maintains an office for the
The following additional facts are necessary for our resolution of this claim. The court's conclusion to dismiss the action on the ground of exhaustion was based, in large part, on its categorization of the plaintiffs action as one that merely challenged the reappointment process of the defendants. In support of its conclusion, the court noted that the hospital's bylaws set forth fairly comprehensive procedures for the reappointment process and for the hearing and appellate procedures for adverse reappointment recommendations. A review of the plaintiffs complaint reveals, however, that he challenged allegedly tortious conduct on the part of the defendants unrelated to the reappointment process and that he sought compensation for financial damage caused by injury to his reputation and standing. The hospital's bylaws do not provide a means for the plaintiff to receive redress for the type of injury alleged.
"An adequate remedy at law is one which is specific and adapted to securing the relief sought conveniently, effectively and completely." (Internal quotation marks
The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly dismissed O'Halloran I on the ground that the claims therein were nonjusticiable. We agree.
A review of the court's memorandum of decision indicates that the court based its decision to dismiss the plaintiffs action as nonjusticiable on (1) its miscategorization of the nature of the plaintiffs action
"The principles that underlie justiciability are well established. `Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute ... (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse ... (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power ... and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant.' ... State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 109, 111-12, 445 A.2d 304 (1982); Pellegrino v. O'Neill, 193 Conn. 670, 674, 480 A.2d 476, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 875, 105 S.Ct. 236, 83 L. Ed.2d
It is apparent from a reading of the complaint in O'Halloran I that the plaintiff sought compensation for financial damage caused by tortious injury to his reputation and standing. The requirements of justiciability are, therefore, satisfied. Accordingly, the court improperly dismissed the action on the ground that the claims were nonjusticiable.
The judgment in the first case, O'Halloran I, is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The judgment in the second case, O'Halloran II, is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
On May 28, 1999, the plaintiff brought a second action (O'Halloran II) against the same defendants. The trial court, subsequently dismissed O'Halloran II on the ground that the claims asserted were virtually identical to those in O'Halloran I and were barred under the prior pending action doctrine.