McCOY v. CITY OF NEW YORK No. 99 CV 537(ILG).
131 F.Supp.2d 363 (2001)
Jeffery McCOY, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, City of New York Parks and Recreation, Parks Commissioner, Jerome Candrilli, Vincent Cascella, Anthony Modafferi, Geraldine Lawless, and George Scarpelli, Defendants.
United States District Court, E.D. New York.
February 14, 2001.
Henrique Oliviera, Corporation Counsel, New York City, for Defendants.
Memorandum & Order
GLASSER, District Judge.
Plaintiff Jeffery McCoy brings this employment discrimination action pursuant to those provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a), that proscribe a hostile work environment and retaliation; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.Exec.Law § 296; and the New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. City Admin.Code §§ 8-101 et seq. Defendants the City of New York, the City of New York Parks and Recreation ("Parks Department"), the Parks Commissioner, and Parks Supervisors Jerome Candrilli, Vincent Cascella, Anthony Modafferi, Geraldine
Plaintiff, an African American, worked for the Parks Department from June 15, 1990 to June 2, 1998. Plaintiff began his tenure at the Parks Department as a seasonal worker and worked his way up to a crew chief and summer supervisor for the Work Experience Program ("WEP") in Staten Island. Plaintiff left the Parks Department in June 1998 due to an injury and has since been on voluntary leave.
Plaintiff has not submitted a separate statement of facts pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 as to which he contends that there exists a genuine issue to be tried, but has submitted a statement of facts within his opposition to the motion for summary judgment. As such, the facts alleged in defendants' Rule 56.1 statement must be deemed admitted. The incidents that predate this action are chronicled in the Complaint and in plaintiff's sworn deposition testimony. In September of 1996, plaintiff was transferred to a Parks Department site in Midland Beach on Staten Island. From that date until July 28, 1997, plaintiff appears to have worked without incident. In a performance evaluation dated July 26, 1997, plaintiff received an overall ranking of "very good," with rankings of "very good" in five categories and "extraordinary" in a sixth category. (Oliviera Decl.Exh. B) According to the form used to evaluate employees, the categories into which an employee could be classified were, in descending order: extraordinary, very good, good, conditional, unsatisfactory and unratable. Plaintiff claimed in his deposition that he should have received "excellents" for his work (McCoy Dep. 65), and that all Caucasian employees at his Parks Department work site received "excellent" rankings in all categories but "didn't deserve it." (Id. at 66) Against this backdrop, the discrimination charged in the Complaint is said to have begun on July 28, 1997 and continued until May 27, 1998.
1. July 28, 1997 attempted issuance of insubordination charges against co-worker Calluci
Plaintiff alleges that the first discriminatory incident involved his supervisors' refusal to support his attempt to levy disciplinary charges against one of the employees under his supervision. On July 28, 1997, plaintiff attempted to issue formal written charges for insubordination against Parks Department Employee Peter Calluci. Plaintiff alleges that his supervisor, defendant Vincent Cascella, instructed him to issue a verbal warning instead of a written charge. Plaintiff avers that he had already issued the employee several verbal warnings, and that because the employee had not complied with those verbal warnings, plaintiff decided to prepare a written charge anyway. He contends that he asked defendants Cascella, the Principal Park Supervisor, and Jerome Candrilli, plaintiff's direct supervisor, to witness his write-up of the insubordination charge, but that both refused to do so. Plaintiff was never disciplined as a result of this incident and his salary and benefits, or other material terms and conditions of his employment, were never affected.
2. January 16, 1998 discussion with defendant Scarpelli concerning defendants Candrilli and Cascella
Six months later, plaintiff again encountered trouble when he attempted to bring the behavior of his supervisors to the attention of a park chief. On January 16, 1998, plaintiff informed defendant George Scarpelli, Chief of Operations, that defendant Candrilli sat around and discussed ball games during work and that defendant Cascella drank beer during work. (Complaint ¶ 17; McCoy Dep. 74-75)
3. January 23, 1998 verbal altercation with defendant Candrilli
Shortly after plaintiff reported Candrilli and Cascella to Scarpelli, plaintiff and Candrilli had a dispute over time sheets that escalated into a verbal altercation. At this point, plaintiff apparently had begun to carry to work a tape recorder and a camera. (McCoy Dep. 135-137) According to an unofficial "transcript" of the altercation produced by plaintiff, the problem began when Candrilli stated to plaintiff: "I'm tired of you and your attitude. You got a problem. You and Vinny got a problem. You know what the problem is, you are a rat. You are a rat bastard." Plaintiff then told Candrilli, whose father had apparently recently passed away: "Why don't you grow up and stop crying. You're like little kids ... Go cry, go cry to daddy. That's all you do like little kids." Candrilli responded with the following: "Let me tell you something. If you mention my family, I will break your fucking neck, you cocksucker. You leave my fucking family out of it." (Pl.'s Exh. 4) Plaintiff does not dispute that race was never explicitly mentioned or even hinted at by Candrilli during this altercation. He further admits that Candrilli threatened his life because of the statements he made to Scarpelli and for no other reason of which he was aware. (McCoy Dep. 75)
4. January 24, 1998 transfer
One day after this verbal altercation, plaintiff was transferred to another Parks Department site in District 1, the Cromwell Center. Plaintiff testified at his deposition that this transfer was involuntary. (McCoy Dep. 85, 86) He also testified that after this transfer, his title, salary, job responsibilities and salary did not change. (Id. at 86, 87)
5. January 27, 1998 supervisory conference with defendant Candrilli
On January 27, 1998, plaintiff received a "Supervisor's Conference" with defendant Candrilli. According to Candrilli's notes of the meeting, plaintiff was disciplined for: "failure to communicate a change in assignment"; "failure to follow a direct order"; "conduct unbecoming a City employee"; "neglecting assigned duties"; "failure to obey the lawful order of a superior in the agency"; and "engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to good order and discipline." (Oliviera Decl., Exh. E) Plaintiff contends in the Complaint that this disciplinary measure, which remained in his personnel folder, was highly pretextual and that each of the charges listed were fabricated, unfair and highly discriminatory. (Comp. ¶ 21) Yet, plaintiff admitted in his deposition that the only reason he believes he received the supervisory conference was in retaliation for the statements he had made on January 16, 1998 to Scarpelli concerning Candrilli and Cascella and that he could think of no other reason for the conference. (McCoy Dep. 78-80)
6. January 28 and 29, 1998 denial of access to Forestry Department bathroom
The Complaint alleges that on January 28 and 29, 1998, plaintiff and his mostly African American crew were denied use of a bathroom in the Forestry Department facility in Staten Island which apparently was reserved for Forestry Department employees. In his deposition, plaintiff clarifies that his crew was composed of four African Americans and one Caucasian worker and that while crew members were forced to use another bathroom, Forestry Department employees, all of whom were Caucasian, were permitted to use both bathrooms. (Comp. ¶ 28) Plaintiff admits that regardless of their race, all WEP workers were denied use of the bathroom in question. However, he suggests that the categorical exclusion of WEP workers by the Forestry Department was linked to race when he testifies that this policy was "very offensive to [him], especially since there was no minorities working in that department." (McCoy Dep. 130) Plaintiff claims that WEP workers may have been
7. January 30, 1998 order and threat
On January 30, 1998, plaintiff claims that he was ordered not to go to the sites where defendants Candrilli and Cascella worked unless accompanied by another supervisor (Comp. ¶ 24) or unless he obtained "prior approval" (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n, 8), whereas Candrilli and Cascella were not similarly ordered. Apparently that same day, plaintiff claims that defendant Scarpelli threatened that if plaintiff continued to complain about conditions at work, he "would be jeopardizing" his summer step-up position as Park Supervisor. (McCoy Dep. 100)
8. February 7, 1998 evaluation
On February 7, 1998, plaintiff received another performance evaluation in which his overall performance for the period of July 7, 1997 through December 31, 1997 was categorized as "good," one category below his previous evaluation. (Oliviera Decl., Exh. B) Plaintiff testified that he believed that the only reason he received the "good" rating was the statement he made to Scarpelli on January 16, 1998 and that he could think of no other reason which prompted this evaluation.
9. February 10, 1998 supervisory conference with defendant Lawless
Three days later, on February 10, 1998, plaintiff was given another supervisory conference by defendant Geraldine Lawless, a supervisor. The conference notes charge plaintiff with "disrespectful" and "disruptive" behavior; that he "presumed to question supervisory authority and why specific supervisors were present at [the work site]"; and finally, that plaintiff was "uncooperative in receiving orders for various details[.]" (Oliviera Decl., Exh. F) In his written response to the conference prepared on the same day, plaintiff admits that he "did get a little loud because [he] was upset" by what he saw at the work site. Specifically, plaintiff contends that he had been promised one day earlier, in a meeting in Scarpelli's office, that neither Cascella not Candrilli were to supervise him and that when he saw both Cascella and Candrilli at the work site and was informed by Lawless that they could in fact supervise him at that particular work site, he "felt betrayed by management." Moreover, plaintiff claims that although he did not directly respond to Cascella, because Cascella addressed him as "Yo McCoy," plaintiff "did receive [his] orders from ... Cascella and [he] did do his job and [he] was cooperative." (Id.) As with the January 27, 1998 supervisory conference, the Complaint alleges that this disciplinary measure was highly pretextual and racially motivated. However, plaintiff admits in his deposition that he felt that the only reason he received the conference was in retaliation for the comments he had made on January 16, 1998 to Scarpelli concerning Candrilli and Cascella. (McCoy Dep. 80-81)
10. February 26, 1998 drawing of rat
On February 26, 1998, plaintiff received a drawing of a rat in the mail. (Comp. ¶ 26; Pl.'s Exh. 7) The Complaint alleges this act was carried out with the object of discriminating and retaliating against plaintiff because of his race. In his deposition, however, plaintiff again attributes this incident to the January 16, 1998 statements he made to Scarpelli. (McCoy Dep. 76-77)
11. March 12, 1998 noose in garage and racially stereotypical advertisement and exclusion from Forestry Department bathroom
On March 12, 1998, plaintiff observed a noose hanging from the pipes in a working
Plaintiff complained about the noose and the offensive advertisement to the Equal Employment Opportunity Officer employed by the Parks Department, Julie Poole, an African American woman, who shared his sentiment. At some point thereafter, Poole apparently informed plaintiff that the offensive material had been removed (McCoy Dep. 132 (not filed with court)), but plaintiff never returned to the site and is not certain whether the objects are still there. (Id. at 131)
Plaintiff also testified during his deposition that on this same day, he and his crew members were prevented once again from using the Forestry Department bathroom. (McCoy Dep. 121) The Complaint makes no mention of this incident.
12. April 21, 1998 "fucking nigger" comment
On April 21, 1998, plaintiff was returning to the Forestry Department when he had a confrontation with defendant Mullusky in which Mullusky called him a "fucking nigger," spat at him, and obscenely gestured at him. (McCoy Dep. 135-137) Plaintiff testified that he had seen Mullusky speaking with Cascella frequently. Plaintiff reported this incident on April 24, 1998 in a statement to the Parks Department Investigation Unit. (Oliviera Decl., Exh. G) In a memorandum dated April 27, 1998, Mullusky disputed plaintiff's version of the events and claimed that plaintiff approached him in an aggressive manner, called him "trash" and "faggot," and wrote down his personal vehicle license plate number. In a hand-written note dated July 20, 1998, Mullusky further stated: "On this particular day, I had said no racial slurs to this individual." (Id., Exh. H) Three other Parks Department employees submitted statements that contradicted plaintiff's version of the events and, after conducting an investigation, a Parks Department investigator concluded on August 5, 1998 that there was insufficient evidence to support plaintiff's allegations. (Id.) When questioned in his deposition about whether he had ever before been addressed in a derogatory manner, plaintiff testified that although he had never before been called a "nigger" by Parks Department employees, he had been referred to as "boy" (McCoy Dep. 137-138) and had been told to "whip" his crew into shape (id. at 197-198), both of which plaintiff found to be racially-offensive.
13. June 30, 1998 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") charge
Plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC on June 30, 1998, in which he charged that, between the dates of January 23, 1998 and May 27, 1998, he was subjected to discrimination based on his race and color in the form of retaliation for complaining of harassment at his job. (Oliviera Decl., Exh. I) On December 1, 1998, the EEOC issued plaintiff a "Right to Sue" letter. He filed the instant Complaint on January 27, 1999.
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment under Rule 56 is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
If the summary judgment movant satisfies its initial burden of production, the burden of proof shifts to the nonmovant who must demonstrate that a genuine issue of fact exists for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
II. Title VII, New York Human Rights Law and N.Y. City Human Rights Law
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 governs claims of discrimination on the basis of race, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and claims of retaliation for conduct aimed to remedy such discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). New York Human Rights Law, in pertinent part, makes it unlawful for an employer "because of the ... race, creed [or] color ... of any individual ... to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment." N.Y.Exec.Law § 296(1)(a). In addition, § 296(6) of the Human Rights Law prohibits any person from aiding and abetting any of the acts forbidden in the statute. New York City's version of the Human Rights Law, N.Y. City Admin Code, § 8-107, also contains a provision regarding aiding and abetting which is worded exactly the same as § 296(6) of the New York Human Rights law. Because New York courts require the same standard of proof for claims brought under the Human Rights Law as for those claims brought under Title VII, see Tomka v. Seiler Corp.,
While plaintiff has not distinguished among the various named defendants for purposes of liability under Title VII, an individual employee may not be held liable under Title VII. See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1317. As such plaintiff's Title VII claim is considered only as against the City and the Parks Department.
In contrast, New York Human Rights Law provides that an individual employee may be liable for discriminatory conduct if the employee actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim. See id. at 1317 (noting that the New York Court of Appeals held in Patrowich v. Chemical Bank,
A. Hostile Work Environment
Title VII prohibits an employer's conduct that "has the purpose or effect of ... creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1305 (citing Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
1. Incidents that may be imputed to the City or the Parks Department
A plaintiff, in order to recover under Title VII, must show not only that the environment is hostile but also that "the conduct which created the hostile environment should be imputed to the employer." Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc.,
Because each of the individual defendants named in the caption were supervisors, the Parks Department is presumptively responsible for any discrimination they may have manifested against McCoy. Defendants have failed to offer evidence to rebut this presumption, and the court, accordingly, imputes the conduct of plaintiff's individual supervisors to the Parks Department. Of the many incidents alleged by plaintiff, only one involved a co-worker, Keith Mullusky. While plaintiff stated in
2. Incidents that may be considered
As a preliminary matter, the court may only consider incidents contributing to the purportedly hostile work environment alleged to have occurred within the limitations period or incidents that occurred beyond the period if plaintiff can demonstrate a "continuing violation." Title VII requires a claimant to file a discrimination charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment action or, if the claimant has already filed the charge with a proper state or local equal employment agency, within 300 days of the alleged act of discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,
McCoy's cause of action under New York's Human Rights Law is governed by a three-year statute of limitations period, measured from the filing of the action in court. See N.Y. CPLR § 214(2); Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,
Each of the acts McCoy alleges falls within the three-year period proscribed by New York law and each of those acts, with the exception of one, falls within the 180 period proscribed by Title VII. The only act that falls beyond the 180 day time period is McCoy's attempted issuance of insubordination charges against Parks Department employee Peter Calluci on July 28, 1997. Because that act precedes by approximately six months the first allegedly discriminatory act that occurred within
3. The work environment at the Parks Department
Turning to the question of whether the acts alleged to have occurred within the relevant time period constitute actionable harassment, the court must consider whether these acts amount to "discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of the [plaintiff's] employment and create an abusive working environment." Quinn, 159 F.3d at 767 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367). Whether a working environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive depends on the "totality of circumstances," including "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Id. The conduct alleged must be severe and pervasive enough to create an environment that "would be reasonably perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive." Schwapp, 118 F.3d at 110 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct. 367).
For acts of racial discrimination such as racist comments, slurs and jokes to be actionable, there must be "more than a few isolated incidents of racial enmity, ... meaning that instead of sporadic racial slurs there must be a steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments[.]" Schwapp v. Town of Avon,
Plaintiff in this case has alleged four sets of incidents which he claims show that the Parks Department was plagued by a pervasive and continuous atmosphere of racial discrimination. The first set of incidents revolves around plaintiff's troubled relationship with two of his supervisors, defendants Candrilli and Cascella. Shortly after he reported Candrilli and Cascella's improper behavior on the job to Scarpelli, plaintiff alleges that Candrilli called him a "rat bastard" and threatened his life; that he was involuntarily transferred to a different work site; that he was written up in two separate supervisory conferences; that he was given poor performance evaluations; and that he received a drawing of a rat in the mail. The second set of incidents involved the exclusion of plaintiff and his work crew on two separate occasions from a bathroom that was limited to Forestry Department employees, who all happened to be Caucasian. The third set of incidents involved the display of a noose and what the plaintiff perceived to be racially offensive advertisement at a Parks Department work site. The fourth and final incident involved a confrontation between plaintiff and his co-worker, Chris Mullusky, in which Mullusky directed racist comments and obscene gestures at plaintiff.
Accepting as true all of these incidents, McCoy has not adduced evidence sufficient
With respect to the incidents involving plaintiff's exclusion from the Forestry Department bathroom, plaintiff again fails to establish that racial hostility motivated his exclusion. Even as described by plaintiff, the policy that excluded plaintiff and his WEP crew, one of whom was Caucasian, from this bathroom was enforced uniformly against all WEP workers, not only minority WEP workers, and was, according to plaintiff, motivated by a dislike on the part of Forestry Department employees of WEP workers because they felt that WEP participants "were going to take their jobs away." (McCoy Dep., 160) While it may be true that Forestry Department employees were all Caucasian, absent a showing that this policy was selectively enforced, plaintiff's allegation is insufficient to convert what appears to be an otherwise neutral policy into a racially discriminatory one.
As for the third set of incidents involving the display of a noose and a racially offensive advertisement of an African American man and boy with exaggerated facial features, these reasonably could have been perceived by and were in fact perceived by plaintiff as racially-hostile. Snell v. Suffolk County,
Unlike in Schwapp, where plaintiff alleged ten separate incidents of racially-hostile comments (two of which occurred in his presence) that, viewed together, justified his perception that his work environment was rife with hostility towards minority groups, plaintiff here has not alleged facts that altered the conditions of his employment and created an abusive work environment. At most, he has alleged two separate incidents that, while conceivably offensive, are insufficient to permit a trier of fact to conclude that they pervaded McCoy's work environment.
Title VII also prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for participation in proceedings aimed to combat discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Retaliation claims are tested under the three-step burden shifting analysis articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
Turning to this case, plaintiff has met his burden only on the first element of the prima facie case. The first time McCoy complained to his employer of race discrimination was when he spoke with EEO Officer Julie Poole in March 1998. This is sufficient to satisfy the first prong. See, e.g., Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1308; Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 65 (internal complaints to company management about sexual harassment constitute protected activity). However, McCoy has articulated neither an adverse employment action which disadvantaged him nor a causal connection between the protected activity and such adverse action. Even accepting plaintiff's version of the events as true, the second and third elements of the prima facie case are undermined by his repeated testimony that the terms and conditions of his work (including his salary, benefits, job responsibilities and hours) did not change as a result of a complaint concerning the perceived racial harassment The only three employment actions plaintiff has alleged were adverse are that he was involuntarily transferred to a different work site, that he was subjected to a supervisory conference, and that he received a ranking of "good" in a performance evaluation. However, plaintiff testifies repeatedly that none of these actions imposed any adverse consequences on his job. In fact, he even concedes that these actions do not constitute "the kind of retaliation that is protected under Title VII." (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n, 8) More significantly for purposes of the prima facie case, plaintiff admits repeatedly that those three actions were taken as a result of his January 16, 1998 statements to Scarpelli, in which race was never mentioned or hinted at, and not as a result of his attempt to seek recourse for what he believed to be racial discrimination. Because plaintiff fails to articulate the second and third elements of the prima facie case, the court need not address the remaining portions of the McDonnell Douglas scheme. As such, plaintiff's efforts to establish a genuine issue of fact as to the Parks Department's retaliation against him must fail.
C. New York State and City Human Rights Laws
For the same reason that plaintiff's Title VII claim against the City and the Parks Department fails, his claim against those defendants based on the New York Human Rights Law, N.Y.Exec.
As for his claims against the individual defendants, which are barred under Title VII but not under the state or city Human Rights Law, these too must fail under § 296. A claim against an individual employee under § 296(1) requires a showing that the employee "has an ownership interest or any power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others." Even assuming that plaintiff could establish that racial hostility motivated any of the incidents he describes, plaintiff fails to allege that any of the individual employees named as defendants had the direct power to fire him. A claim against an individual employee also is available under § 296(6), which makes it unlawful for "any person" to aid or abet the violation of the statute. While some courts have required a plaintiff to establish employer liability before imposing liability for aiding and abetting against other employees, other courts have permitted recovery against individual defendants under this provision on the lesser showing that the "defendant actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim." Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1317 (holding that plaintiff's allegation that "each of the individual defendants assaulted her and thereby created a hostile environment" is sufficient to satisfy § 296(6)); Steadman v. Sinclair,
Following the Second Circuit's interpretation of § 296(6) in Tomka, it can be assumed that a claim under this provision is available against an individual defendant who engages in discriminatory conduct that produces a hostile work environment. However, the facts of this case do not rise to the level of severity that warranted the court's conclusion in Tomka that plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants should survive. For reasons already discussed, plaintiff has clearly failed to allege racial animus in the incidents involving Candrilli and Cascella and in the policy excluding him from the Forestry Department bathroom. Moreover, while plaintiff arguably may have been justified in perceiving the noose and the advertisement as racially-offensive, the display of these objects does not clearly rise to the level of discrimination. Plaintiff saw the objects on only two occasions (the advertisement once and the noose once) and, as soon as he complained about them, they were immediately removed. As for plaintiff's allegations with respect to Mullusky's derogatory comments, the lack of strong factual support for this comments is evident from the Parks Department's investigation. Three separate witnesses, whose credibility plaintiff has not questioned, did not hear Mullusky say the word "nigger." Even assuming that all three witnesses
III. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Plaintiff has also alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. To establish a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff first must allege a substantive violation of his rights to make contracts under color of state law and, second, that the defendants can be held liable for that violation. See Philippeaux v. North Cent. Bronx Hosp.,
Whether in the context of direct discrimination in the form of a hostile work environment or retaliation, plaintiff must specifically allege that the discrimination charged took place "because of the individual's race" and must support this charge with "more than conclusory allegations." Id. (emphasis added); see also Albert v. Carovano,
Applying these principles to this case, it is apparent that plaintiff has failed to allege the prima facie elements of a § 1981 claim. The second cause of action delineated in the Complaint contains nothing but conclusory allegations that plaintiff has failed to substantiate in either his moving papers — which do not contain even a single reference to § 1981 — or his deposition. Despite plaintiff's failure to address the § 1981 claim in a meaningful manner, the claim can be analyzed in the same manner as his Title VII claim. Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ.,
Even assuming that he did allege a substantive violation of § 1981, plaintiff also must establish that defendants can be held liable for that violation. The Complaint does not distinguish among the various named defendants for purposes of liability under § 1981 and, accordingly, it must be assumed that plaintiff asserts a violation of § 1981 as against each of the individual defendants as well as the municipality and the Parks Department.
As for plaintiff's claims against the City of New York and the Parks Department, plaintiff must prove that these defendants can be liable for the individual acts of their employees. Philippeaux, 871 F.Supp. at 654. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of municipal liability in Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.,
Applying these principles to McCoy's allegations, it is apparent that his allegations fail to satisfy the requirements needed to hold a municipality liable under § 1981. In Philippeaux, 871 F.Supp. at 652-53, the court found that although plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to make out a substantive violation of § 1981, he failed to establish that the actions taken by his supervisors, even if they were discriminatory, were a result of an official policy of the City or its agencies. Plaintiff here not only has failed to allege facts establishing
As for plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants pursuant to § 1981, the Second Circuit has not definitively answered the question of whether § 1981 provides for liability against individual employees. See Hicks v. IBM,
For the foregoing reasons, summary judgement on each of plaintiff's claims is appropriate and is hereby granted.
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